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Jon Carry was supposedly a distinguished (sic) US Senator throughout the Clinton years into the Bush years, yet he was/is completely clueless about what was happening. Just to give one example, George Tenet (whatever his failings the following is an accurate description of items ANYONE in Congress ought to be concerned about) described the following to Congress in 2002:

http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/101702tenet.html

[from CIA Director George Tenet’s 2002 statement to Congress]:

In 1998, I told key leaders at CIA and across the Intelligence Community that we should consider ourselves “at war” with Usama Bin Ladin. I ordered that no effort or resource be spared in prosecuting this war. In early 1999, I ordered a baseline review of CIA’s operational strategy against Bin Ladin.

In spring 1999, CTC produced a new comprehensive operational plan of attack against the Bin Ladin/al-Qa’ida target inside and outside Afghanistan.

* This new strategy was previewed to senior CIA management by the end of July 1999. By mid-September, it had been briefed to CIA operational level personnel, and to NSA, the FBI, and other partners.

* CIA then began to put in place the elements of this operational strategy, which structured the Agency’s counterterrorist activity until September 11th, 2001.

[Tenet’s description of the build-up of Al Qaeda’s war on America]:

* In July 1996, Bin Ladin described the killing of Americans in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in June 1996 as the beginning of a war between Muslims and the United States.

* One month later, in August 1996, Bin Ladin issued a religious edict or fatwa entitled “Declaration of War,” authorizing attacks against Western military targets on the Arabian Peninsula.

* In February 1998, six months prior to the US Embassy bombings in East Africa, al-Qa’ida—under the banner of the “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders”—issued another fatwa stating that all Muslims have a religious duty “to kill Americans and their allies, both civilian and military” worldwide.

By the time of the 1998 East Africa bombings, al-Qa’ida had established its intention to inflict mass casualties and a modus operandi emphasizing careful planning and exhaustive field preparations, which Bin Ladin saw as a prerequisite for the type of spectacular operations he had in mind.

* For example, when asked in a November 1996 interview why his organization had not yet conducted attacks in response to its August fatwa statement, Bin Ladin replied, “If we wanted to carry out small operations, it would have been easy to do so after the statements, but the nature of the battle requires qualitative operations that affect the adversary, which obviously requires good preparation.”

The East Africa bombings in August 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 succeeded because of al-Qa’ida’s meticulous preparation and effective security practices.

* CIA analysts looked at captured al-Qa’ida targeting studies and training materials around the time of the East Africa and USS Cole attacks. They published an in-depth intelligence study of al-Qa’ida’s terrorist operations that revealed that much of the terrorists’ advance planning involved careful, patient, and meticulous preparation.

Beyond the conventional threat, we were also becoming increasingly concerned—and therefore stepped up our warning—about al-Qa’ida’s interest in acquiring unconventional weapons, not only chemical or biological elements, but nuclear materials as well.

* In a December 1998 interview, Bin Ladin called the acquisition of these weapons a “religious duty” and noted, “How we would use them is up to us.”

* We reported in 1998 that an extremist associated with Al-Qa’ida said Bin Ladin was seeking a “Hiroshima.”