And for legal interpretations on the BWCC combined with characterization of the sophistication of the mailed anthrax, there is American Journal of International Law, April 1, 2007 — containing the article “The shortcomings of indeterminacy in arms control regimes: the case of the Biological Weapons Convention.”
Excerpt:
“Although the BWC purports to out law the development and possession of all biological weapons, deadlier and more sophisticated biological weapons than were imaginable in 1972 can now be and have been produced, as evidenced in October 2001 by two letters sent to the Capitol Hill offices of Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy. (2) These letters reportedly contained threatening notes and a dangerous and sophisticated form of “weapons-grade” anthrax spores. (3) Even though both the sender of these letters and the source of the anthrax remain unknown, the technical sophistication of the spores led some experts to suggest that the attacker was supported by aU.S. “biodefense” laboratory or an advanced foreign-state-run biological weapons (BW) facility because the spores could not have been produced by an amateur working in his basement. (4)
In addition to the empirical evidence of new “super” biological weapons, the failings of the BWC are further mani-fested by the growing significance that countries like the United States attach to the BW threat, (5) allegations by senior U.S. government officials that terrorists and rogue states possess biological weapons, (6) and contentious review conferences of BWC states parties that have been unable to resolve cheating and compliance concerns.”
The cited authority will be familiar to you both except, perhaps, this one which I can forward if you haven’t seen it:
Reynolds M. Salerno et al., A BW Risk Assessment: Historical and Technical Perspectives, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall/Winter 2004, at25, 53 n.50.
The author in the post above cites these publications in his footnotes in support. It would avoid repetition if only the Salerno publication is discussed.
“(3) A diverse group of sixteen biodefense scientists published a paper describing the Senate anthrax powder as an exceptionally deadly “weapons-grade” version of the bacterium with “high spore concentration, uniform particle size, low electrostatic charge, treated to reduce clumping.”ThomasV. Inglesby et al., Anthrax as a Biological Weapon,2002: Updated Recommendations for Management, 287 J. AM.MED. ASS’N 2236, 2237 (2002); see also Dan Eggen & Guy Gugliotta, FBI Secretly Trying to Re-create Anthrax from Mail Attacks, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2002, at A9 (describing the particles as “astonishingly pure”); Gary Matsumoto, Anthrax Powder: State of the Art? 302 SCIENCE 1492, 1492-94 (2003); Reynolds M. Salerno et al., A BW Risk Assessment: Historical and Technical Perspectives, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall/Winter 2004, at25, 53 n.50.
(4) Although the FBI originally suggested that the anthrax powder could have been produced by a lone amateur working in a basement laboratory, this theory soon came to be regarded as unlikely and was abandoned. Guy Gugliotta & Gary Matsumoto, FBI’s Theory on Anthrax Is Doubted; Attacks Not Likely Work of 1 Person, Experts Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2002, at A1. The spores were also reportedly identified as belonging to a highly virulent strain of an-thrax used in U.S. biodefense research programs. Eileen Choffnes, Bioweapons: New Labs, More Terror? BULL. ATOM. SCI., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 28. After more than five years without an arrest, however, some FBI officials have reportedly questioned the sophistication of the anthrax powder used in the attacks. Allan Lengel & Joby Warrick, FBI Is Casting a Wider Net in Anthrax Attacks, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2006, at A1.”