The authors of the September 2004 article in the Nonproliferation Review include a Principal member of the technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories and two biosecurity analysts at Sandia National Laboratories.
The authors state:
“The Bacillus anthracis in this attack had additionally been coated with a substance to eliminate the electrostatic charge so that the spores would not be attracted to one another and clump together, thus increasing their ability to remain aerosolized.”
For background reading on Al Qaeda and anthrax, you might request through interlibrary loan
“The challenge of biological terrorism”
by Cordesman, Anthony H.
Published by CSIS Press, xiii, 208 p.; 2005
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Preface ix
1. WHEN TO CRY ‘WOLF’, p. 1
1. Problem of Risk Assessments, p. 3
Little Transparency and Uncertain Pattern Analysis, p. 5
Failure of U.S. Department of State Reports, p. 6
Reform of Reporting Needed, p. 9
Threat Analysis Based on History, p. 11
Cases from the Sixth Century B.C. to A.D. 2000, p. 12
2001: Amerithrax Odyssey, p. 17
Incidents after September 11, 2001, p. 22
The Islamist Extremist Threat as a Case Study, p. 24
Words and Actions of Islamic Extremism, p. 24
CIA View of the Al Qaeda Threat, p. 31
Presidential Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 35
Other Views, p. 36
Capability-Based Threat Analysis, p. 38
Key Challenges for Action: Improve Incident and Scenario
Analysis and the Tracking of Terrorists, p. 40
2. WHAT TO CRY, p. 47
2. Problem of Intelligence, p. 49
Critical Problems Even in Superpower Intelligence, p. 49
Key Challenges for Action: Improving Intelligence, p. 52
3. Problem of Low-Level Biological Attack, p. 55
Low-Level Attacks Most Likely, p. 56
Challenges Nonstate Actors Face, p. 57
Prospects for Bioterrorism in Near Future, p. 60
Key Challenges for Action: Improve Response to Low-
Level Attack, p. 62
4. Uncertainties of High-Level Biological Attack, p. 69
Lethality and Medical Impact, p. 70
Anthrax, p. 71
Smallpox, p. 74
Plague, p. 76
Other Human Lethality Issues, p. 78
Beyond Single-Disease Lethality and Medical Effects, p. 81
Impacts Other than Direct Medical Effects, p. 82
Threats to Livestock and Agriculture, p. 83
Manufacture, Weaponization, and Dissemination, p. 85
Soviet Manufacture, Weaponization, and Lethality, p. 86
Dissemination of Necessary Equipment and Technology, p. 89
Dual-Use Technology, p. 91
Dual-Use Research, p. 94
Options for Control of Dual-Use Technology
United States as a Case Study, p. 96
Controlling the Flow of Scientific Expertise, p. 99
Other Issues of Technology and Weaponization, p. 100
Technological Change and the ô12 Monkeyö Problem, p. 102
Key Challenges for Action: Improving the Response to
High-Level Attack, p. 108
3. HOW TO CRY ‘WOLF’, p. 119
5. Resources and Levels of Effort, p. 121
The Prudent Minimum, p. 121
Prudent Minimalism or Inglorious Excess: United States as
a Case Study, p. 124
Estimates of the U.S. Effort, p. 124
Administrative Reorganization, p. 130
Programs of Detection, p. 132
Key Challenges for Action: Finding the Golden Mean, p. 137
6. Threat from Man vs. Threat from Nature, p. 141
Threat from Man, Seen by Scientists, p. 141
Threat from Nature, Seen by the National Intelligence Council 144
Threat from Nature, Seen by the WHO, p. 148
Key Challenges for Action: Integrating Bioterrorism and
Public Health Initiatives, p. 150
4. WHEN TO CRY ‘WOLF,’ WHAT TO CRY, AND HOW TO CRY, p. 153
7. Challenge of International Cooperation, p. 155
Transparency in the Real World, p. 155
Current International Initiatives: Reality or Rhetoric?, p. 156
Key Challenges for Action: Strengthening International
Cooperation, p. 164
Appendix A: Planning Scenarios, p. 173
Scenario 2: Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax, p. 173
Scenario 4: Biological Attack - Plague, p. 176
Scenario 13: Biological Attack - Food Contamination, p. 179
Appendix B: Biodefense for the 21st Century, p. 183
Appendix C: Pandemic Influenza, p. 195
Appendix D: Supporting Material Attached to Scientists’ Letter to
Director of NIH, p. 199
About the Author, p. 207
“The Bacillus anthracis in this attack had additionally been coated with a substance to eliminate the electrostatic charge so that the spores would not be attracted to one another and clump together, thus increasing their ability to remain aerosolized.”
And if questioned, they'd undoubtedly tell you that they never actually had any access to the attack anthrax and only got their information from the media (which includes Science Magazine).
There appear to be COUNTLESS articles in respected journals where the authors just mindlessly repeat totally BUGUS information about the attack anthrax that they read somewhere in the media.