Russia’s Illusory Allies

russiaprofile.org ^ | February 11, 2009 | Sergei Balashov

[Tailgunner Joe]

Last December Belarus approached Russia with a request for a loan aimed at facilitating the switch to the Russian ruble as the main currency for bilateral trade. The global financial crisis depleted the country’s international reserves and put the economy in a rather dire condition, creating a desperate need for more funding, even after the country secured a $2 billion loan earlier in the year. But the Russians made it clear that they were not interested in giving out more money.

However, after last week’s meeting of the Higher State Council of the Union of Russia and Belarus, the Assistant to the Russian President Sergei Prikhodko indicated that Russia would review the request, and is most likely to make a positive decision. According to Reuters, the loan could reach as much as $3 billion, while Russia also agreed to contribute up to $7 billion to a $10 billion regional emergency fund. This coincided with the agreement to deepen military cooperation between the two countries, as Russia and Belarus agreed to set up a joint force comprised of air force squadrons, missiles and radars.

This falls in line with the recent agreements made with Kyrgyzstan, which agreed to oust the American military base in Manas. Around the same time, Russia granted a $2 billion loan and an additional $150 million in financial aid to Kyrgyzstan. Both sides insisted that this was a pure coincidence, and the hefty loans have nothing to do with Russia’s successful attempt to get rid of another U.S. base in the CIS.

Both Belarus and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian-dominated security organization comprised of seven ex-Soviet republics, including Uzbekistan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Russia has intensified its efforts to enhance military cooperation within the CSTO by applying its leverage in Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and most recently Armenia, which also got a $500 million loan from Russia, meant to combat the global financial crisis.

Russia has had its own share of problems, seeing its currency devalued by almost a third, and about $1 trillion worth of capital gone since the crisis arrived last summer. This, however, does not seem to discourage the country from handing out large sums to its allies, in hopes of strengthening the CSTO, a supposed counterweight to NATO. However, apart from the logo, which bears a striking resemblance to that of NATO, the two organizations have little in common. Russia’s defense systems and its military are far superior to those of its CSTO allies, meaning that merging forces with Belarus would hardly produce a considerable cumulative effect. More so, even the Russians admitted that the agreement was simply formalizing what had already been in place.

Despite the dismissal of any such suggestions by Belarusian and Russian officials, the recent agreement is widely regarded as a publicity stunt, intended as a response to the United States’ reluctance to abandon the plans to install an anti-missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. “Not a single new missile will be added, so nothing will really change. This is aimed at setting up joint command, which will supposedly increase the efficiency of the system that is already in place, and it is evidently a political move. Russia is trying to make it look like it has allies, and Belarus along with others wants to get economic benefits,” said Alexander Khramchikhin, the head of the analytical department at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis.

This mirrors Russia’s attempts to combat the sharply falling commodity prices last year, when it held a summit featuring itself, Iran and Qatar, the world’s three largest gas exporters. Deals were struck to give the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, which had existed since 2001, an official charter and a fixed membership structure. That, however, failed to garner any palpable results and did little to loosen up the gas market to create room for more volatility in prices.

The strategy chosen for waging battles against the imminent decline of gas prices are echoed in Russia’s current efforts to counter the anti-missile defense, which had caused much controversy and tensions in its relations with NATO. Yet, the only problem NATO seems to have with what Russia sees as the expansion of its influence in the region comes from a source other than fears of its growing military potential. “When we start bolstering our security; when we start strengthening the CSTO, we are told that it’s an expression of Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions, that we are trying to force our will upon our neighbors,” said the Russian Envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin during a live press conference from Brussels.

The first part of this statement appears to be true. With regard to pursuing Russia’s security interests at the expense of its neighbors, other CSTO countries actually seem to willingly embrace Moscow’s help and eagerly accept cooperation proposals. This happens for a reason, since creating an illusion that the region is rapidly turning into Russia’s strategic stronghold comes with a big price tag, which is not limited to economic aid.

Back in late 2007, Russia agreed to sell arms to CSTO countries for domestic prices. The latter will get the right not only to use these to equip their armies, but also their special forces. “The CSTO is a reflection of Russia’s psychological complexes. We’re trying to pretend that the Soviet Union still exists, and that we’re still in charge. We get symbolic gestures, but in return we have to defend everybody, sell arms at a fraction of their real price, and support these states financially,” said Khramchikhin.

At the same time, Russia has been gradually stepping up cooperation with NATO with an agreement to transport non-military supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan through its territory, and talks about providing routes for weaponry. This is easily explained not only by Moscow’s efforts to improve relations with the West, particularly with the United States, but also by the very pragmatic need to fight off multiple threats it might face from the Taliban should they once again take charge.

In its turn, the CSTO has yet to turn into a functioning collective security organization. Back in 2008, Russia had to fight the war in South Ossetia on its own, without much support from its allies. And it’s not likely that Russia is going to get such support anytime soon. On Tuesday, Russia and Belarus got into a row over the latter’s objection to sending soldiers to partake in joint security operations. “I want to emphasize with all certainty that our boys have not and will not fight in conflict zones,” the Belarusian Foreign Minister Sergei Martynov said in an interview to Belarusian television.