Larger Force in Afghanistan ‘Might Be Counterintuitive,’ General Says

WASHINGTON, June 13, 2008 – The current number of forces in Afghanistan is enough to accomplish the mission, but it’ll take awhile to do so, the U.S. officer who just finished his tour as commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan said here today.

“Let’s just say that somebody waved a magic wand, and by gosh, between the Afghans and the international force you’d produced a force that was well over 400,000,” Army Gen. Dan K. McNeill said to reporters at a Pentagon news conference.

That larger force, McNeill said, likely would produce “instant quiet” across much of Afghanistan.

Yet, “in some areas you’d see a different kind of friction arising,” McNeill predicted, as the Afghans probably would become incensed at having so many foreign troops in their land.

“So, probably, to get that many [troops] in there would be somewhat counterintuitive,” the four-star general said.

McNeill, who recently wrapped up a 16-month duty tour in Afghanistan as commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, shared his experiences and thoughts about his prior command. He is preparing to retire from the Army after a 40-year career. Army Gen. David D. McKiernan assumed command of NATO’s ISAF from McNeill.

The number 400,000 was obtained through a mathematical formula derived from U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine that factors in a country’s landmass and population, McNeill explained. That force, he noted, would include diplomatic and reconstruction specialists, as well as U.S., NATO and Afghan security forces.

The aim of a counterinsurgency operation, McNeill pointed out, is to defeat the enemy’s strategy by separating the people from the insurgents.

“You need reconstruction, you need the right kind of governance,” in addition to security forces during counterinsurgency operations, McNeill pointed out.

Everyone acknowledges that anti-insurgent forces in Afghanistan are under-resourced, McNeill said. And there’s little chance, he noted, that those forces would be greatly increased.

“The answer is, we’ve got the get the Afghans enabled” to conduct their own security, McNeill said.

It’s important, McNeill said, to contemplate the state of the wills of the U.S. and European governments, as well as the Afghan people, to see the fight against insurgents in Afghanistan through to the end.

However, if there are going to be terrorist sanctuaries just out of reach of NATO or Afghan forces, McNeill said, then it doesn’t matter how many terrorists are destroyed in Afghanistan.

“And, so it seems to me, at some juncture, the Afghans have to take on the responsibility for security of their own battle space,” McNeill said. The Afghans, he noted, “are well on their way to doing that.”

It’ll take a few years for the Afghans to be ready to provide for their own security, McNeill predicted, noting Afghan forces will start taking over some of the battle space in their country around August.

The United States, its NATO allies and the Afghans accomplish the job with an under-resourced force structure, McNeill told reporters.

“It will simply take longer,” he explained. “If you want a faster rate of progress, you need a more capable force. If you’re not willing to make the force more capable, then you have to accept the pace that you presently have, which by some people’s reckoning is somewhat slow.”

I disagree strongly, for one reason: those personnel might not be needed to fight, but they can immeasurably improve the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Every thousand adult males who are employed, even in the tiny minimum wage of Afghanistan, will mean 1 less serious fighter.

That country has about 33,000,000 people. Their *median* age is 18 years old! 40% of their population is unemployed, and over 50% are below the *Afghan* poverty level.

The fastest way to create jobs in such a situation is first, a massive jobs program designed to improve infrastructure.

Afghan Army soldiers are paid $4/day. The Taliban offers $12/day. For a measly, by American standards, $1M a day, we could employ 100,000 Afghans. If by their labor, they created jobs, by the end of the year their national unemployment rate would be down to perhaps 10%.

We could *buy* a new Afghanistan for much less than it costs to *fight* for a new Afghanistan. Granted, our soldiers would still be keeping the peace, and keeping fanatical Pakistanis out, but a healthy Afghan economy is far more effective at ending this conflict in the long run.

And with those extra soldiers leading and teaching the Afghans how to rebuild their country, they could do it in a fraction of the time.

I would agree. Afghanistan is at risk, because people like General Petraeus and his philosophy are scarce commodities. NATO, Pentagon and intelligence bureaucrats, many masquerading in military uniforms, have consistently ignored and depreciated counterinsurgency warfare. Successful career development worldwide requires resumes applying advanced technologies to planning conventional warfare in Europe and blue water seas. Counterinsurgency warfare receives scant attention for being low tech, labor intensive and unspectacular. I would expect most to depreciate and distort the doctrine.

When General Petraeus commanded the 101st Airborne in Iraq in April 2003 he said, “Now the hard part begins”. However, he had only two stars and did not co-author Army’s counterinsurgency field manual until 2006. The Marine Corps, not Army, has unpopular distinction for embracing the culture of counterinsurgency warfare. As Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Peter Pace had the watch for internal political battles allowing General Petraeus to come to the fore. Seldom would such a gifted, experienced soldier obtain prominence needed within ossified intelligence and defense bureaucracies to implement proven counterinsurgency tactics. When he takes over Central Command maybe he can adjust some thinking based on the fact he will be writing the fitness reports.

Application of counterinsurgency tactics would increase momentum among local religious, tribal and political leaders to reject the Taliban and accept national government. The objective would be helping them make pragmatic, consistent decisions recognizing utility of and alignment with Kabul. Afghan and NATO combined units would clear Taliban from marginal regions, retain military forces, and allow reconstruction team entry. Locals would assume authority as behavior confirmed commitment to national goals. In rebellious regions attacks would disrupt Taliban units planning offensives, until regular presence expanded from adjacent pacific areas.

While that is a realistic assessment based on the current strategy, unfortunately, I don’t think it will work in the long run, especially because of long standing counterinsurgency doctrine.

That is, the problem does not lay in Afghanistan, the problem is in Pakistan, an area to a great extent outside of our influence, but which can spread trouble across almost half of the entire border of Afghanistan. We cannot base our strategy on the ability or willingness of the Pakistanis, as they are the weak link in the chain.

This is why I suggested the broad brush approach, which is in fact predicated on two things: isolating Afghanistan from Pakistan, and then converting the Afghan people in such a way to break any affiliation they have with their peers across the border.

Much has been made of the comparison of how our tactics and strategy bear interesting policy similarities with how the US military acted during the Indian Wars. And what I suggest bears a direct comparison. That is, nomadic tribes need to be restricted to borders. They can no longer be permitted the ability to freely raid or evade.

This means closing the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Second, they need to be broken of their warrior ways, much as General George Crook ended the Apache menace. And this is the second half of my strategy. Unlike Crook, it would be unwise to bottle up the Afghans on reservations; so they must be civilized by civilization.

This means being obliged to follow western style laws, have a western style government and legal system, and especially have a western style educational system. My boast is that, living in such a society for only 10 years would utterly destroy their old ways of doing things. It is so superior to how they did things that they would be insane to return to their old ways.

Set aside romanticizing their decrepit systems of order. They should be discarded, supplanted, replaced. Their is no majesty or “local color” in failure. Living under such system of order is torturous, unfair, and evil. Even their lowliest peasant can see the difference.

Modernization is the path for Afghans to leave 2000 years of bitter, murderous war behind them. For them, even Stalinist communism was a step up. A real, liberal democracy would be like heaven itself. What they don’t need is for us to try and retool their worthless ways out of some twisted sense of respect. It deserves no respect. They need modernity.

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