Compare and Contrast Russian Strategy in the First and the Second Chechen wars.

Compare and contrast Russian Strategy in the First and the Second Chechen wars.

Perhaps the greatest challenge Yeltsin had to face after he had been elected president of the Russian Federation in August 1991was to deal with a country that had 89 regions and autonomous republics, often populated by different national minorities oppressed by the Soviet rule, which sought independence. Yeltsin’s famous phrase ‘the republics have to take as much sovereignty as they can,’[1] was perhaps the spunk that local leaders needed. However, in one particular case, this would become catastrophic for the FSU.

The Chechen Republic was one of those regions where the inadequacy of the Soviet System, in addition to a history characterised by animosity and hate towards Russian rule,[2] made people passionately seek their independence. Dudayev’s election in 1991 as president of Chechnya, with Yeltsin’s backing,[3] was the starting point for the bloodiest conflict in recent history.

The causes for war are mainly four; however they will not be examined in detail due to a restricting word limit. The first reason was that if Chechnya would become independent, it was believed that the whole Caucasus would secede from the FSU; the domino effect theory loomed large in the minds of Russian politicians.[4] The second major reason was the preservation of internal security in the FSU, since Chechnya had arguably become a criminal state. Dudayev’s government ‘epitomised what some called a Mafia government.’[5] Yeltsin many times argued that a military operation would ‘have a positive impact on the overall crime situation in the country.’[6]

The other two reasons are obviously important but also are the most complicated. It is argued that Chechnya would have a positive impact on Yeltsin’s political career, a fact that can be epitomized by Lobov’s statement that the president needs ‘a small victorious war, like the USA had in Haiti.’[7] Last but not least, pipeline politics is highlighted as a reason for engagement. As Lieven argues, ‘the presence of Chechnya across the existing pipeline route from Baku to the Black Sea has obviously been an impediment to Russian hopes...’[8]

Initially, Russian policy regarding Chechnya was characterised by attempts to undermine Dudayev. This would be achieved by supporting hostile elements in the republic, and by promoting a policy of sanctions. However, both were ill managed. Firstly, the policy of supporting the opposition without becoming overtly involved in covert operations, intensified with the Provisional council establishing itself as the major opponent of Dudayev on August 1994.

Immediately Russia supported this group, and as Lieven argues, ‘a consensus was reached…not to intervene directly but to give technical, financial and military support to the Provisional council.’[9]Yeltsin’s idea was to support the opposition in order to topple Dudayev but also to establish a friendly government in Chechnya. Foreign elements like Khasbulatov who at that time was Yeltsin’s major political threat, had to be stopped from taking power.[10]

Secondly, the embargo policy that Russia followed was a failure. As Siren notes, ‘the embargo had by 1993 severely curtailed public services in Chechnya, it did not stop the oil or arms trade in the republic.’[11] Therefore, Russian policy alienated the population, creating a dire welfare situation inside the republic thus, becoming a tool for Dudayev’s propaganda, while at the same time permitted establishment of illegal links between Chechens and Russian officials.[12] Therefore, corruption made impossible the embargo implementation, alienated Chechen people, and permitted Dudayev and his gang to stay in power.

This policy of undermining Dudayev from a distance did not last long. The nail in the coffin for Kremlin was the disastrous operation in November 1994. By speeding up Russian strategy to pre-empt a foreign element to take power, Moscow revealed its engagement thus undermining its strategy. Lieven notes, that ‘if [this strategy] had been conducted slowly enough in order to build up the opposition it might have worked.’[13] Arrest of Russian conscripts and Dudayev’s statement that if Russia would not acknowledge its engagement the Chechens would execute them was the worst case scenario.

Starting negotiations with Chechnya for releasing Russian troops implied on one hand, the admittance of Russian engagement and, on the other, that this might mean Chechnya’s recognition as an independent republic. Both issues were out of the question for Yeltsin. Furthermore, if he did not do something then this might have a political cost.[14] On 29^th November 1994, the Russian Security Council met in order to endorse decision for invasion, the next day ‘Yeltsin took the decision for war….’[15]

However, now that the country was going to war, Yeltsin’s government seemed to commit more mistakes. Firstly, it is argued that the propaganda against Chechnya and the reasons that used by officials in order to explain Russian intervention were completely discarded by Russian people. As Simunovic argues, ‘Russians failed to see that Russian survival was at stake, Chechens were not going to march to Moscow…’[16] additionally, Russian propaganda backfired.[17] Secondly, during the war Yeltsin and other officials exemplified Russian political inconsistency. Lieven, notes that, ‘for the first eighteenth months of the war, Yeltsin did not visit the troops in Chechnya.’[18] Also, during the Budennovsk raid in 1995, Chernomyrdin tried to negotiate with the Chechens while Yeltsin condemned negotiations.[19] Perhaps the only period when Yeltsin showed a positive attitude for resolving the conflict was before the elections in 1996, when he made comments about peace. After the victorious result, he reneged his promises.[20]

The second major element of Russian strategy regarding Chechnya was the military engagement, which proved disastrous. The initial plan was to create three military groups (North- East- West) for invading Grozny. The second phase would be the invasion that would start on 11 December and would end three days later with the capture of Grozny. Once inside the city, the Russian army would have moved swiftly neutralising Chechen resistance by using artillery, armour and infantry. As Seely notes, ‘Russian forces would seize the presidential palace, government buildings, railway station and other strategic sites. The speed of attack would leave Dudayev surrounded and defenceless…’[21] The last phase was the normalisation of the situation and thus, the turning over to MVD and FSK troops. However, literally nothing went right for the Russians.

Firstly, the Russian columns reached Grozny in two weeks instead of three days,[22] and secondly when they entered Grozny they were slaughtered. For example as Van Dyke notes, ‘the 131^st brigade was badly shot up. Out of the 26 tanks in the brigade, 20 were destroyed, as well as 102 out of 120 BMP’s.’[23] Russian armour could not function properly in the closed streets of Grozny, there was no infantry protection, and instructions were not issued.[24] Thus, Chechens isolated armoured columns, and from elevated positions opened fire with RPG’s. As Frolov notes, ‘within 20 minutes…I saw three tanks and two BMP’s destroyed, I am convinced that this happened to other places.’[25]

Despite the general pitfall of the Russian military, and the heavy casualties sustained both in terms of personnel and equipment, the Russians remodelled their tactics. Higher quality troops were sent (Marines), progress inside the city was organised slowly in order to secure every building, and reliance on armour replaced by heavily armed infantry groups. Finally, artillery was extensively used in order to neutralise Chechen resistance.[26] Grozny was taken on January 19^th 1995.

Regardless of the bloody success, control on the whole republic was never established. On one hand, Chechens tried to re-create Grozny elsewhere by luring Russian armour inside towns and villages.[27] Russians answered by shelling these places, in a tactic which as General Shurkov notes, ‘is like using cannon to kill sparrows.’[28] On the other hand, Russians never actually established proper control in towns and villages despite the use of “Sword and Samovar” tactics: terrorise, bribe or even persuade Chechens into pacification.[29]

The result was that the Chechens were free to move anywhere, and the Russians relied more on mass artillery and air strikes that flattened a large part of the urban scenery in the republic; of course collateral damage was not taken into consideration by the Russians. The military operation in Chechnya was quickly transformed, from a lightning combined arms operation, into a protracted conflict which gradually transformed into guerrilla warfare. The Russians tried to counter Chechen mobility with heavy artillery barrages and air strikes. Limiting Russian casualties by increasing collateral damage was the Russian solution to the problem.

The military strategy in Chechnya revealed the exact state of the Russian armed forces. Lack of training, no unity of command, low morale, problematic logistics, problematic equipment, lack of discipline, and shortage of men were the most major issues that downgraded military performance[30] in a kind of warfare that by its nature is the most demanding for even highly trained armies.[31] By 1996, with Yeltsin having won the elections and with Chechen resistance continuing, the war finally came to an end only to be restarted in 1999. The only real success the Russians enjoyed in the first war was to kill Dudayev in an air strike.[32]

With the Khasavyurt peace accords signed in 1996, Russian policy of undermining Chechnya continued. This had to do not only with the nature of the accords which left many issues unanswered[33] but also because Russia clearly used economic matters as a policy of ‘Carrot and stick.’ [34] In 1999 Russia once again invaded Chechnya, but this time some things had changed.

It is widely argued that the invasion of Dagestan in August 1999 by Chechen hardliners,[35] and the bloody bombing attacks in Moscow shortly afterwards made war possible. Although these incidents are very dubious regarding their timing and their strategic importance,[36] they are important since they reversed public opinion in Russia, a fact that president Putin used to his advantage. Thus the three pillars of Putin’s policy in relation to Chechnya were a) to gain public support, b) to seek international legitimacy and c) to discredit and isolate Chechen politicians.

Firstly, the bombing and the invasion of Dagestan provoked a widespread and uncritical support for war; it is not exaggeration to assume that ‘they had the same effect that 9/11 had for the USA.’[37] In addition to the NATO attack in Kosovo and the effect it had on Russian motives,[38] the Kremlin proceeded in a very successful campaign for gaining public support. As Service argues, ‘Russian TV carried reports on every outrage elsewhere in the FSU…and the blame was put on the peoples of the Caucasus.’[39] Additionally, Putin placed Chechnya in quarantine, and the media now were supportive. For example as Pain notes, ‘aircraft are not bombing and artillery is not firing on towns…they are “working on towns”.[40] Furthermore, in December 1999 a Russian information centre established that it would filter any information regarding the war and that would also disseminate information from the foreign press.[41]

Putin’s second pillar was to link the war with the struggle against international terrorism. Right from the start the operation labelled anti-terrorist, while many analysts stressed that Russia once again was in the position to resort to war in order to safeguard the world from Jihad.[42] Also, Putin pressed for an international crusade either by sending a memo to the UN Security Council making explicit linkage between Chechnya and Al-Qaeda, [43] or by emphasizing continually Islamic links. His purpose was twofold. Firstly, to stop western criticism for the Russian conduct and the massive violation of human rights,[44] and secondly to gain the support of the USA, which seems to have been achieved since in 2003, the US state department’s list of terrorist organizations included 3 Chechen groups.[45] Clearly Putin gave his policy a more international aspect in order to convince everyone that, he fought terrorists and not Chechens.[46]

Last but not least, Putin strongly, identified himself with his policies. As Service notes, ‘Putin said unequivocally that the military campaign would be carried out through to a victorious end.’[47] Also, Putin was not interested in finding a political solution, in spite of the existence of opportunities that would enable him to do so. As Evangelista notes, ‘Putin issued Maskhadov an ultimatum, [although]…in retrospect it would have been more sensible to try and work with him rather than threaten him.’[48] Therefore, it seems that Moscow did not care about the power struggle between the moderates (Maskhadov) and the hardliners (Basayev and Khattab),[49] and choose not to alienate the later by establishing contacts with the former. Thus, Putin, perhaps strengthened by public opinion and Russian racist motives[50] against Chechnya, decided to conduct war rather than diplomacy.

The military strategy in Chechnya was in a large part changed, and many scholars argue that the military had learned its lessons. Firstly, Russians as already stressed won the media war, thus minimising public reaction for casualties, unlike the first war. Secondly, an indirect approach was used in direct comparison with the ill-managed attack in 1994. As Kipp points, ‘Russian commanders sought to inflict serious damage upon the enemy with indirect fire [in order] to reduce the risks of close combat and Russian casualties.’[51] Also, the Russian command used small teams for urban reconnaissance,[52] while even Chechen elements sympathetic to Russia provided information.[53]

Tactically, the creation of a decentralized fire control that allowed proper initiative for artillery, the use of better communications, the use of fuel-air explosives and also better training were evident trends in the performance of the military in Chechnya.[54] Strategically, the operation differed from the chaotic 1994 operation. There was improvement in logistics, mobilization and especially command and control.[55] As a result, Grozny was taken in March 2000, and in the spring of 2001 the FSB took over control for pacification of the republic.[56]

However, problems still remain, transcending from the first war, and obscuring the conduct of the military. Corruption is still a major problem. As Orr points, deployment of the 138^th MR brigade halted since it was discovered that soldiers …sold the explosive from their tanks armour.’[57] Morale is still very low, and manning the army is a thorn in the side of Russian command. Orr reveals that, ‘over a hundred ships and sub-units of the Baltic fleet had to be combed to raise a composite battalion of naval infantry.’[58] Lastly, reliance on heavy artillery barrage and air strikes continued, but the difference from 1994 is that now Russians completely flattened what was still left of Grozny, without any thought of minimising collateral damage.[59]

Thus, in terms of the Russian military strategy there is continuity in discarding civilian lives to save Russian troops, thus safeguarding political cost. Tactics have changed; Russians this time used reconnaissance, decentralised their artillery, relied less on armour and more on sheer firepower in order to deal with Chechen tactics. A conventional victory was achieved this time much more easily and brutally. However, this made the Chechens resort to much bolder guerrilla tactics in order to make the Russians realise that a victory in Chechnya is not yet achieved. Chechen attacks at the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow in October 2002, and in the Tushino rock concert in July 2003 are hard evidence.

In the political realm there is a mixed record also for the Russian conduct of the war in Chechnya. The information war was won much more easily by Putin, who used specific events in order to reverse public opinion, thus, presenting Chechnya as a direct threat for Russia; in direct comparison Yeltsin struggled to gain popular support since he could not convince the Russians about the need for intervening militarily.[60]

Also, Putin as already stressed identified himself with the war in Chechnya. Putin flew to Chechnya in order to reprimand the generals for the conduct of war,[61] while Yeltsin failed to even make a TV address about the war in the first two weeks of the invasion.[62] As Service points, ‘[Putin] identified vigorously with his policy…in 1994 Yeltsin had given the impression that he had nothing to do with the invasion…’[63]

Additionally, Putin managed to persuade Russians about the need to conduct a military intervention once again, that the criminal character justified an intervention, and, last but not least, pursued a much more international policy by linking international terrorism with the war. As Kipp argues, ‘Putin has made clear the paramount importance of a Russian presence for stability.’[64]In direct contrast, Yeltsin tried to avoid any blame for the campaign at one point, he was indifferent or he could not win public and political support, and the reasons he used to justify intervention discarded domestically and internationally.

However, similarities also exist. Both (Yeltsin & Putin) used the same excuse for intervention, despite Putin expressing this much more eloquently. Putin stressed in the beginning (August 1999) that the Russian goal was to repel Chechen aggression, while on January 2000 announced that the goal was the preservation of territorial integrity of the Russia. The Russian public has not noticed this substitution in the goals.[65]

Additionally, in both cases Duma support was not received. In Yeltsin’s case, the whole operation was decided after a Security Council meeting, while in Putin’s case the Duma’s approval again not deemed necessary. Despite a change in faces, some things never stop, Presidential power in Russia is more important than ratification from an elected parliament, especially in cases of war. Last but not least, in both cases the Russian people have been told lies; by Yeltsin when he promised peace in order to win elections, and by Putin when he pointed that ‘our boys would not be sent off to fight, without their voluntary agreement.’[66] The reality was different since many conscripts were forced to sign.[67]

In conclusion, the first war revealed the inability of the Russian political elite which centred on Yeltsin engaged in a destructive strategy to overthrow Dudayev. Sadly this policy backfired and war broke out. The Russian military record was even worse; no coordination, and human sacrifice in an operation that did not involve any great cause for the already decaying Russian army. In direct comparison, the situation in the military improved in the second war. As Thomas, lucidly reveals, ‘If Russians received an “F” for their assault or a “C” for their capture of Grozny in 1995, they would receive a “B” for their performance during the January 2000 battle.’[68] However, problems still remain in the once dominant institution of the USSR.

Regarding the political strategy, an improvement was also clear. Putin won the information war, campaigned for international support, and identified himself with the war. However, like his predecessor, he permitted to solve the problem militarily rather than diplomatically, thus bringing back Soviet memories (Hungary 1956-Czechoslovakia 1968).

Sadly, Chechnya seems to be evolving into a Gordian knot. This situation reveals a lot about the state of Russian politics in general since in a pure democracy the military solution should be the last resort when all other ways fail; evidently in both wars this was not the case. Some things changed while others perpetuated revealing classic Russian politics. As Brzezinski argues, the most obnoxious aspect of Russian policy towards Chechnya is its highly Soviet style…’[69]

[1] Grammatikov, (1998), p. 112

[2] Dunlop, (1998), Chapter 1 and 2.

[3] Lieven, (1999), p. 60

[4] Siren, (1998), p. 98

[5] Gall and De Waal, (1997) p. 108

[6] Siren, (1998), p. 100

[7] Lieven, (1998) p. 87

[8] Ibid, p. 85

[9] Ibid, p. 89

[10] Ibid, p. 91

[11] Siren, (1998), p. 95

[12]Seely, (2001), p. 199

[13] Lieven, (1998) p. 91

[14] Siren, (1998), pp. 109-110

[15] Evangelista, (2002), p. 32

[16] Simunovic, (1998), p. 68

[17] Ibid, p. 71

[18] Lieven, (1999), p. 103

[19] Evangelista, (2002), p. 40

[20] Ibid, p. 43

[21] Seely, (2001), p. 241

[22] Ibid, pp. 226-227

[23] Van Dyke, (1996), p. 701

[24] Raevsky, (1995), p. 684

[25] Seely, (2001), p. 245

[26] Raevsky, (1995), pp. 685-686

[27] Thomas, (1999), p. 91

[28] Lieven, (1999), p. 115

[29] Ibid, p. 129

[30] Van Dyke (1996), pp. 698-699

[31] See: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/mout.htm.

[32] Lieven, (1999), p. 140

[33] Cornell, (2001), p. 241

[34] Ibid, p. 243

[35] Evangelista, (2002), pp. 63-64

[36] Ibid, pp. 77-84

[37] Ibid, p. 67

[38] Pain, (2000), p. 4

[39] Service, (2002), p. 162

[40] Pain, (2000), p. 2

[41] Ibid, p. 3

[42] Ignatenko, Evolution of Islamic Terrorism.

[43] Kipp, (2003), p. 177

[44] Welcome to Hell, Human Rights watch, (2000)

[45] Military Balance (2003-4), p. 87

[46] Kipp, (2003), p. 194

[47] Service, (2002), p. 163

[48] Evangelista, (2002), pp. 68

[49] Cornel, (2001), pp. 246-249

[50] Bennett, (1998), p. 16

[51] Kipp, (2003), p. 191

[52] Thomas, (2000), p. 3

[53] Grau & Thomas, (2000), p. 6

[54] Thomas, (2000), pp. 6-9

[55] Orr, (2000), p. 2

[56] Military Balance (2001-2), p. 107

[57] Orr, (1999), p. 4

[58] Ibid, p. 1

[59] Military Balance (2000-1), p. 112

[60] Simunovic, (1998), pp. 68-69

[61] Service, (2002), p. 164

[62] Lieven, (1998), p. 103

[63] Service, (2002), p. 163

[64] Kipp, (2003), p. 194

[65] Pain, (2000), p. 5

[66] Politovskaya, (2001), p. 208

[67] Ibid.

[68] Thomas, (2000), p.12

[69] Siren, (1998), p. 87

http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/Rusn_leslrn.htm

WARNING!
The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Russian Lessons Learned From the Battles For Grozny

Mr. Lester W. Grau and Mr. Timothy L. Thomas
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

This article first appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, April 2000.

Two years ago, Mr. Thomas gave a conference briefing on the Russian lessons learned from the first battle for Grozny (January 1995). Apparently, a conference participant put his notes of the briefing on the Internet and these notes have enjoyed a long run. However, some of the notes were slightly exaggerated from the original presentation. With the third battle of Grozny just concluded (second battle was August 1996, third battle January 2000), The Marine Corps Gazette decided to reprint the original lessons learned with minor adjustments from Mr. Thomas, and add FMSO's Russian lessons learned from their subsequent battles for Grozny. The latter represents the joint work of Mr. Thomas and Mr. Grau.

Grozny 1 (January 1995, an eventual Russian victory)

The Russian Army invaded Chechnya in December 1994, and immediately moved on Grozny, encircling it from three sides. In the subsequent fighting, the armed forces learned many lessons about fighting in cities. These include:

You need to culturally orient your forces so that you don't end up being your own worst enemy simply out of cultural ignorance. Many times Russian soldiers made serious cultural errors in dealing with the Chechen civilians. Once insulted or mistreated, they became active fighters or supported the active fighters. Russians admit they underestimated the affect of religion and culture on the conflict.
You need some way of sorting out the combatants from the non-combatants. The days when battles are fought in empty cities are over. Local civilians have nowhere to go to and will stay in place. The Russians were forced to resort to searching the pockets of civilians for military equipment, checking shoulder blades for bruises from firing weapons and forearms for powder burns, and to sniffing them for the smell of gunpowder and gun oil.
The psychological impact of high intensity urban combat is so intense that you should maintain a large reserve that will allow you to rotate units in and out of combat. If you do this, you can preserve a unit for a fairly long time. If you don't, once it gets used up, it can't be rebuilt.
Training and discipline are paramount. You can accomplish nothing without them. You may need to do the training in the combat zone. Discipline must be demanded. Once it begins to slip, the results are disastrous.
The Russians were surprised and embarrassed at the degree to which the Chechens exploited the use of cell phones, Motorola radios, improvised TV stations, light video cameras, and the Internet to win the information war. The Russians admitted that they lost control of the information coming out of Grozny early in the operation and never regained it, and vowed never again to lose the "information war.".
The proliferation of rocket propelled grenade launchers surprised the Russians, as well as the diversity of uses to which they were put. RPGs were shot at everything that moved. They were fired at high angle over low buildings as mortars, and were also used as area weapons against advancing infantry, antitank weapons and, on occassion, as air defense weapons. They were sometimes fired in very disciplined volleys and were the weapon of choice for the Chechens, along with the sniper rifle. Not only were the Russians faced with well-trained, well equipped Chechen military snipers, there were also large numbers of designated marksmen who were very good shots using standard military rifles. These were very hard to deal with and usually required massive fire power to overcome. The Chechen standard hunter-killer team consisted of a RPG gunner, machine gunner and sniper. Three to five hunter-killer teams would work together in a sector.
As expected, the Russians reiterated the need for large numbers of trained Infantrymen.
They found that boundaries between units were still tactical weak points, but that it wasn't just horizontal boundaries they had to worry about. In some cases, the Chechens held the third floor and above, while the Russians held the first two floors and sometimes the roof.
Ambushes were common. Sometimes they actually had three tiers. Chechens would be underground, on the ground floor, and on the roof. The ambushers would concentrate fires against targets when possible. Multiple RPG rounds flying from different heights and directions limit a vehicle commander's ability to respond. Escape routes were always predetermined.
The most common response by the Chechens to the increasingly powerful Russian indirect and aerial firepower was hugging the Russian unit. If the hugging tactics caused the Russians to cease artillery and air fires, it became a sergeant's and platoon leaders war—the level of command at which the Russians are weakest.
Both the physical and the mental health of the Russian units began to decline almost immediately upon initiation of high intensity combat. In less than a month, almost 20% of the Russian soldiers were suffering from viral hepatitis. Viral hepatitis and cholera were the two major diseases that Russian medical personnel had to deal with. Shigellosis, entercolitis, diptheria, malignant anthrax and plague were also problem diseases. Lack of clean drinking and dishwashing water was the source of these diseases. Viral hepatitis fell off during the summer months, but was replaced with severe bowel infections. Lack of shower and bath facilities close to the combat led to outbreaks of lice.
According to a survey of over 1300 troops, about 72% had some sort of psychological disorder. Almost 75% had an exaggerated startle response. About 28% had what was described as neurotic reactions, and almost 10% had acute emotional reactions. The Russians recommended 2 psycho-physiologists, 1 psycho-pharmacologist, 1 psychiatrist, and 1 medical psychologist at each Russian corps-sized unit. Although their experience in Afghanistan prepared them somewhat for the physical health problems, they were not prepared for this level of mental health treatment. Many permanent combat stress casualties resulted from the soldiers not being provided proper immediate treatment.
Chechens weren't afraid of tanks and BMPs. They assigned groups of RPG gunners to fire volleys at the lead and trail vehicles. Once they were destroyed, the others were picked off one-by-one. The Russian forces lost 20 of 26 tanks, 102 of 120 BMPs, and 6 of 6 ZSU-23s in the first three day's fighting. Chechens chose firing positions high enough or low enough to stay out of the fields of fire of tank and BMP weapons. Russian conscript Infantry simply refused to dismount and often died in their BMP without ever firing a shot. Russian elite Infantry did much better, but didn't coordinate well with armored vehicles initially. An initial problem was that there were not enough dismounts. Many of the BMPs initially destroyed had few or no dismounts on board. The Chechens used mobile tactics and "let the situation do the organizing" while the Russians relied more on brute strength.
Russian wounded and dead were hung upside down in windows of defended Chechen positions. Russians had to shoot at the bodies to engage the Chechens. Russian prisoners were decapitated and their heads placed on curbs leading into the city, over which Russian replacements and reinforcements had to travel. Both Russian and Chechen dead were routinely booby-trapped.
Russians were not surprised by the ferocity and brutality of the Chechens, but they were surprised by the sophistication of the Chechen use of booby traps and mines. Chechens mined and boobytrapped everything, showing excellent insight into the actions and reactions of the average Russian soldier. Mine and boobytrap awareness was hard to maintain.
Russians were satisfied with the combat performance of most of their infantry weapons. The unprotected tank was dead meat (too vulnerable, too awkward, not agile, no visibility, poor weapons coverage at short ranges). Self-propelled artillery, ADA guns, and BMPs were more effective in the city, but not by a considerable margin. Some non-lethal weapons, such as riot gas and tranquilizer gas, were recommended for future use. The flamethrower was also designated as a very useful Russian weapon, especially the RPO-A thermobaric round. Ultimately, a strong combined arms team and flexible command and control meant more than the individual weapons used by each side. Armored vehicles with reactive armor survived while others were in trouble. Flank and top shots were most dangerous.

Grozny 2 (August 1996, a Chechen victory)

Grozny 2 occurred when Chechen forces infiltrated the city following a complete reconnaissance. The reconnaissance was performed by guerillas who readily blended with the civilian population over the course of two or three months. The Chechen force simultaneously attacked key points within the city. Russian occupation troops were not operationally surprised (MVD Minister Anatoliy Kulikov was repeartedly calling for more troops at the time, having foreseen the attack) but were tactically unable to prevent the attack or to repulse it. They withdrew precipitously. Shortly afterward, negotiations brought an end to the fighting leaving the Chechens in control of Grozny. Russian lessons learned from Grozny 2 include:

Once a city has been taken, it must be garrisoned and guarded. The military, as the most visible representative of the government, will have to assume many civilian responsibilities to include reinstituting health care, public sanitation, public works, public safety, public transportation, power, food distribution, water purification, and rudimentary government. The Russian force did garrison the city to a considerable degree, but to no avail in this instance. When reinforcements were needed, they were not provided.
Counter-reconnaissance is a primary concern in holding a captured city. All city entry and exit points must by closely monitored. The difficulty with a city the size of Grozny is that with 123 exit roads, it becomes almost an impossible task. The force is spread too thin. Indigenous police, if they can be trusted, are invaluable in monitoring these check points.
The occupying force must conduct a "hearts and minds" program to win over the civilian populace. A hostile populace is a constant source of intelligence to the opposition. A neutral populace is better than a hostile populace, but a populace that feels the occupying army has its best interests at heart will furnish reliable information to the occupying army. Russian local intelligence from the populace did exist, but so did rebel intelligence. The latter appeared to be the stronger of the two.
The misbehavior of Russian soldiers alienated the populace of Grozny, to include ethnic Russians. Russian soldiers were always looking for food and drink and would obtain it by selling military equipment, theft or looting.
Rapid reaction forces and reserves are an essential part of an occupying army. If all forces are fully committed to holding real estate, no forces are available to counter planned, simultaneous attacks.
Once the fighting has moved beyond the city, the tendency is to garrison the city with troops that are less-trained and not as well-equipped as the forward combat units. Armor, artillery and air support are particularly lacking. This lack will be most apparent when the opposition attacks unexpectedly.

Military Thought article, 1998

Some two years after Grozny 2 and two years before Grozny 3, an article appeared in the authoritative Russian military journal Military Thought. Titled "New Views on Urban Combat," the article addressed several key considerations for MOUT operations. In hindsight, the article offered an incisive look into future Russian MOUT strategy and tactics.

The article highlighted the requirement first to block a city and concentrate around it a large force with the assets to impose psychological intimidation. These included the use of ultimatums. The Russians issued a number of ultimatums via leaflets during the 2000 battle for Grozny. Second, if a peaceful settlement appears impossible, the article called for a special operation to capture the city after civilians have left. This operation would require both MVD and armed forces special detachments, such as OMON, GRU, and SOBR forces. These forces served as the advance guard, and were supplemented by the Chechen force of former Grozny Mayor Bislan Gantamirov. Third, it would be necessary to supply the force with non-lethal weapons. Obviously, this was not done. The potential use of chemical weapons or clorine bombs was continuously threatened, but no significant use of these weapons was made by either side. Fourth, it would be necessary to identify precisely the lines of contact between friendly troops and enemy forces in any future MOUT operation. Pagers were suggested for this process, but it was more successfully accomplished through the use of radar signatures. Fifth, it was recommended to use the full potential of army aviation. Helicopter use and aviation assets of the air force were deployed much more widely in the 2000 battle for Grozny than earlier. Finally, advancing troops must understand the basics of working with radio cables, water and gas mains, seismic sensors, and other devices in the city. This meant much more preparatory work in mock towns and participation in tactical exercises than in the past. The Russians did conduct several exercises in preparation for entering Chechnya, but it is unknown just how thorough their preparation was for MOUT.

Grozny 3 (January 2000, Russian victory)

In 1995 Russian forces moved directly into Grozny with little or no artillery or reconnaissance preparation of the city. In 2000, an entirely different approach was used. The Russian force surrounded the city and used an "indirect approach" that offered success at varying levels. In spite of the pessimistic appraisals of most Western analysts, a comprehensive review of the Russian MOUT method in 2000 demonstrated that Russia's commanders learned and applied many lessons from the first battle of Grozny. If the Russians received an F for their first fight in Grozny, they earned at a C for Grozny 2000. First, the Russians won the information war in the mass media, reporting their version of events and thereby keeping the populace on the side of federal forces; second, somewhat like the use of Kit Carson scouts in Vietnam, the Russians used the talents, connections, and knowledge of Bislan Gantemirov (a former Mayor of Grozny and a Chechen) and his men (a Chechen militia) to help spearhead the fight against the Chechen rebel force in Grozny. This force was able to ascertain the situation and obtain intelligence from the local population that federal forces could not get; third, this time around there was a healthy respect for the RPG-7, the king of battle in the city. As a result armored vehicles, except on rare occasion, were kept out of the city fight. Instead, tanks and artillery were positioned on the side of hills overlooking and surrounding Grozny, and these pieces fired into the city. This was a Russian version of "remote war" as exercised by NATO forces against Kosovo, executed in a much cruder and more imprecise manner; fourth, there were much fewer frontal assaults. Instead, Russian reconnaissance forces (along with Gantemirov's forces) entered the city and tried to locate resistance pockets. Then artillery or air power was called in on these objectives; fifth, the Russians reportedly introduced communications equipment into theater that encrypted messages, in particular the Akveduk radio, in November. In the first battle the Chechens intercepted radio transmissions nearly at will; sixth, the Russians completely surrounded the city and left no easy exit as they did the first time, making it much more difficult for the rebel force to get resupplies or to move out of the city and rest; and seventh, Russians continued to rest men at every opportunity, recognizing the stress factor as something worthy of the closest attention.

Russian lessons learned during Grozny 3 include:

Instead of a coup de main against Grozny, a determined march was mounted first into Chechnya and only later against Grozny. Altogether, more than 100,000 soldiers entered Chechnya, and reportedly some 50,000 eventually surrounded the city. This was nearly two and one half times the size of the first intervention force, and several times larger than the forces that entered Grozny in 1995.
The military did not permit moratoriums or ceasefires, which they said allowed the Chechens to regroup and resupply in the first battle for the city. This also eliminated federal force complaints that the politicians were keeping Russian forces from winning.
Russia's use of force included several new aspects. First, city plans were studied much closer than for the first battle to ascertain the location of sewers, oil pipelines, etc. Many more officers had maps, and there were several exercises conducted during 1999 to prepare the command and staff elements for the intervention. This included the assignment of a career army officer (Colonel General Leontiy Shevtsov) to the position of MVD commander of the North Caucasus region to improve MVD-armed forces cooperation. Second, the most important equipment development was the fuel air explosives (both the jet propelled "Bumblebee" 93mm flamethrower with a 600 meter range and capable of shooting a thermobaric round; and the TOS-1, a flamethrower mounted on a T-72 chasis and capable of shooting a thermobaric round over 3.5 km). In addition, electronic and reconnaissance warfare received much more attention than in the first conflict, and the Russians were much more successful in protecting their own communications and intercepting Chechen transmissions. Finally, Russian artillery forces used a zonal-target method of firing at Chechen forces, a method that allowed an artillery or mortar battery to reinforce a motorized-rifle company.
Chechen tactics remained versatile and flexible. They boarded up first floor windows to slow Russian access to buildings, continued to "hug" Russian forces in the suburbs to limit the use of Russian artillery and supporting fires, and operated in a very centrally controlled fashion instead of in the "defenseless defense" or "let the situation do the organizing" mode of 1995. This was an obvious adjustment because the Russians refused to enter the city exposed and in mass formations. The Chechens used trenches more than in the first battle in order to move between buildings. They also positioned snipers in a "misdirection" tactic (soldiers habitually entered the city looking up at windows to find snipers). They constructed escape routes from their firing positions, and interconnected these positions. Finally, the Chechens continued to exploit hand-held Motorola radios, and even Iridium satellite system handsets.
Problems remain for the Russian force. These include the absence of a reliable friend or foe system; night vision devices for pilots; a reliable method for "organizing for combat" in cities; and instruction on MOUT operations in the academies. Additionally, enemy "off-the-shelf" equipment (especially communications gear) continued to negate the effectiveness of even brand new Russian communications developments. MVD-armed forces joint operations still lacked proper coordination and cooperation, even after several joint exercises. And finally, there remained problems with the discipline of the force. It was still possible to bribe soldiers or buy weapons from them, and soldiers still mistreated both prisoners and civilians.

Over the next few months, many more lessons will continue to be uncovered. There indeed is much for western forces to learn from both the Russian and Chechen experiences.

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