Boeing to stick with KC-767 for US tanker recompete
FARNBOROUGH 2008: EADS to offer unchanged aircraft in relaunched KC-X contest
New rules for second KC-X competition create controversy
The US Department of Defense will reopen the competition for the KC-X contract with two major changes to the evaluation criteria that are already being challenged by Boeing supporters in Congress.
The Pentagon's controversial changes will assign rankings to the 808 individual requirements in the contract solicitation - with a special focus on downplaying the value of life-cycle cost estimates for maintenance and fuel -- and clarify the US Air Force's desire for greater fuel off-load capacity than now provided by the ageing KC-135E fleet.
Both changes would do nothing to undercut the premise of the USAF's original decision to award the contract to the Northrop Grumman/EADS North America KC-30B, a larger aircraft than the Boeing KC-767. USAF officials credited the KC-30B's larger size as a prime factor in their decision.
For “life-cycle cost estimates” I found an interesting article down under.
http://www.ausairpower.net/Analysis-AAR-Mar-04.pdf
The economics of tanker fleet operation are not driven by airframe maintenance alone. Recent studies into ageing aircraft problems carried out in the US by the Air Force and Navy indicate that the single biggest cost factors in older aircraft are engine maintenance costs and obsolescence of unique parts. The US KC-135 fleet rode on the back of the retiring 707 fleet, seeing large numbers of common components and JT3D engines cannibalised. The exhaustion of this pool of cheap spares is in part driving the current plans to replace the JT3D powered KC-135Es. The KC-135 is an interesting case study in that it has spent much of its service life to date feeding off the commercial 707 fleet, which resulted in exceptional economies of scale in spare parts.
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Experience in the US with both the 20 year old KC-10 and 40 year old KC-135 suggests that the collapse of the parallel commercial fleets has had a large impact on operating costs, especially due to the rapid increase in the prices of high consumption spares.
What does that tells us about future costs for an aircraft with an almost closed production line for commercial aircrafts and on the other side an aircraft with a backlog of over 400 units and more than 500 options (- A350/787-9)?