Snippet from ruling ...
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“The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners do not dispute that the City was faced with aprima facie case of disparate-impact liability.
On the captain exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 64percent but was 37.5 percent for both black and Hispanic candidates.
On the lieutenant exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 58.1 percent; for black candidates, 31.6 percent; and for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent.
The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.
See 29 CFR §1607.4(D) (2008) (selection rate that is less than 80 percent “of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact”); Watson, 487 U. S., at 995–996, n. 3 (plurality opinion) (EEOC’s 80-percent standard is “a rule of thumb for the courts”).
Based on how the passing candidates ranked and an application of the “rule of three,” certifying the examinations would have meant that the City could not have considered black candidates for any of the then-vacant lieutenant or captain positions.
Based on the degree of adverse impact reflected in the results, respondents were compelled to take a hard look at the examinations to determine whether certifying the
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RICCI v. DESTEFANO Opinion of the Court
results would have had an impermissible disparate impact.
The problem for respondents is that a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability—essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity, Connecticut
v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 446 (1982), and nothing more — is far from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title VII had it certified the results.
That is because the City could be liable for disparate-impact discrimination only if the examinations were not job related and consistent with business necessity, or if there existed an equally valid, less-discriminatory alternative that served the City’s needs but that the City refused to adopt. §2000e–2(k)(1)(A), (C).
We conclude there is no strong basis in evidence to establish that the test was deficient in either of these respects. We address each of the two points in turn, based on the record developed by the parties through discovery— a record that concentrates in substantial part on the statements various witnesses made to the CSB.”