Deciding whether ‘ID is science’ was central to the case rather than entirely irrelevant as you claim. If ID could demonstrate that it was legitimate science, then it could reasonably ask that it be included in the science curriculum at Dover. The painful part for ID’er (amongst many) was when it was shown concusively that ‘Pandas’ was a rehash of previous creationist texts.
As to the stuff about Minnich, most of those ‘7 or 10’ (knock yourself out guys!) articles in peer reviewed publications are review articles and contain little or no orignal science. Let’s hear from Behe on this matter, who testified on the stand at Dover that “there are no peer reviewed articles by anyone advocating for intelligent design supported by pertinent experiments or calculations which provide detailed rigorous accounts of how intelligent design of any biological system occurred.” I think we can safely say that the criticism of Jones’ findings is nitpicking, at best.
I don’t believe that we should uncritcially accept the pronouncements of judges. For that reason, I’ve read the transcripts of the trial. It’s obvious that Jones got the constitiutional aspect absolutely correct. The evidence that ID is not science and has a theological underpinning was also compelling and well within the scope of his findings.
Cheers.
It was not legally or Constitutionally necessary under Lemon and the Ambler Realty principle once the judge determined that the school board had religious motives. But what do such limitations matter to a liberal judge who conflates the motives of a local school board with an entire scientific movement so that he can dictate a broad array of public policy issues? Even an ID critic such as Jay Wexler recognize the over broad scope of the decision:
The important issue for evaluating the decision is not whether ID actually is sciencea question that sounds in philosophy of sciencebut rather whether judges should be deciding in their written opinions that ID is or is not science as a matter of law. On this question, I think the answer is no, particularly when the overall question posed to a court is whether teaching ID endorses religion , not whether ID is or is not science. The part of Kitzmiller that finds ID not to be science is unnecessary, unconvincing, not particularly suited to the judicial role, and even perhaps dangerous both to science and to freedom of religion.
Jay D. Wexler, Kitzmiller and the Is It Science? Question, 5 First Amend. L. Review. 90, 93 (2006)
The evidence that ID is not science and has a theological underpinning was also compelling and well within the scope of his findings.
And is it also within the scope of his employment to dictate from the federal bench the heresy of certain religious assumptions; namely, that to see conflict between religion and evolution is "utterly false"?
Cordially,