The 'Cases of Rebellion or Invasion' are also covered in Article 4, Section 4:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive means the Legislature and Governor of a State, not the federal government.
Unless a State requests the assistance of the federal government, the federal government has no business within a State even if there is rebellion or domestic violence.
At the same time it is properly provided, in order that such interference may not wantonly or arbitrarily take place; that it shall only be on the request of the state authorities: otherwise the self-government of the state might be encroached upon at the pleasure of the Union, and a small state might fear or feel the effects of a combination of larger states against it under colour of constitutional authority;
William Rawle
I believe you are in error here. I'll research it and get back to you.
Look a bit higher, Article I, Section 8, Clause 15: Congress shall have the power "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions".
Suppress rebellion is a federal responsibility, not dependent on any state or local government.
I believe they meant the federal government all along. How could the Feds guarantee an action by a State?
When I read of this in my "Heritage Guide to the Constitution" it hardly covered this....just a couple of lines. But then I found this:
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 AS REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON
Tuesday, May 29, 1787
Mr. RANDOLPH then opened the main business. [Here insert his speech [26] including his resolutions.] [27]
(Mr. R. Speech A. to be inserted Tuesday May 29) [27]
He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather than those, who were of longer standing in life and political experience, to open the great subject of their mission. But, as the convention had originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed that some proposition was expected from them, they had imposed this task on him.
He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the necessity of preventing the fulfillment of the prophecies of the American downfal.
He observed that in revising the fœderal system we ought to inquire 1.[28] into the properties, which such a government ought to possess, 2.[28] the defects of the confederation, 3.[28] the danger of our situation & 4.[28] the remedy.
1. The Character of such a government ought to secure 1.[28] against foreign invasion: 2.[28] against dissentions between members of the Union, or seditions in particular states: 3.[28] to procure to the several States, various blessings, of which an isolated situation was incapable: 4.[28] [29] to be able to defend itself against incroachment: & 5.[28] to be paramount to the state constitutions.
2. In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed a high respect for its authors, and considered them, as having done all that patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science, of constitutions, & of confederacies, — when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown — no commercial discord had arisen among any states — no rebellion had appeared as in Massts — foreign debts had not become urgent — the havoc of paper money had not been foreseen — treaties had not been violated — and perhaps nothing better could be obtained from the jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty.
He then proceeded to enumerate the defects: 1.[30] that the confederation produced no security against foreign invasion; congress not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by their own authority — Of this he cited many examples; most of which tended to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished: that particular states might by their conduct provoke war without controul; and that neither militia nor draughts being fit for defence on such occasions, inlistments only could be successful, and these could not be executed without money.
2.[30] that the fœderal government could not check the quarrels between states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power nor means to interpose according to the exigency: 3.[30] that there were many advantages, which the U. S. might acquire, which were not attainable under the confederation — such as a productive impost — counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations — pushing of commerce ad libitum — &c &c.
4.[30] that the fœderal government could not defend itself against the [31] incroachments from the states. 5.[30] that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions, ratified, as it was in may of the states. 3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation,[32] appealed to the sense of the best friends of the U. S. — the prospect of anarchy from the laxity of government every where; and to other considerations.
4. He then proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which he said must be the republican principle He proposed as conformable to his ideas the following resolutions, which he explained one by one [Here insert ye Resolutions annexed.] [33]
The guarantee was federal and made to the States.
In the Constitution we find further evidence of designed federal power, as it gives Congress the power to have a navy and an Army (for two years) to deal with invasion or the threat thereof.
OK, I'm going to enjoy the rest of my Saturday! I'll check back tomorrow.