I've also thought that was odd.
The KC-10 is already impressively big...
This gives some sense of scale:
Posted on 06/19/2008 5:26:15 PM PDT by Paul Ross
Too Big, Too Heavy
by Jed Babbin, Human Events
Posted: 03/24/2008
The mission of the US Air Force is to fly and to fight. Everyone in the Air Force’s job falls into one of three categories: to do the flying and fighting, to command those who do, or to support them. Part of supporting the warriors is to buy the best aircraft to accomplish the mission at lowest risk. Which is why the Air Force’s decision to buy urgently-needed tanker aircraft from the Northrop Grumman – EADS consortium must be reversed.
That decision -- announced on February 29 -- could not be judged quickly or without consulting with experts on both sides of the controversy. Air mobility experts, two former chiefs of staff of the Air Force and other experienced warfighters gave me very different opinions.
My reluctant conclusion is that the Air Force’s decision is profoundly wrong. I base it on two facts: first, the warfighters need a tanker that isn’t so big and heavy that it is unable to deploy on many of the world’s airfields; and second, the Air Force is taking an unreasonably high risk on the NG– EADS aircraft.
Congressional whiners and populist pundits are suffering a case of the vapors over the decision to award the contract (for an estimated $40 billion) to NG-EADS because American jobs will be exported to France. To be sure, US jobs and tax dollars will go to the subsidized French Airbus company -- a subsidiary of EADS -- whose A-330 will be modified into the tankers. But it was Congress that imposed a procurement system under which the Air Force was required to have competition for the sole US company capable of building the tanker -- Boeing -- and it is Congress that enabled foreign companies to compete.
Tankers aren’t glamorous. They are big, heavy and drab. But without them, America would not be a superpower. There are not that many places in the world in which American combat aircraft can land to refuel. Without tankers showing up in the right places at the right times, fighters can’t fight, bombers can’t bomb and transport aircraft can’t deliver troops, supplies, or disaster relief to far corners of the world in a matter of hours.
Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John Jumper (who has consulted for Northrop Grumman on other programs) told me that he believed the tanker procurement was “squeaky clean” and that the warfighters would get what they need from the NG-EADS aircraft because it met all the requirements set by the Air Force.
Air mobility experts point out that we don’t run out of bulk cargo and passenger-carrying capacity. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet -- civilian airliners and cargo aircraft that can be called into service by the Air Force in a crisis -- provide tremendous capacity to carry people and cargo, but not jet fuel. But our warfighting ability is limited by the number of tankers and how and where they can be deployed.
Deployability is critical because tankers are bad tenants. Most runways can’t handle their weight and their size limits the number that can be stationed on any airfield. The bigger and heavier the tankers are, the fewer airfields can accommodate them.
The Boeing tanker, a version of the 767 jetliner, has a maximum takeoff weight of 395,000 pounds. It’s 159 feet long and has a wingspan of 156 feet. The NG-EADS Airbus 330 tanker’s max weight is 507,000 pounds. It is 192 feet long and has a 197-foot wingspan. My best scientific wild guess is that the NG-EADS aircraft will be unable to operate out of at least 20% of the airfields that could accommodate the right-sized Boeing tanker.
How the Air Force allowed this to happen is nothing short of bizarre. The warfighters are supposed to control the “requirements” -- the criteria the aircraft must meet -- and the procurement pukes are supposed to apply those criteria to choose which aircraft will be bought. But somehow, in mid-stream, the criteria were changed without the warfighters’ knowing about it. Critical criteria including maximum takeoff weight and clearance between wingtips while parked were changed to skew the competition to favor the larger Airbus.
Gen. Ronald Fogelman -- former Air Force chief of staff (and before that, commander of what is now Air Mobility Command which operates the tankers) is a Boeing consultant. He disputed that idea: “Anybody who thinks that somehow they’re going to dual-use these airplanes in a crisis and get benefit from both tanker and cargo-carrying capacity just doesn’t understand the way these things get used.”
Fogelman’s point is well-taken. For every hour a tanker is diverted to other purposes, every other aircraft that depends on the tankers has one less hour to fly.
One senior retired officer who requested anonymity told me that when the changes were revealed he called several officers high in the chain of command and they all reacted by asking “what are you talking about?” Now they know.
The other huge problem is the risk inherent in the winner’s inexperience and plan to build the aircraft. Boeing tankers have been delivering fuel in flight for over 50 years. NG-EADS has delivered fuel to an aircraft in flight through a “boom”, the crane-like device that is extended from the back of a tanker and through which fuel is delivered, precisely once. And NG-EADS promises to assemble the aircraft in a new plant in Alabama that isn’t built, using a new workforce that hasn’t ever built a tanker.
I’ve been down this path before.
Seventeen years ago, I sat in my Pentagon office wondering what went wrong and how to fix it. A top-secret Navy attack aircraft program (which we know now was the A-12) had turned into a disaster. I hadn’t been cleared into the program, so despite my fancy security clearances and title I couldn’t even find out what had happened far less try to fix it. My boss had done a bad job of judging how the program was doing and had told the Secretary of Defense (a gent named Cheney) that all was well when it wasn’t. The big boss had passed that opinion on to Congress with embarrassing results.
My puzzlement ended when a familiar large head leaned into my office. Its owner smiled and asked, “Jed, you got a minute?” This friend, whom I count among my mentors, was a retired Air Force four-star general and had been commander of Air Force Systems Command. AFSC ran all aircraft procurement for USAF, so he knew a thing or two about building airplanes.
The explanation he gave was horribly simple. My boss had been shown an empty factory floor by the CEO of General Dynamics (now a part of Northrop Grumman), on which chalk rectangles marked the spots where specialized machinery would be placed to produce the A-12. And the CEO told my boss that they’d be turning out aircraft in 18 months or less.
Which sounded perfectly reasonable to my boss, whose previous career had been in the automobile industry. He was used to retooling factories and retraining workers every year to build new cars. He didn’t know you can’t do that for complex aircraft. It takes 18-24 months just to get the special tooling and test equipment (known in the aerospace biz as “STTE”) you need, and only then can you train your workforce to use it. My boss fell for the CEO’s yarn and the A-12 program produced a lawsuit but no aircraft.
NG-EADS promises to deliver about fifty tankers in the next five years. The component sections will be built in European plants and shipped to Mobile, Alabama to be assembled. But they haven’t broken ground for the Mobile factory yet. Whatever empty lot is chosen can’t be turned into the KC-45 plant for at least two years. Then -- if you make the false assumption that you know exactly what STTE you need now, and order it today -- you still have to install it, hire and train your workforce and organize to assemble and test-fly the aircraft.
If they can deliver fifty aircraft from Mobile in five years I’ll parachute from the 50th at 20,000 feet wearing my tuxedo. The risk inherent in this scheme is enormous, and it means that the NG-EADS aircraft is a huge mission risk measured in time. They will be years late in producing the aircraft, the costs will increase greatly, and tankers won’t be where we need them when we do.
The Government Accountability Office will rule on the Boeing protest against this contract in the next several months. But the GAO -- as I know from three decades of trying cases like this before it -- cannot rule on anything more than the legalities of what the Air Force did. Its authority does not extend to judging the effect on our warfighting capability.
Before GAO acts, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates must. He should call in all the combatant commanders and all of the Air Mobility Command former bosses he can find who aren’t working for one of the competitors. Get to the bottom of why the warfighters were apparently ignored. And fix this before billions of dollars and precious years are spent on what may reduce the Air Force’s ability to fly and to fight.
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Mr. Babbin is the editor of Human Events. He served as a deputy undersecretary of defense in President George H.W. Bush's administration. He is the author of "In the Words of our Enemies"(Regnery,2007) and (with Edward Timperlake) of "Showdown: Why China Wants War with the United States" (Regnery, 2006) and "Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe are Worse than You Think" (Regnery, 2004). E-mail him at jbabbin@eaglepub.com.
Big plane related: A C-5 came to town yesterday and did a 1/2 hour’s worth of touch-n-go at the local airport. What a treat to see a beast that size in low, steep banking turns. Very nice engine noise, much higher pitched than standard airliners.
You have greater patience than me, sir.
How you maintain such tolerance for irrational bias is a testament to your professionalism.
No matter the weight of the argument in favor of GAO, no matter the merits of the GAO decision, no matter the emerging proof of a flawed and unequal Air Force process, some cling to their anti-Boeing biases.
Further, more and more advocates who examine closely the issue are coming to defense of OMB and Boeing. Of course, according to some, Boeing bought them off. Boeing may have deep pockets, but they are not that deep.
Loren Thompson, a highly respected Lexington Institute member and CEO, initially sided with the Air Force, but when he actually met with Air Force officials, as well as NG/EADS and Boeing personnel, he changed his mind and now seems how flawed the Air Force decision was—and is not at all pleased. Of course, some will insist he was “bought off” as well. Loren? Please.
PBS had an interview the other day with Peter Spiegel of the LA Times. Hardly a pro-Boeing organization. Spiegel lays out nicely how the Air Force made errors and did not follow their own rules.
Some have an irrational mind-set that actually believes Boeing is some sort of powerful Leviathan in DC, making the government and military do their bidding, but yet, as said before, if they had that sort of influence, the whole thing would have been over a long time ago. Additionally, Boeing would have won the JSF, the F-22 bid, the UCAS bid, would not be worried about the NGLRB, etc.
If Boeing was as influential as some believe, they would never lose a bid.
When the full report is released the same people arguing against the OMB will not be swayed, no matter the depth of proof, or the lack of integrity of the Air Force process.
Good luck fighting the good fight.
OMB should read “GAO”. . . but of course, you knew that.
(Been reading quite a few OMB reports today.)
Yes. The discord is actually pretty alarming when you consider that the "sectional rivalry" is rather ugly...and the people they are trashing ...[Boeing Mgt, engineers and workers] while they may be in a Rat-controlled fiefdom, are actually pretty strong pro-defense.
Something which is brought in question now about the priorities of the EADs apologists when they tout their prospective jobs and connections to the contract. This "venal vote" now on display amongst those backing EADS should give us all pause as to the strength of our union, and the selflessness of our national character, those willing to support the nation's good over their own petty self-interest.
Your disquiet about foreign dependency is well noted. It is shared by a broad consensus of true national defense proponents who believe that as well. Remember how the Federalist Papers warned us against divisive influence of foreign interests against our own national?
Both are unimproved field rated, I think. The C-17 for sure.
IMHO the military for sure should not be dependent on any other country for supplies.
Both are unimproved field rated, I think. The C-17 for sure.
I've also thought that was odd.
The KC-10 is already impressively big...
This gives some sense of scale:
Thanks. Glad you’ve noticed it too.
The Defense Science Board also thought that this might be a good idea, except for the trade-off of higher fuel consumption, and risk of reduced logistical availability. The C-17 is damn near as big as a C-5A, and uses four engines as well, unlike the two (more efficient) of either the KC-767 or KC-30 proposals.
McDonnell-Douglas, the developer of the plane was in fact supposed to have made a tanker version, but that got waived at some point when they decided they didn't want to sacrifice and reduce our cargo logistics capacity in exchange after all. It was too valuable for its primary mission.
Or the retired C-141 Starlifter?
The Starlifter [Lockheed] originated in 1965, retired over two years ago now, and used four, now-dated engines, hence it would not be as efficient as the new generation commercial conversions that are at issue in the new round of bidding. It might need new wings, new avionics, new engines...could be a daunting proposition.
The DSB has also suggested snapping up used commercial aircraft from the boneyards, rather than buying new. Those are all ideas to be considered. The question is bang for the buck and urgency. All decisions requiring a deliberate and careful weighing of options.
the KC10 / Dc-10 has the same 156 ft wingspan, but it does have a much higher MTW, and is far less efficient than the 767 in fuel burn. the KC10 pruchase was a political one, since the airline were not buying Dc10s anymore.
no actually is was a pilot who had left the AF and was flying commercial 767s, his comment was not about the “initial climb rate” ( all those AB takeoffs you guys mentioned are impressive, the SR71 moreso ), but actual “time-to-altitude”, say 35,000 ft. The 767 is over-thrusted, since it has to be able to fly on one engine at MTOW, should one fail at take-off. Go back a few years in AV/WK and you will see his comments.
You're welcome. [356,000 pounds v. 245,000 lbs] and it is eleven feet shorter, and commensurately shorter wings. And it is FAST. [619 mph v. 537/547 (peak)mph for KC-30]
bttt
Sounds like a pretty stupid point to me. There are plenty of times when cargo capacity might be needed but refueling capacity is not.
That was part of it, but it really was a complete package, and its origins and useages were primarily of strategic orientation, ferrying tactical squadrons to their regions included. A nice overview history is from Wikipedia here with some helpful additional observations:
Operational historyUnited States
The KC-10 was delivered to the USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC) (then in control of AAR assets) from 1981 to 1987.[1] SAC had KC-10 Extenders in service from 1981-92, when they were re-assigned to the newly established Air Mobility Command.
In the AAR role, the KC-10s have operated largely in the strategic refueling of large number of tactical aircraft on ferry flights and the refueling of other strategic transport aircraft. Conversely, the KC-135 fleet has operated largely in the in-theatre tactical role.
When faced with refusals of basing and overflight rights from continental European countries during Operation El Dorado Canyon, the U.S. was forced to use the UK-based F-111s in the 1986 air-strikes against Libya. The KC-10s allowed 29 F-111s to reach their targets.
The KC-10 fleet facilitated the deployment of tactical, strategic, and transport aircraft to Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Shield.
There are 59 KC-10 Extenders currently in service.[3] The KC-10 has a significantly larger fuel capacity than the Air Force's other tanker plane, the KC-135,[5] which has over 500 in service. The USAF's KC-10s are stationed primarily at Travis AFB, California and McGuire AFB, New Jersey.
The KC-10 is currently the world's longest-ranged production aircraft (because the payload tanks are interconnected with the fuel source), surpassing even the Boeing 777-200LR, the longest-range commercial aircraft.
A significant feature of the KC-10 is that in addition to the USAF refueling boom, it also has a separate hose and drogue system used by the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and most NATO allied aircraft. This gives the KC-10 the ability to refuel USAF, USN, USMC and other NATO aircraft, all in the same mission.
Why does he or anyone else need to? They are foreign orders...with foreign partners...the Italians being the choke-point [why are we not surprised?].
The U.S. KC-767 will be U.S. made.
Nontheless,Boeing already delivered two apiece, and the delivery pace was clearly impacted by the Italians wanting more of the pie than they could successfully chew. Note this report in Wikipedia:
Italy's aircraft became the first KC-767 to be assembled. The aircraft are initially built as 767-200ER commercial airplanes, then flown to a separate facility for conversion into tankers. Italy's first aircraft made its maiden flight on May 21, 2005,[25] and in June the same year, Japan's first aircraft arrived at Boeing's Wichita, Kansas modification center to be fitted out with the tanker equipment.[3]
Italy's second aircraft arrived for modification at the Naples, Italy facility of Boeing's partner, Aeronavali on May 6, 2005.[26]
On January 23, 2007, the KC-767 flight test aircraft set a program milestone by making its first hookup with a receiver aircraft, a B-52 Stratofortress. The "dry contact" transferred no fuel, but was intended to test the tanker's fifth-generation fly-by-wire telescoping boom. Unlike the KC-135 boom operator, who is prone, the KC-767 operator uses a remote station with a video display. The testing is being done at Edwards Air Force Base, and the test aircraft is destined for Italy once testing is complete.[4] Even if the KC-767 is not the final winner of the KC-X competition, Boeing expects the refueling boom being developed in the current program to be used on the KC-X airframe.[4]
The KC-767 extended its air refueling boom and transferred fuel to another aircraft for the first time on March 5, 2007.[27] The tanker completed another test milestone on April 12, 2007 when its aircrew successfully extended and retracted both wing refueling hoses.[28] Flight testing has resumed on Japan's tanker after modifications were completed.[29] In November 2007, Boeing decided to shift modification work on the KC-767A tankers for Italy and Japan from subcontractor Aeronavali's facility in Italy to Boeing's Wichita facility in an effort to meet delivery schedules.[30]
Both the Japanese and Italian planes were to be done via work by the Italian partner... so there is an object lesson for all would-be "global" and "multinational" defense manufacturing. Production by Committee times Ten. Bring the work home, boys, bring it home.
The choke point of tanker availability is real...and progressively more urgent in the future with the USAF plans to retire the KC-135Es wholesale, albeit the DSB thinks we can safely keep 'em going longer.
This based on Northrup-Grumman-supplied software that was tweaked with non-reproducible results? ;-)
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