Global Opposition Movement Challenges JSF

The first major military aircraft project of the Internet-era, the Joint Strike Fighter, faces a new opposition: a global, networked movement comprising independent and think-tank analysts, retired air force leaders and industry professionals and politicians concerned with the JSF’s financial and operational risks. All of them have immediate access to worldwide news, official reports and program briefings to an extent that was inconceivable when the F-22 was at the same stage of development a decade ago.

There are a few main themes that run through many JSF critiques—some of which are complicated by classified information—but the F-35 Joint Program Office and Lockheed Martin have responded to many of them.

•Risk: Critics assert that the JSF program represents a huge gamble. Alternative fighters—such as the F-22 and F/A-18—are due to go out of production soon. The JSF has yet to fly 100 sorties out of a 5,000-mission flight-test program. It is 30 months late, over budget and (depending on variant) 2,300-4,800 lb. above the empty weight goals set in 2002.

Response: JSF leaders say the problems are behind them and the program has stayed largely on track since the redesign of 2004-05. Modeling, simulation and ground tests reduce the uncertainties of flight-testing, and the flight-test program has the resources—including more than 30 dedicated aircraft—to complete the program by mid-2014.

•Cost: Independent analysts note that the real acquisition costs of JSF—a key factor in averting an F-22-like “death spiral” of declining numbers and increasing unit costs—are much higher than the less than $60 million quoted in many briefings (and by the Norwegian and Dutch governments). U.S. government numbers point to unit procurement costs in the $100-million range for the F-35A, in early years of high-rate production.

Response: Program officials say the cost will remain stable, relative to the figures reported to customers, as long as decision-makers continue to support the program as planned and do not cut back on production. What seem to be unrealistically low numbers are legitimate “flyaway” costs, rather than full acquisition costs, and most real increases over the original cost goals are the result of historic factors. There are ongoing efforts to put together a fixed-price, multiyear, multinational binding contract for non-U.S. customers.

•Capability: The “fifth-generation” tag applied to the JSF, critics and competitors assert, does not mean total superiority. The JSF cannot carry as many air-to-air missiles as a Eurofighter Typhoon or Sukhoi Su-35 and does not match their speed and agility. The weapons load is restricted in size and diversity unless the aircraft operates in non-stealth mode—in which case it lacks now-standard defenses, such as a towed decoy.

Response: The JSF will operate in “stealth mode” in high-risk situations, giving it an advantage in air combat. The JSF pilot, with unique situational awareness, will have the option of declining close-quarters maneuvering combat while tracking and engaging adversaries from any direction. In surface-attack missions, accurate and lethal weapons and the JSF’s all-weather precision targeting system mean that fewer large munitions are needed.

•Stealth: While the JSF’s radar cross-section characteristics are fixed by shape and construction, radar processing and networking are advancing according to Moore’s law, and new systems (like VHF radars) designed to detect stealth targets are under development. They may be even more effective against export-standard JSFs if those aircraft do not have the same stealth technology as U.S.-operated aircraft.

Response: The JSF program declines to confirm or deny the existence of an “export stealth” configuration. “Anti-stealth” radars are unproven beyond the laboratory and test stage, and program officials are confident the JSF’s stealth technology will be good enough to “break the kill chain”—that is, prevent the defenses from consistently detecting, tracking and engaging the aircraft—for the life of the system.

•Sovereignty: A combination of security (protecting stealth-related materials and the radar cross-section characteristics of the aircraft, embedded in the mission planning system) and a tightly controlled, automated logistics system will render overseas operators dependent on the U.S. Because the only stealth-compatible data link on the aircraft is the Harris Multifunction Advanced Data Link, too, the aircraft won’t be able to talk to export customers’ other systems while in emission-controlled mode.

Response: Partners are happy enough with the level of sovereignty and national control provided, and the complex issue of connectivity with non-stealth assets is starting to be addressed.

•Future airpower challenges: Supporters of the F-22, the Next Generation Bomber, the U.S. Navy Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle and other platforms worry that the size of the JSF program will crowd out other projects that may be critically needed in future conflicts. Many defense analysts envisage a future of Afghanistan-type counterinsurgency missions, deterrence against China, or both—but a stealthy, 600-mi.-range fighter is not central for either.

Response: Affordable and stealthy, the JSF will still be a mainstay of future air forces and help promote coalitions. Funding of other programs is a budgetary issue for each customer.

•Stovl: The value of the short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing F-35B, which will cost much more to buy and support than the F-35A but has inferior payload and range, is questionable. Stovl, as pioneered by the Harrier, made it possible to fly from short, unimproved air strips and small and multipurpose ships, but the much bigger JSF, with a hotter exhaust, will not be well-suited to those environments.

Response: USMC Commandant Gen. James Conway asserts that the F-35B will be able to operate from unimproved, hot-and-high airfields unsuited for conventional aircraft. The U.K., however, has deliberately maintained the option to switch to the F-35C in the design of its new carriers.

I don’t own much knowledge about these, so my opinion means squat, but it seems to me that their “value proposition” is sadly lacking.

As well, I’m not sold on the “less is more” theory they seem to be operating on with regards to fuel, munitions, range, etc.

I think our money would be better spent on more of what we know works at a world class beating level, more unmanned air operatives, and less 100 million dollar gambles.

I’m also not fond of the “international-ness” they are embracing.

sukhoi-30mki: I’m always fascinated by your postings, thanks for soing so.

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