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To: All; DAVEY CROCKETT

I have to quit, so am posting my searches:

http://search.yahoo.com/search?p=U.S.+gangs+foreign&ei=UTF-8&fr=yalerts-keyword&fr2=tab-news&xargs=0&pstart=1&b=21

http://www.google.com/search?q=U.S.+prison+gangs%2C+whose+members+seem+to+be+particularly+susceptible+to+terrorist+and+other+extremist+recruitment.&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

http://www.google.com/search?q=development+of+organized+gangs+in+the+US&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&hs=lq0&q=extremist+recruitment+attempts&start=10&sa=N

http://www.google.com/search?q=United+States%E2%80%99+home-grown+Violent+Extremists&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

http://www.google.com/search?q=gangs+carrying+weapons+and+drugs&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

Now in U.S. Military:

http://www.google.com/search?q=New+FBI+Report+Confirms+Extremist+Activity+in+U.S&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

http://www.google.com/search?q=Al-Qaida%3A+Terrorist+Selection+and+Recruitment&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

http://www.google.com/search?q=Terrorist+and+Why%3F&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

http://www.google.com/search?q=The+Sociology+and+Psychology+of+Terrorism&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

http://www.google.com/search?q=Abu+Banan+Global+Islamic+Media+group&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

http://www.google.com/search?q=Islamic+al-Qaeda+Organization+in+Palestine&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

http://www.google.com/search?q=Global+Islamic+Media+Front&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

Links to last the night:

http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/resources.htm


http://209.85.141.104/search?q=cache:r29phgP74rwJ:www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/TM_004_021.pdf+U.S.+prison+gangs,+whose+members+seem+to+be+particularly+susceptible+to+terrorist+and+other+extremist+recruitment.&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=7&gl=us&client=firefox-a

TerrorismMonitor
Volume IV

Issue 21

November 2, 2006
1
Al-Qaeda’s Caucasian Foot Soldiers
By Hayder Mili
In the West, Islamic terrorism is a threat traditionally associated with Middle
Eastern men whose faces are easily perceived as “alien” and who present a
suitable profile around which to organize law enforcement monitoring. Recent
events have again shown that this profile is outdated. The July 7, 2005 London
bombings and the further discovery of other operational cells in Britain and
Canada included several converts, such as 25-year-old Hindu-Canadian convert
Steven Chand and Germaine “Jamal” Lindsay, the young Briton who not only
participated in but led the four-man suicide bombing cell on July 7. The activities
of converts, or rather those who adopt a militant ideology inspired by Salafi-
Jihadi interpretations of Islam, have become increasingly important in executing
terrorist attacks. The incorrect perception of the “face of terror” risks obscuring
our understanding of how terrorist groups operate. In monitoring and preventing
terrorist activity, law enforcement agencies need to move beyond the current
profile and react to the empirical reality.
Blue-Eyed Emirs
That empirical reality has been apparent for some time, particularly in France.
The logistical support cell involved in the Algerian Armed Islamic Group’s (GIA)
1995 bombing campaign in France included two converts, David Vallat and
Joseph Raime, who had been converted to Salafi-Jihadism while in prison by GIA
“emir” and Afghan veteran Ahtmane Saada. Beyond logistical support, French
law enforcement also found operational converts when they investigated the
ultra-violent jihadi-gangster Roubaix Gang (Terrorism Monitor, January 12).
Notably, the gang was composed of Algerians led by two ethnic Frenchmen,
TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE TERRORISM MONITOR, VISIT http://www.jamestown.org
IN THIS ISSUE:
AL-QAEDA’S CAUCASIAN FOOT SOLDIERS
By Hayder Mili....................................................................................................................1
DEVISING A NEW COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY IN EUROPE
By Ludo Block................................................................................................................... 4
COMBATING THE IDEOLOGY OF SUICIDE TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN
By Waliullah Rahmani.................................................................................................... 7
THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN SURINAME
By Chris Zambelis............................................................................................................ 9
Volume IV, Issue 21

November 2
,
2006



115 posted on 07/29/2008 9:21:49 PM PDT by nw_arizona_granny ( http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/chat/1990507/posts?page=451 SURVIVAL, RECIPES, GARDENS, & INFO)
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To: nw_arizona_granny

From your searches...good read..Who is the Knights of the Cross?

http://209.85.215.104/search?q=cache:26rgRes9rOcJ:www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/228.pdf+U.S.+prison+gangs,+whose+members+seem+to+be+particularly+susceptible+to+terrorist+and+other+extremist+recruitment.&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=8&gl=us&client=firefox-a

...Internal al-Qa’ida documents reinforce this hypothesis. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point recently released a series of al-Qa’ida documents captured in Afghanistan by US forcesunder the title Harmony and Disharmony.

Amongst these documents is a letter written in 1993 by an al-Qa’ida member in Somalia to the leadership in Sudan. The author complained that Somalifighters were caught up in tribal squabbles and could not be convinced to adopt the al-Qa’ida ideological worldview; thus, the author argued, al-Qa’ida’s objective was not being achieved in Somalia.

Al-Qa’ida leaders responded to this complaint as follows,

When you entered Somalia, the Somali arena was barren and futile. The situation changed,however, after the intervention by America and the Knights of the Cross. You most resembled a hunter aiming his rifle at the dead branch of a tree, with no leaves or birds onit. Suddenly, a bald eagle lands on the branch of the tree, directly in line with the rifle. Shouldn’t the hunter pull the trigger to kill the eagle or at least bloody it? The American bald eagle has landed within range of our rifles. You can kill it or leaveit permanently disfigured.

If you do that, you will have saved Sudan, Yemen, Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf and the waters of the Nile. Could you want more magnificent objectives of war than those?

86Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2005). 7Letters from bin Laden, al-Qa’ida Advice and Reform Committee, US military document number AFGP-2002-003345, available in Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s

Organizational Vulnerabilities, (New York: West Point Combating Terrorism Center, 2006).8Five Letters to the Africa Corps, September 1993 - May 1994, US military document number AFGP-2002-600053, available in Harmony and Disharmony.


Page 7
5 This reply is particularly interesting, because it demonstrates that al-Qa’ida leaders were willing to accept short-term political objectives at a local level. In addition, it demonstrates another layer of al-Qa’ida rhetoric that emerged in the 1990s – anti-Americanism. Given the ascendancy of al-Qa’ida and its worldview in the 1990s, I think it is important not to underestimate the appeal of this entire package: violent Salafism, local political objectives and anti-Americanism.

Indeed, theconfluence of all three appeals laid the foundation for al-Qa’ida’s war against ‘Jews andCrusaders,’ declared in 1998.

In a post 9/11 world, al-Qa’ida leaders have attempted to position themselves at the forefront of the violent Salafi jihadi movement. This approach can be seen in statements issued over the past six years by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as other ideologues.

WhileAbdullah Azzam mobilized the youth for jihad in the 1980s with leaflets distributed throughout the Muslim world, al-Qa’ida leaders and likeminded ideologues have used the internet, and to a certain extent mainstream media, to articulate their ideas. An examination of jihadi websites reveals some emerging trends in the Salafi jihadi movement.

For example, a new generation of strategic thinkers and ideologues has emerged in this movement, including Abu Musab al-Suri, Abu Bakr Naji, Yusuf al-Ayyiri, Saif al-Adl and Louis Atiyatallah. Indeed, Will McCants, from the West Point Combating Terrorism Center, recently published a report entitled Militant Ideology Atlas.

In this study, McCants observed that thesethinkers are cited and referred to more often in jihadi chatrooms and on websites than Osama binLaden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. These thinkers appear more willing now than was evidenced in thepast to make tactical concessions on the issues of local Muslim practices, tribal politics and even nationalism to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of local communities.

It’s worth noting, however, that hardcore al-Qa’ida leaders, such as al-Zawahiri, still evidence reticence to make tactical concessions. Moreover, it is possible that they feel threatened by thelegitimacy garnered by other ideologues and terrorist groups. As an illustration of this point, al-Qa’ida leaders have criticized the leaders of other terrorist groups in their bid to remain at theforefront of this wider ideological movement.

A recent example is the ongoing debate between al-Qa’ida and Hamas. Immediately following the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006, al-Zawahiri rebuked Hams for participating in these elections, stating, 9Bruce Lawrence, ed., A Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, Messages to the World” the Statements of Osama bin Laden (New York: Verso, 2005), 23-30.


125 posted on 07/30/2008 8:19:29 AM PDT by DAVEY CROCKETT
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To: nw_arizona_granny

Still from your searches GREAT STUFF Granny..

Up to this point, I have focused on the evolution of al-Qa’ida’s ideological arguments, as well as how it has appealed to potential recruits and sympathizers. But the most important question for US national security, in my opinion, is how have audiences responded to al-Qa’ida’s appeal? And, for the purposes of this hearing, to what degree has ideology contributed to the audiences’ responses? To answer these questions, it is useful to explore the radicalization processes thatindividuals and clusters of individuals have gone through as they progressed from being sympathetic to the al-Qa’ida worldview to being willing to ‘pick up a gun’. Note that most research suggests that one single pathway to terrorism does not exist.

14And my comments should be taken in that context. Thus, when I discuss ‘radicalization processes’ I meanto imply multiple processes with variation along the way. These processes can be understood as having three separate and distinct phases.

In the first phase, termed ‘availability,’ environment factors make certain individuals susceptible to appeals from terrorist groups.15Of course, these factors are likely to vary according to location, but they might include being brought up in a family that articulates a violent Salafi worldview, frustration with local government policies, peer group influences, or frustration with foreign policies. For example, in his research on suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories, Ami Pedahzur has noted that one particular cell played soccer together prior to their recruitment into Hamas.

16Shazhad Tanweer, one of the 7 July 2005 London bombers, apparently had expressed frustration with UK foreign policy, particularly the conflict in Iraq.17Of course, that is not to say that all soccer players or individuals frustration with the conflict in Iraq are potential terrorist recruits, but rather, at the “availability” stage multiple factors can make al-Qa’ida’s appeal attractive.

The second phase, termed ‘recruitment and indoctrination,’ occurs after initial contact betweenindividuals and the clandestine groups. In examining the recruitment phase, it is useful to focus on

13Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-184, 2005. 14Andrew Silke, ed., Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2003) 15Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism and Development, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002.16Ami Pedahzur, “The Culture of Death: Terrorist Organizations and Suicide Bombings,” presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC as part of the Eisenhower Speaker Series, 17 February 2005. 17Paul Temelty, “An In-Depth Look at the London Bombers,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 15, July28, 2005.


Page 10
8 ‘nodes’ or gateways through which individuals come into contact with terrorist leaders, members orrecruiters.18Some potential recruitment ‘nodes’ include prayer groups, sports clubs, charitableorganizations, or even criminal gangs. For example, in December 2001 Singaporean authorities disrupted a plot to attack Western as well as local targets in that country.

According to a WhitePaper released by that government, some of the arrested individuals had been recruited through religious study groups in Singapore.19Importantly, these nodes vary according to country and community. So it is difficult to identify a laundry list of potential recruitment nodes worldwide.

If any commonalities exist in recruitment nodes, they appear to be best grouped into ‘diaspora communities’ versus ‘majority Muslim communities.’20But al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt todifferent recruiting environments, adjusting both message and method of recruitment. The third phase of the radicalization process yields a commitment to action on the part of certain individuals.

To be honest, this final step has been the most difficult to isolate during the course of our research, because it seems to vary the most individual by individual. In some instances, aspecific grievance appears to have acted as a final trigger.

So, for example, Galib Andang akaCommander Robot, a former member of the now defunct Moro Nationalist Liberation Front in the Philippines, was motivated in part by the death of his grandmother and the hands of the FilipinoArmy.

21Another common factor, at least for diaspora communities, appears to be participation in aforeign jihad.

22Somehow the process of fighting overseas seems to make individuals more willingto engage in terrorism back home as well.

18This concept also was used by Javed Ali, Senior Intelligence Office, Department of Homeland Security, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs entitled, “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in US Cell Blocks?”, 19 September 2006.

19“White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyya Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,” Singapore Government, 7 January 2003.

20For more information on recruitment trends in diaspora communities in Europe, see Michael Taarnby, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives, Denmark: Centre for Cultural Research, January 2005; see also Petter Nesser, Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in the Post-millennium Europe, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004. 21MNLF leaders negotiated a peace agreement with the Philippines as part of the Davao Accords in 1996. 22Ibid, “White Paper;” for more information on recruitment trends in diaspora communities in Europe, see Michael Taarnby, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives, Denmark: Centre for Cultural Research, January 2005; see also Petter Nesser, Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in the Post-millennium Europe, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004.


Page 11
9 I should say, at this point, that my description of radicalization processes for individual terroristsand sympathizers is not particularly unique. That is, Philip Zimbardo, who is probably best knownfor his Stanford prison experiment, has observed similar processes with the recruitment of highschool students into cults in the United States.

23But I find it a useful construct to understanding all the various factors that motivate individuals to ‘pick up a gun.’ So, I am often asked, ‘what motivates terrorism? Is it ideology, politics, or poverty?’ And my answer is, ‘yes, all three, at least to varying degrees.’ The key analytical question then becomes what role does ideology play in motivating terrorism, given that politics and poverty also play apart?

I am not certain that we truly have the answer to that question. Preliminary research suggests that extremist ideology shapes how individuals and communities view problems in the world that need to be resolved, be that corruption or injustice or poor governance. But political and economic grievances justify the use of violence to resolve theseproblems.

That is, individuals and communities understand the problems in their world through anideological lens. But this disgruntlement does not, on its own, motivate violence. That motivationmost often emerges in an environment of political and/or economic grievances, which thentranslate that worldview into action, be it picking up a gun or providing financial and other forms ofsupport. Which brings me back to the initial question posed in this hearing: do we have an accurateunderstanding of the ideological dimensions of the global war on terrorism? I would have to say,‘probably not.’

But I believe that we have come a long way, especially as researchers have begun to account for debates within the wider Salafi movement, as well as how those debates gettranslated and applied on a local level.

As we move forward, I would encourage you not to divorce the ideological dimensions of theconflict from the political and economic. Just like it is impossible to divorce military from non-military activities in the GWOT, it is impossible to truly divorce ideological from political and economic motivations. In fact, doing so only addresses part of the problem.

23Philip Zimbardo and C. Hartley, “Cults Go to High School: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Initial Stage in the Recruitment Process,” Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1985, pp. 91—147.


126 posted on 07/30/2008 8:42:00 AM PDT by DAVEY CROCKETT
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