THUMPING THE HIVE: RUSSIAN NEOCORTICAL WARFARE IN CHECHNYA

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA ^ | September 2004 | Capt Scott E. McIntosh, USAF

[JerseyHighlander]

 
NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
 
 
 
THESIS
 
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
THUMPING THE HIVE: RUSSIAN NEOCORTICAL
WARFARE IN CHECHNYA
 
by
 
Scott E. McIntosh
 
September 2004
 
 
 
  Thesis Advisor:                          M. Tsypkin
  Second Reader:                              T. Thomas

 

ABSTRACT
 
  Since the 1994 Chechen war, analysts have written volumes about the evolution
of—and lessons learned from—this ongoing conflict.  Why has success eluded this Cold
War superpower in subduing the small Caucasian republic?  Russia has since hiccupped
back and forth across the spectrum of conflict in the region and the years have provided
much speculation as to why.  For a decade,  researchers have described Chechen terror,
erosion of the Russian military, and the inconsistent resolve of the Russian population to
support the Kremlin’s actions.  These are significant independent variables that might
explain Russian failure in 1994.  However, another less tangible factor—Richard
Szafranski’s paradigm of Neocortical Warfare—may explain Russia’s poor performance
in the initial invasion and the improved performance in 1999.
  To evaluate this concept, the author examines the influences of Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, and battlefield
communications—prime factors in influencing combatants’ perceptions—to gauge these
factors’ effects on the relative Russian performances in the separate invasions.  He then
holds the results up to the Neocortical lens to evaluate whether the concept is pertinent to
the ongoing conflict in Chechnya.
 

[JerseyHighlander]

This is a 100 page summary of every piece of information thrown about FR regarding discussions on Russia for the last decade.

There are many excellent sections here, I'm not sure what to excerpt, some of the most interesting parts are page 558 to 62 regarding the advances in Russian battlefield communications and urban tactics during the second Chechen War invasion of Chechnya's urban centers including Grozny.

C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS , page 51, It would appear that Russian PSYOP in 1999 allocated less effort toward this hardcore indoctrinated Chechen guerrilla; the enemy’s motivation was too strong to unravel via the available means. As depicted in the previous section, however, the Kremlin’s Public Affairs effort had effectively grabbed the Russian citizenry’s support. This left two target audiences for Russian psychological operations—the Russian soldier and the weary Chechen populace. --------- The parallel between Russia's demands for regime change and lip service to Georgia's democracy are obvious. We've all witnessed the propaganda coming out of Russian media networks the last few days. It will continue to ramp up.

[B-Chan]

"The GRU is as good as it gets. They don't miss a trick." — Eric A. Harry, Arc Light