Why a Texas Appellate Court Seriously Erred

Last week, the Third Court of Appeals in Austin, Texas, issued a very significant – and very seriously mistaken – ruling, In re Sara Steed et al.

The case involved 38 women from the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS), who challenged the state’s removal of all the children from their FLDS compound in Eldorado, Texas when authorities entered on the basis of reports that a 16-year-old girl was being physically and sexually abused.

They presented their dubious challenge as a petition for a writ of mandamus – an extraordinary remedy that is only rarely granted. Yet the court ruled in favor of the women, and against the Texas child protection authorities.

That decision was not just wrong, but wrongheaded – for it applied the opposite approach to questions involving child abuse and religious entities than it should have: the court focused on religious belief while downplaying the actual conduct at issue. Fortunately, the state is now appealing to the Texas Supreme Court, and rightly so.

I wrote about the constitutional issues involving the removal of the children by Texas’ Child Protective Series (CPS) in a prior column. The appellate decision, though, did not address constitutional issues. Rather, it only addressed the Texas law governing the removal of children from their parents. In this column, I will address that separate set of legal questions, and explain why this decision was indefensible.

To begin, the decision was poorly timed, for two reasons. First, as the state argues in its pending appeal, the judges should have waited for the soon-to-be released DNA results, which are necessary to learn which children belong to which adults – and thus may also reveal provide evidence regarding which children are the victims of or the result of statutory rape. Given the intense intermarriage practices within the organization, the results will also clarify any questions regarding incest.

Such testing was necessary because FLDS members and the medical personnel who attend at their births routinely fail to file birth certificates and, during these proceedings, children and adults alike have been less than forthright about their identities or family relationships. For the court to pretend that it knew with certainty which children belonged to the women who filed the writ is irresponsible, given the facts. Moreover, reaching a decision about which children belong to which parents before DNA results are released only rewards this pattern of deception of legal authorities.

Second, the lower courts had already begun individual hearings to reunite some parents with their children, under CPS family service agreements – thus mooting the appeal with reference to these children. Those lower court judges, with the benefit of individualized evidence, were in a far better position to assess the potential harm to each individual child and to craft terms of reunion in a way so as to protect the children.

In fact, at the time the appellate judges were issuing their decision, those hearings were leading to the release of 12 children to their parents – but those releases, importantly, were based on a careful assessment of the facts for each child. Importantly, too, the children were not permitted to be returned to the compound, and the parents had to agree to ongoing oversight by the state (as would any other parent in similar circumstances).

The Relevant Texas Law Requires Evidence of Danger to the Children, and There Was Copious Evidence of That

There are three criteria under Texas law that govern whether CPS may remove children from their homes. Here is the most relevant language from each criterion, and the language on which the Texas appeals court focused: There must be (1) “a danger to the physical health or safety of the child”; (2) “reasonable efforts, consistent with the circumstances . . . were made to eliminate or prevent the child’s removal”; and (3) reasonable efforts have been made to enable the child to return home, but there is a substantial risk of a continuing danger. . . .”

Let’s begin with the first and third factors, invoking danger to the children. Surely, evidence of ongoing felonies must weigh very heavily here – and there was convincing evidence two had been committed repeatedly in the compound: child rape and polygamy.

Texas law makes polygamy a felony -- with its degree determined by the age of the new, additional spouse. The felony is third-degree if the spouse is an adult, second- degree if she is over 16, and first-degree if she is under 16. (In this respect, then, the anti-polygamy laws significantly reinforce the laws against child sex abuse and make a strong statement about the state’s view of underage marriages.)

Felonies are serious business under Texas law. As a general matter, a first-degree felony is subject to imprisonment "for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years"; a second-degree felony entails imprisonment "for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2 years,” and a third-degree felony requires imprisonment "for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years." These are the kinds of sanctions one would have thought a court would have taken seriously, but the appellate court actually ignored the law of polygamy as though those felonies were simply beside the point.

Was there enough evidence to state that felonies had been, and were being, committed in the FLDS compound? Absolutely. The lower court had so found, and the appellate court was legally required to accept those findings unless it saw an “abuse of discretion” on the lower court’s part. Here, the lower-court findings, far from constituting an abuse of discretion were well-substantiated.

Based on the sect’s own written records, there were numerous polygamous marriages in the compound, and plenty of marriages between underage girls and much older men. Moreover, even the appeals court acknowledged evidence that “[t]wenty females living at the ranch had become pregnant between the ages of thirteen and seventeen.” Girls at the compound had told investigators that “there was no age too young for girls to be married.” Evidence indicated that the members of the sect delegate to a single individual – the reigning prophet -- the task of choosing who will marry whom, which leads to the inescapable conclusion that the community’s marriage and sexual practices constitute a seamless web as opposed to a collection of independent nuclear families. (While a few one-wife families exist, only younger men are likely to have a single wife, as they wait for the blessing of at least three to get a preferred spot in heaven.)

How the Appellate Judges Trivialized Rampant Sexual Abuse and Numerous Felonies

How could the appeals court ignore such compelling facts and conclude there was no real danger to all of the children? No one will ever know the actual motives of these three Republican judges, but the opinion strongly suggests unthinking deference to claims of religious and parental “rights,” even though those claims do little more than cloak criminal behavior that puts children at risk.

First, the judges treated past felonies as if time had erased them – even though these crimes went unprosecuted and unpunished. For instance, they gratuitously asserted that of the 20 underage mothers (and, thus, statutory rape victims) identified, 15 are now adults. Yet that does not negate that these women were victims of crime, that when the sex occurred they could not legally consent, and that the other 5 continue to be victimized.

This is just another version of the message so many victims of child sex abuse hear: they should just move on with their lives and leave the rest of us alone, an antiquated attitude wholly inappropriate for modern-day judges.

Second, the judges tried to magically convert statutory rape into marital intercourse, citing the rule that if a minor is legally married, she (or he) can have “consensual sexual intercourse.” The problem is that for the underage marriage to be legal, the marriage has to be sanctioned by either parental consent or court order. Where was the proof that either existed here? And even if it did, what of the many polygamous marriages, which no parent or court could sanction, and in which underage girls played a part?

More fundamentally, we must ask what, exactly, led the appellate court to try to justify this many child rapes in such a small community? Or the pervasive grooming of boys to be child rapists? Just how many children have to be sexually abused or groomed to rape in order to pass the appropriate threshold of “danger” according to these judges? I would have thought adult males having sex with 20 underage girls (repeatedly, given that some of them have more than one child) out of this small, close-knit community passed all standards of decency and easily justified bringing all of the children out of the enclave. If not 20, how many?

The Fallacy Behind the Court’s Opinion: Absolute Freedom of Religious Belief Is Guaranteed, But Is Never An Excuse for Crime

The appellate judges chastised the court below for taking into account the beliefs of the FLDS, but the existence of religious belief does not erase the illegality of conduct.

There is an absolute right to believe whatever you want under the First Amendment. No court or other government entity may punish a group for its shared beliefs, whether they be religious or secular.

For example, if a group believed in polygamy and child brides and bemoaned the laws against those practices, but still abided by the law, no legal sanction could be applied. They could proclaim their beliefs in every legislature and from every rooftop, and no one could make them stop. This is one of the great cornerstones of the American experiment with religious liberty.

When such a group crosses the line from vocal objection to legal violation, though, that absolute right disappears. In its place is the rule of law. While religious beliefs are protected from religious discrimination, they are no excuse or defense to the application of laws like those governing marriage, crime, and child abuse.

For this reason, the appellate court should have been focused on the conduct alleged, regardless of the belief that motivated it, and regardless whether belief was mentioned below. Had it focused on that conduct, as was its duty, then the court would surely have been led to the opposite conclusion, and would have upheld the earlier decision approving the removal of all children from this troubling compound.

For those who may still question the belief/action distinction (as I did at one point in my career), I think it is worthwhile to consider the following two hypotheticals, which strongly prove the value of that very distinction (and why CPS acted appropriately when it removed all of the children):

Hypothetical Number One. A group of 100 adults and 400 children live together, in a remote location with little contact beyond their own community. None of them are religious. Rather, they have a secular belief that men live longer if they have sex with multiple women, and especially if they have sex with girls as soon as they start menstruating. A man’s future health is confirmed most clearly by the birth of a child, which means women are forced to produce as many children as possible from adolescence through old age. Within the community’s practices, boys are groomed to be men with multiple spouses and child brides. A single “medical” leader determines which female partners will most improve each man’s health. In short, they practice top-down polygamy and engage in persistent statutory rape. The authorities get a report that a 16-year-old girl is being abused. When they enter and see the underage pregnant girls and the girls with children of their own, which children should they leave behind?

Hypothetical Number Two. A group of adults engages in child prostitution and lives in an isolated enclave. They do not practice polygamy; in fact, the adults do not get married at all. Each adult might sleep with another adult at some point, but never for any period of time that would be recognized by the state as even a common law marriage. They do have as many children as possible, though, to keep the business going. The kingpin determines where the girls are sent after they reach adolescence – most are transported within the United States or up to Canada, and made available for whatever men are interested. Some are kept on the premises for more child-bearing. Girls generate the most income, so boys are either abandoned or they stay within the group, spreading their sperm to as many girls and women as possible, to produce the most children possible. Here, we have rampant child abuse, though no polygamy. Local authorities get a tip that a girl is being abused. When they arrive and find records establishing the above facts, they have to decide which children to take and which to leave behind. Which child would you leave behind? How would you sleep at night if you left one behind?

The Texas courts should be looking at the conduct of the FLDS, just as authorities would in the above scenarios. No matter what they believe, their actions require state intervention for every child involved. Under Texas law (and basic common sense), every child is in danger in both the real sect and in the two hypotheticals, and state officials should be given the latitude necessary to secure their safety. The facts establish that the FLDS is a fundamentally lawless group, which has no respect for marriage laws, rape laws, child abuse laws, or even the legal requirements governing birth certificates. (Others who have escaped from the organization detail welfare fraud and child labor law violations as well.) As currently constituted, they offer no environment for children, period.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS ════════════ No. 08-0391 ════════════ In re Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Relator ════════════════════════════════════════════════════ On Petition for Mandamus ════════════════════════════════════════════════════ PER CURIAM Justice O’Neill filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Johnson and Justice Willett joined. The Yearning for Zion Ranch is a 1,700-acre complex near Eldorado, Texas, that is home to a large community associated with the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. On March 29, 2008, the Texas Department of Family Protective Services received a telephone call reporting that a sixteen-year-old girl named Sarah was being physically and sexually abused at the Ranch. On April 3, about 9:00 p.m., Department investigators and law enforcement officials entered the Ranch, and throughout the night they interviewed adults and children and searched for documents. Concerned that the community had a culture of polygamy and of directing girls younger than eighteen to enter spiritual unions with older men and have children, the Department took possession of all 468 children at the Ranch without a court order.[1] The Department calls this “the largest child protection case documented in the history of the United States.” It never located the girl Sarah who was the subject of the March 29 call. The Department then filed several suits affecting the parent-child relationship (“SAPCRs”)[2] requesting emergency orders removing the children from their parents and limiting the parents’ access to the children. The Department also requested appointment as temporary sole managing conservator of the children, genetic testing, and permanent relief. On April 17-18, the district court conducted the adversary hearing required by section 262.201(a) of the Texas Family Code.[3] Subsections (b) and (c) state in relevant part: (b) At the conclusion of the full adversary hearing, the court shall order the return of the child to the parent . . . entitled to possession unless the court finds sufficient evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary prudence and caution that: (1) there was a danger to the physical health or safety of the child which was caused by an act or failure to act of the person entitled to possession and for the child to remain in the home is contrary to the welfare of the child; (2) the urgent need for protection required the immediate removal of the child and reasonable efforts, consistent with the circumstances and providing for the safety of the child, were made to eliminate or prevent the child's removal; and (3) reasonable efforts have been made to enable the child to return home, but there is a substantial risk of a continuing danger if the child is returned home. (c) If the court finds sufficient evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary prudence and caution that there is a continuing danger to the physical health or safety of the child and for the child to remain in the home is contrary to the welfare of the child, the court shall issue an appropriate temporary order under Chapter 105. The hearing was attended by scores of attorneys for the parties, attorneys ad litem, guardians ad litem, Texas Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA), and many others. The hearing was conducted in the courtroom in San Angelo with overflow participants in the city auditorium. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court issued temporary orders continuing the Department’s custody of the children and allowing for visitation by the parents only with the Department’s agreement. Thirty-eight mothers petitioned the court of appeals for review by mandamus, seeking return of their 126 children. The record reflects that at least 117 of the children are under 13 and that two boys are 13 and 17. The ages of the other seven, at least two of whom are boys, are not shown. Concluding that the Department had failed to meet its burden of proof under section 262.201(b)(1), the court of appeals directed the district to vacate its temporary orders granting the Department custody. In re Steed, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.–Austin 2008). The Department petitioned this Court for review by mandamus. Having carefully examined the testimony at the adversary hearing and the other evidence before us, we are not inclined to disturb the court of appeals’ decision. On the record before us, removal of the children was not warranted. The Department argues without explanation that the court of appeals’ decision leaves the Department unable to protect the children’s safety, but the Family Code gives the district court broad authority to protect children short of separating them from their parents and placing them in foster care. The court may make and modify temporary orders “for the safety and welfare of the child”,[4] including an order “restraining a party from removing the child beyond a geographical area identified by the court”.[5] The court may also order the removal of an alleged perpetrator from the child’s home[6] and may issue orders to assist the Department in its investigation.[7] The Code prohibits interference with an investigation,[8] and a person who relocates a residence or conceals a child with the intent to interfere with an investigation commits an offense.[9] While the district court must vacate the current temporary custody orders as directed by the court of appeals, it need not do so without granting other appropriate relief to protect the children, as the mothers involved in this proceeding concede in response to the Department’s motion for emergency relief. The court of appeals’ decision does not conclude the SAPCR proceedings. Although the SAPCRs involve important, fundamental issues concerning parental rights and the State’s interest in protecting children, it is premature for us to address those issues. The Department’s petition for mandamus is denied. Opinion issued: May 29, 2008

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Why a Texas Appellate Court Seriously Erred In Concluding that Texas Child Protective Services Should Not Have Rescued All of the Children at the FLDS Compound