He war only partly right by dumb luck.
The surge called for an additional 30,000 troops for a total of about 140,000 ....
Gen Shineski claimed we would need 300,000 troops or more ...
It was intelligence that enabled us to eventually win, not strength in numbers.
Tribal leaders at first were more scared of the crazy jihadists than US troops.
Once we turned the tribal leaders, and it took several years (which is where Rummy was wrong).. we essentially won the war fairly quickly.
GEN. SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point -- something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground-force presence.
If you add up all the coalition troops, Iraqi MOD troops, and Iraqi policemen (who's jobs would have been done immediately following the invasion by coalition MP's or other soldiers) available at the height of the surge, you're in the several hundred thousand range. Granted, the indigenous forces aren't as effective as our soldiers, but when they're providing law and order through their presence, rather than having to overcome heavily armed resistance, they don't have to be.
I find it simpy amazing that people are still debating this - read the end of David Gregory's interview with Sec. Rumsfeld & Gen Pace from 5 Nov 07:
DAVID GREGORY: Hey, also your favorite subject: looking back. What's become conventional wisdom,simply Shinseki was right? If we simply had 400,000 troops or 200 and 300? What's your thought as you looked at it?
GEN. PACE: I'm sorry, sir. I didn't take the (unintelligible). I apologize.
SEC. RUMSFELD: First of all, I don't think Shinseki ever said that. I think he was pressed in a congressional hearing hard and hard and hard and over again, well, how many? And his answer was roughly the same as it would take to do the job - to defeat the regime. It wouldbe about the right amount for post-major combat operation stabilization. And they said, "Well,how much is that?" And I think he may have said then, "Well, maybe 200,000 or 300,000."
GEN. PACE: I think he said several.
DAVID GREGORY: Several, yes, several hundred thousand. (Cross talk.)
SEC RUMSFELD: Now, it turned out he was right. The commanders - you guys ended up wanting roughly the same as you had for the major combat operation, and that's what we've have. There is no damned guidebook that says what the number ought to be. We were queued up to go up to what, 400-plus thousand.
GEN. PACE: Yes, they were already in queue.
SEC. RUMSFELD: They were in the queue. We would have gone right on if they'd wanted them, but they didn't, so life goes on.
In short, not even Rumsfeld thinks Rumsfeld was right anymore - he's just looking for someone else to blame for being wrong.