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What Went Wrong [ 2002 anthrax contamination at USAMRIID studied by Dr. Ivins ]
News-Post ^ | 2007 | Alison Walker

Posted on 08/02/2008 6:47:54 AM PDT by LurkedLongEnough

FREDERICK — During a two-week period in April four years ago, officials at the Army’s lead biodefense laboratory at Fort Detrick discovered anthrax spores had escaped carefully guarded suites into the building’s unprotected areas.

The breach called into question the ability of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases to keep its deadly agents within laboratory walls seven months after the terrorism attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the anthrax mailings that autumn.

The 2002 incident was considered a containment breach because anthrax was found outside a containment suite, which is a group of laboratories and administrative rooms. USAMRIID uses strict security and sterilization methods to prevent the deadly agents stored inside from escaping.

Through a Freedom Of Information Act request, The Frederick News-Post obtained a 361-page report on the 2002 breach compiled by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, which oversees USAMRIID.

The News-Post also obtained reports of Detrick workers’ potential exposures to biological agents between April 1, 2002, and Dec. 1, 2005.

The News-Post used the USAMRMC report and the potential exposure documents to examine the changes USAMRIID has learned in the last four years, measuring its progress against Army recommendations and providing a rare look behind USAMRIID’s walls.

Concern about anthrax spores in supposedly clean areas began months before the April 2002 breach, during late 2001. That fall, anthrax-laced letters were mailed to Sens. Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), as well as media outlets in New York and Florida.

In December 2001, a USAMRIID technician told Dr. Bruce Ivins, a microbiologist in USAMRIID’s Division of Bacteriology, that she was concerned she was exposed to anthrax spores when handling an anthrax-contaminated letter.

USAMRIID was in the midst of processing tens of thousands of items and environmental samples to rule out anthrax contamination, including the letters mailed to Sens. Daschle and Leahy.

Dr. Ivins, who still works in the bacteriology division but declined to comment for this story, tested the technician’s desk area that December and found growth that had the earmarks of anthrax.

He decontaminated her desk, computer, keypad and monitor, but didn’t notify his superiors.

In the USAMRMC report, Dr. Ivins told Army investigators he did the unauthorized testing because he was concerned the powder in the anthrax letters and other samples might not be adequately contained.

He again became suspicious of contamination April 8, 2002, when two researchers reported potential exposures to anthrax after noticing flasks they were working with had leaked anthrax, crusting the outside of the glass tubes.

USAMRIID officials found anthrax spores in several rooms within a conainment suite near the potential exposure.

Nasal swabs from one scientist involved in the incident tested positive. The scientist had been previously vaccinated and did not contract the disease.

When the contamination was discovered, Dr. Ivins performed an unauthorized sampling of areas outside containment April 15, according to the USAMRMC report.

He found anthrax spores in his office area; a passbox, which uses UV radiation to allow personnel to safely transfer materials from labs to outside areas such as hallways; and an area where scientists and technicians change from civilian clothing into laboratory garb.

Dr. Ivins found heavy growth of Ames-strain anthrax, a pathogenic or disease-causing form of the agent, on rubber molding surrounding the noncontainment side of a passbox. The anthrax found in these areas was a different strain from that in the potential anthrax exposure April 8, suggesting at least two incidents of contamination. USAMRIID works with three anthrax strains: pathogenic strains Ames and Vollum 1B and Sterne, a nonpathogenic vaccine strain.

On April 16, 2002, Dr. Ivins notified the USAMRIID Bacteriology Division chief of the preliminary results from his April 15 sampling. USAMRIID confirmed the contamination April 16.

On April 18, official testing found anthrax spores in areas outside containment, including Dr. Ivins’ office and near a passbox. A sample taken near the passbox tested positive for more than 200 spores of Ames-strain anthrax.

The testing also revealed spores in a men’s change room, posing a risk of contamination to the Jeanne Bussard center on South Market Street, where USAMRIID’s laundry is routinely processed after being sterilized at Fort Detrick.


TOPICS: Anthrax Scare; Crime/Corruption; Government
KEYWORDS: anthrax; bruceivins; foia; ivins; usamriid
Sorry if this has already been posted - did a search on the title came up blank - however, knowing FR I would guess that this story had been posted in the past anyway. The facts were staring us right in the face. It's a four-day narrative, with part of day one posted above.
1 posted on 08/02/2008 6:47:54 AM PDT by LurkedLongEnough
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To: LurkedLongEnough

Friendly fire?


2 posted on 08/02/2008 7:06:10 AM PDT by ex-snook ("Above all things, truth beareth away the victory.")
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