Nationalismin Iran was multifacetous. The Shah himself made a quite interesting and I think apt distinction between his 'positive Nationalism' and Mossadeq's 'negative Nationalism'.
Mossadeq: His past reveals a lot about him. He was as the Shah described it a 'negative Nationalist', meaning that his vision for Iran was entirely based on xenophobia and regressive thinking. In 1924 when Reza Khan, the father of the last Shah, tried to abolish the Qajar monarchy, in favor of a secular presidential Republic, it was (oh irony!) MP Mossadeq and the Ayatollah Mudarris who rejected abolishing the corrupt Qajar monarchy! The Mullahs agitated that a Republic would be the end of Islam. Trying to avoid a civil war in the country he painfully united, Reza Khan, instead of changing the system, let himself be made King (Shah) by the Parliament in 1925.
Instead of venerating Mossadeq for trying to make Iran a frail republic in 1953, he should be condemned for preventing a modernist republic in 1924! Throughout Reza Shah's 16 year reign, which saw the rapid modernization and secularization of Iran, Mossadeq (who for a time was governor of the province Fars) was resisting any efforts to modernize, industrialize and westernize Iran. Thus he was imprisoned, and (oh irony!) pardoned after Crownprince Mohammed Reza pleaded to his father for the frail and sickly Mossadeq.
After the war Nationalisation of the Oil Industry, which was monopolized by the British AIOC, was an issue supported by almost every Iranian. The Shah and the USA, far from being on the British side also supported getting rid of British domination.
When Mossadeq became legally PM under the Shah's constitutional reign in 1951, his Oil Nationalisation efforts were supported by the USA and numerous factions of Iran's political landscape, including various Nationalists (positive and negative) the clergy under Ayatollah Kashani and also the Communists. And here laid the danger. Things turned ugly first after Mossadeq began to abuse his power as PM. He sought dictatorial powers including being Commander in Chief! While getting rid of British rule over the Oil was supported by Iranians and also the US, Mossadeq was going too far. His attempt to get rid of the monarchy costed his the support of many Nationalists and the mainstream clergy. The only 'base' he had left were the Tudeh Communists, who already plotted to replace the foolish Mossadeq with a Communist dictatorship after Mossadeq had finished his role as useful tool. The Shah aware of the danger dismissed Mossadeq in favor of General Zahedi, but Mossadeq clinged on the seat and riots errupted. The Shah left for Italy, while Communist mobs were preparing to tear down the monarchy. Here the USA under Eisenhower stepped in brilliantly. The CIA together with the Imperial Iranian Army under Zahedi devised the Coup that would eventually arrest Mossadeq, install Zahedi as PM and bring back the Shah as constitutional head of state. The Army, US supported and with the help of Tehran's populance crushed the communist plots and put an end to Mossadeq delusional plans, that wrecked Iran's economy and increased Soviet influence. Iran had not the means to produce their own oil. Thus Mossadeq was a fool, but certainly consistent with his rejection of technological progress. The Oil question was solved in the best way for Iran and the USA, the losers being Britain and the Soviets. A Consortium dominated by various large and small US oil companies, seconded by BP (the AIOC's follower) and French and Dutch companies produced the Oil with the NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company). Thus the oil was produced more efficiently, Iran enjoyed more revenues/royalties, Iran steadily increased control over it's resources, US companies gained a foothold in Iran, and British influence dwindled in favor of the USA, while keeping the Soviets out. These events were at the same time of the Korea War, the Berlin Blockade, the East German rebellion and shortly before the Hungarian uprising. There can be no doubt that Iran would have become Soviet dominated, even though it may have not been originally intended by Mossadeq.
Perception of the USA: Since 1941 the Shah has sought to replace Britain with the USA in Iran. This was supported widely by the middle and upper class. The USA had a VERY favorable image in Iran, already before WW2, due to their reputation of being a non-colonial, progressive (in the good classical sense) protector of small nations, and the fact that in the 1910's and 1920's American advisors were sanitizing the finances. Except for Communists and radical Nationalists and Islamists, the USA wasn't at all perceived to be on the same page like Britain. After the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in 1941, the USA was THE third power Iran sought to replace British and Soviet influence, which were seen as colonial. In 1942 US military (under Norman Schwarzkopf Sr.!) and political missions came on invitation of Iran and created an ever increasing bridgehead for US cultural and political influence in Iran. The positive perception of the USA reached a new high after the USA sided with Iran in the crisis over the Communist puppet states in N-Iran the Soviets set up in 1945. US supported Iran succesfully reclaimed the territory the Soviets tried to grab in December 1946. After WW2 the USA actively increased their cultural and political clout among Iranians. Educational and military programs had Iranians visit the USA, where they were absorbing American thinking and American culture like sponges. Also after the 1953 coup anti-Western (in the sense of anti-US) sentiment wasn't widespread among Iranians, except for typically leftist segments like many students and workers. Iran for the next (almost) three decades was increasingly and ever widespread americanized in culture and outlook. This can't be described as solely on the part of the Royals. The millions of Iranian middle and upper class people who dressed like Americans, drove American cars, heard American music, viewed American movies etc. must have espoused this Americanism (much to the dislike of Communists and Mullahs).
Now to the role of the Mullah's. They, like the Communists, regained tremendous power after the abdication of Reza Shah in fall 1941. While the Communists were supported by the Soviets, the British occupiers supported the clergy in a effort to balance Communism. This two resurgent forces put into peril the whole two decades of reform and secularization of Reza Shah. Mohammed Reza Shah from 1941-1953 had only limited political power as the constitutional monarch. It wasn't until after the 1953 coup that he became increasingly authoritarian. The mainstream clergy under Ayatollah Kashani was originally pro-Mossadeq but out of fear from Communism switched towards the Shah. Unlike his father, who with iron fist destroyed Islamic influence punch by punch (replacing Sharia with Western laws, replacing Madrassas with modern schools, Dervishes and quacks with Hospitals and Doctors, women and religious minorities were granted rights, the veil was abolished and most importantly Reza Shah replaced Islam with a modernist, secular Nationalism, which specifically oriented itself on pre-islamic Iran and at the same time Western civilization), Mohammed Reza (who wasn't nearly has heavy-handed (which isn't always bad) as his father) had to accomodate the clergy with bribes and granting them a limited role within his system which was dominated formostly by anti-Communism. But nontheless the Shah was increasingly at odds with the clergy, since he oriented Iran more and more culturally on the US/Western model, revered the pre-Islamic Iranian past (he replaced eventually the Islamic calender with a new one starting with the foundation of the Achaemenid Empire). The final push that cost him the mainstream clergy was the Carter policies, which prevented him keeping the clergy at bay with money...
Beside this relation to the mainstream clergy, there was also a radical Islamist problem in Iran. During the 1950's a terrorist Jihadist group the 'Fedayeen Islam' under the terrorist Navab Safavi brutally murdered PM General Razmara, the secular intellectual Kasravi and other leading figures. The Shah finally busted the terrorist group, and Safavi and Co. were tried and executed. During the 1960's Khomeini emerged as the leader of the radical Islamists. The Secret Police SAVAK was combatting them, but the Shah missed several chances to have Khomeini preemptively eliminated until it was too late. Keep in mind that the Revolution in 1978/79 wasn't solely by the Islamists. Orignally the backbone of the Revolution were the Communists and left-liberals who had sway over many students. The Islamists joined in and gained the leading hand. Eventually the inter-Revolutionary struggle was won by the Islamists who eliminated their Communist and liberal buddies. In total the Revolution was supported by a very slim group of Iranians... really broad support for the new Government (which orignally was a secular republican Government) didn't shape up until after 1980, when Saddam Hussein seized the opportunity to invade Iran. Iranians, faced with a foreign Arab invasion rallied around the flag which the Mullahs used to cement their savage rule.
Conclusively the decision of the USA to stop Mossadeq in favor of the Shah was the only strategically rational and morally acceptable decision. I fundamentally diagree with the author of the rather recent book 'All the Shah's men', whose take on the issue, was espoused enthusiastically by Western MSM and liberals... basically blaming the current Islamist problem on the US intervention in Iran 1953. Letting Iran go Communist during the 1950's would have equated a Soviet victory in the Cold War (you know warm water ports and oil...), also IMO the Revolution of 1979 was an avoidable, irrational fit of insanity on part of many Iranians and gross naivite on part of the Carter Administration, which was cunningly exploited by the plain evil Islamofascists. Though the rule of the Shah, who made Iran a one-party state in the late 1970's and the rapid economic development left many people confused and disgruntled, there was no reason to go that far. Carter treated him despicably, viewed the Shah as a pariah and denied the cancer-suffering King treatment in the US. The Shah, after the protests which started already in 1978, was willing to backtrack the authoritarianism. IMO there was a real chance of him reverting to his constitutional role. Keep in mind that he was already ailing and poised to let his wife become interim Empress until the Crownprince would have become new Shah. Iranians who supported the Revolution are ingrate lunatics. Everything positive they had (and still have), everything that set them apart from the backwards Arabic and Afghan neighbours, the fact that Iran had territorial integrity, a bulwark against Communism, international prestige, an impressive military, education, individual social (though little political) rights, cultural freedom, non-oil industry, hygiene and medicine, infrastructure like dams, railways, streets, airports etc. etc. is all solely owed to the two Pahlevi Shahs. Without them they would have ceased to exist as a state, being swallowed by the Soviets and probably continued to live in the Middle Ages. Alone, in silence, when in a dark room, any Iranian who participated in the Revolution (provided he lays off the drugs and isn't already totally corrupted by regime propaganda), when honest, will admit meekly that they were fools for toppling the Shah and following the black turbans. As one Iranian puts it:“For a few moments we all lost our brains“.
(Darn me... again so many words.)
Thanks a lot for that!
I have the impression that regardless of Mussadeq’s characteristics, he got the bulk of the credit for driving the British out of Iran & that seems to me like it counted for a lot with Iranians. The Shah being positioned against him doesn’t sound like it gives off a good impression & enabled the 3ulama2 & the radical nationalists to both put their pressure against the shah rather than alienate them from each other, which is what should have been done.
I’ve been told that the average person didn’t see the real benefits of Iran’s technological developments at the time & felt that all these projects were for the benefit of a handful of corrupt people & foreigners. (For example, the arragements between Parviz Bushehri & Sofrecom & then an American company.) Of course everyone wants western products & material benefits, but that doesn’t mean they want western domination. A lot of Iranians felt that there were way too many Americans in Iran holding posts in these American companies (telecommunications, military, etc) that should have been given to Iranians, & that the whole thing was a rip off designed by the elite.
I don’t think that the Shah had evil intentions, I think that 1) he assumed that the thin crust of Westernized Persians is representative of all of Iran, 2) assumed that raising the standard of living, education, & exposure of middle class Iranians to the West would make them into Westerners themselves. Many of those people actually went groping for the 3ulama2 eventually, & their power in Iran has been vastly underestimated I think. They have always had a big say in the Iranian state, much more so than the 3ulama2 in Iraq, for instance.
It’s true that America was at first well liked not just in Iran, but in the whole middle east because they were not tainted by colonialism. But that quickly changed everywhere & now the only country more hated is Israel.
I think almost all revolutions are brought about by a small margin of dedicated people. It works because they are able to co-opt & combine grievances from various segments of society, which is what I believe the 3ulama2 were most successful at.
Thanks a lot for all your answers & information. I’m trying to learn more about Iran because I really don’t know that much other than a few Persian classes when I was little & conversations with Iranian friends. & most Iranians I know are Muslim supporters of the revolution, so for most of my life I got their opinions & perspectives & not knowing much about Iran myself, I didn’t have any other information to compare it with.