Dr. Rebel.
You need to stop needlessly tilting at windmills (especially after you built them).
Corinne M. Verzoni wrote a 2007 PhD thesis titled “An Assessment of Exploitable Weakness in Universities” which discusses Al-Timimi and GMU Center for Biodefense/Discovery Hall at considerable length.
She quotes me on what was found on KSM’s computer. Now aside from not relying on a more citable source like Susan Schmidt or Barton Gellman at the Washington Post on such an issue, she does beautifully. She discusses Al-Timimi, the nature of the research at Discovery Hall, the vulnerability to theft, the consequences to the University if such a theft were discovered and revealed, equipment that has gone missing (examples are from 2006), evidence of covert research being conducted, the failure to inventory equipment costing less than $2,000, and numerous details providing “I am here” flavor” — such as when and how equipment can easily be walked out the loading dock on weekends. She explains that students have access to lab equipment even for their own work or studies — with such work being totally unmonitored. She also talks about computer security (or rather access to computers). For example, she notes that a researcher can and typically will enter research results in a lab computer that then can be accessed by someone else, and the experiments repeated. The most fascinating aspect of the thesis concerns how a strain of anthrax (such as Pasteur), which is not particularly pathogenic, is nonetheless of concern (and listed now as a select agent) because it can be genetically modified. (You’ll recall the issue of the mailed anthrax having an inverted strain). The building is presently BL-2, BL-2+ with a BL-3 contemplated. But note that the Ames strain (in liquid form) was a BL-2 agent. I would have Zack send you the thesis when he gets back but I know how opposed you are to developments in scientific learning. But if the Hartford Courant were to take this thesis — which was supervised by someone whose day job is at the DOD (hint, hint) — and do the thorough job the paper did on the 1992 research at Ft. Detrick — I’d say there is a Pulitzer in the works.
While Ed and TrebleRebel are looking back to yesteryear, Professor Meseson’s wife is looking to the future in Patrick Tucker’s “Germ Warfare Under the Microscope”
Washington:May/Jun 2008 issue of The Futurist.
In an interview, MIT bioweapons expert Jeanne Guillemin talked about biowarfare. She says that technology by itself is not the driving force behind the threat of biological weapons. That force continues to be political. But for the sake of discussion, they can say that the technology for biological weapons is characterized by two levels of threat. One is residual, emanating from the old program, in which the weapons potential of anthrax, tularemia, plague, and other infectious diseases was developed. The other threat concerns innovations in human genetics and neurology. In the last six years, the US has invested some $44 billion in biodefense research and development, but whether this use of resources has deterred bioterrorism is unclear.
“Guillemin: To feel empowered against the threat of biological weapons, individual citizens should insist on two policies: One is an effective, equitable health-care system that guarantees general protection from a range of medical threats. The other is government accountability regarding military or other programs potentially in violation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.”
Jeanne Guillemin is a professor of sociology at Boston College and a senior fellow at the MIT Security Studies Program. She is the author of several books on biological warfare, including Biological Weapons: The History of State Sponsored Programs and the Problem of Bioterrorism (Columbia University Press, 2004). Her e-mail address is guillemin@mit. edu.
This interview was conducted by Patrick Tucker, senior editor of THE FUTURIST.