No experts who examined the spore pictures actually SAW any additives.
There is no principle to silica coatings.
Anthrax spores don't clump.
It's a near certainty that a child wrote the letters.
Posted on 04/13/2008 8:20:52 AM PDT by ZacandPook
On Friday, the government filed this statement of the facts in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment in a civil rights and Privacy Act lawsuit brought by Dr. Steve Hatfill.
“The anthrax attacks occurred in October 2001. Public officials, prominent members of the media, and ordinary citizens were targeted by this first bio-terrorist attack on American soil. Twenty-two persons were infected with anthrax; five died. At least 17 public buildings were contaminated. The attacks wreaked havoc on the U.S. postal system and disrupted government and commerce, resulting in economic losses estimated to exceed one billion dollars. The attacks spread anxiety throughout the nation – already in a heightened state of alert in the wake of the attacks of September 11 – and left behind a lasting sense of vulnerability to future acts of bioterrorism. Given the unprecedented nature of the attacks, the investigation received intense media attention. Journalists from virtually every news organization pursued the story, sometimes conducting their own worldwide investigation to determine the person or persons responsible for the attacks and the motive behind them.
A. Journalistic Interest In Hatfill That Predates Alleged Disclosures
Testimony has revealed that at least certain members of the media began focusing their attention upon Hatfill in early 2002 because of tips they had received from former colleagues of his who found him to be highly suspicious. Articles about Hatfill thus began to appear in the mainstream press and on internet sites as early as January of 2002, and continued until the first search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, which, in turn, led to even more intense press attention.
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a Professor at the State University of New York, for example, complained in January and February 2002 on the Federation of American Scientists’ (“FAS”) website of the FBI’s apparent lack of progress on the investigation, and described generally the person she believed was the “anthrax perpetrator.” “Analysis of Anthrax Attacks,” Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator (Section IV.6), Defendant’s Appendix , Ex. 1. Rosenberg did not identify Hatfill by name, but described him in sufficient detail: a “Middle-aged American” who “[w]orks for a CIA contractor in Washington, DC area” and [w]orked in USAMRIID laboratory in the past” and “[k]nows Bill Patrick and probably learned a thing or two about weaponization from him informally.” Id. In his amended complaint, Hatfill states that “Professor Rosenberg’s ‘Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator’ . . . described [him].”
In addition to her postings on the FAS website, Professor Rosenberg also presented a lecture on February 18, 2002 at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, entitled “The Anthrax Attacks and the Control of Bioterrorism.” Ex. 2. During the course of her lecture, Rosenberg stated that she had “draw[n] a likely portrait of the perpetrator as a former Fort Detrick scientist who is now working for a contractor in the Washington, D.C, area[.]” Ex. 3. Rosenberg also commented upon Hatfill’s whereabouts on the date of the attacks, stating that “[h]e had reason for travel to Florida, New Jersey and the United Kingdom” – where the attacks had been and from which the letters had been purportedly sent – that “[h]e grew [the anthrax], probably on a solid medium, and weaponised it at a private location where he had accumulated the equipment and the material.” Id. Rosenberg also stated that the investigation had narrowed to a “common suspect[,]” and that “[t]he FBI has questioned that person more than once[.]” Id. Former White House Spokesperson, Ari Fleischer, immediately responded to Rosenberg’s comments, stating that there were several suspects and the FBI had not narrowed that list down to one. Ex. 4. The FBI also issued a press release, stating that it had “interviewed hundreds of persons, in some instances, more than once. It is not accurate, however, that the FBI has identified a prime suspect in this case.” Id. Rosenberg’s comments and writings were subsequently pursued by The New York Times (“The Times”). In a series of Op-Ed articles published from May through July 2002, Nicholas Kristof, a journalist with The Times, accused Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks. Kristof wrote on May 24, 2002 that the FBI was overlooking the anthrax perpetrator, noting that “experts” (Professor Rosenberg) point “to one middle-aged American who has worked for the United States military bio-defense program and had access to the labs at Fort Detrick, Md. His anthrax vaccinations are up to date, he unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax, and he was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the anthrax attack.” Ex. 5.
Hatfill first noticed the Kristof columns in May 2002. Hatfill Dep. Tran. in Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 6, at 13: 3-6. According to Hatfill, “[w]hen Mr. Kristof’s article appeared, it was the first [time] that [he] realized that [his] name [was] in the public domain with connection with an incident of mass murder.” Id. at 16:15-18. Hatfill has charged that The Times began the “entire conflagration and gave every journalist out there reason to drive this thing beyond any sort of sanity. Mr. Kristof lit the fuse to a barn fire and he repeatedly kept stoking the fire.” Id. at 43:19 - 44:1. In July 2004, Hatfill thus filed suit alleging that these articles libeled him by falsely accusing him of being the anthrax mailer. Complaint, Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 7.
Hatfill alleges in that lawsuit that “Kristof wrote his columns in such a way as to impute guilt for the anthrax letters to [him] in the minds of reasonable readers.” Id. ¶ 12. The articles, Hatfill claimed, which described his “background and work in the field of bio-terrorism, state or imply that [he] was the anthrax mailer.” Id. ¶ 14. Hatfill specifically alleged that statements in Kristof’s articles were false and defamatory, including those that stated that he: (1) “‘unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax’”; (2) “had the ‘ability’ to send the anthrax”; (3) “had the ‘access’ required to send the anthrax”; (4) “had a ‘motive’ to send the anthrax”; (5) “was one of a ‘handful’ of individuals who had the ‘ability, access and motive to send the anthrax’”; (6) “had access” to an ‘isolated residence’ in the fall of 2001, when the anthrax letters were sent”; (7) “‘gave CIPRO [an antibiotic famously used in the treatment of anthrax infection] to people who visited [the ‘isolated residence’]”; (8) his “anthrax vaccinations were ‘up to date’ as of May 24, 2002”; (9) he “‘failed 3 successive polygraph examinations’ between January 2002 and August 13, 2002”; (10) he “‘was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the attack’”; (11) he “‘was once caught with a girlfriend in a biohazard ‘hot suite’ at Fort Detrick [where Hatfill had concedely worked] surrounded only by blushing germs.’” Id. ¶ 16 (brackets in original). Hatfill alleges in his lawsuit against The Times that “[t]he publication of [Kristof’s] repeated defamation of [him] . . .gave rise to severe notoriety gravely injurious to [him].” Id. ¶ 29. The injury, Hatfill alleged, “was [made] all the more severe given the status and journalistic clout of The Times.” Id. This harm was compounded, Hatfill alleged, by the fact that these articles were “thereafter repeatedly published by a host of print and on-line publications and on the television and radio news” in the following months. Id., ¶ 30.
The case was initially dismissed by the trial court. Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807, 2004 WL 3023003 (E.D.Va.). That decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005). Upon remand, the trial court granted The Times summary judgment, finding that Hatfill was a public figure and public official and had failed to present evidence of malice. Hatfill v. The New York Times, 488 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D. Va. 2007). In arriving at that conclusion, the court considered Hatfill’s repeated media interviews before the attacks; the fact that he had “drafted a novel, which he registered with [the] United States Copyright office, describing a scenario in which a terrorist sickens government officials with a biological agent”; and had lectured on the medical effects of chemical and biological agents. Id. at 525.
Although not recited by the district court in The New York Times litigation, Hatfill also talked directly to reporters about his suspected involvement in the attacks. Brian Ross of ABC News, and his producer, Victor Walter, for example, talked separately to Hatfill on two to three occasions as early as January and February 2002, Ross Dep. Tran., Ex. 8, at 263:14 - 270:1, and continued talking to Hatfill until May of that year. Id. Ross also spoke to Hatfill’s friend and mentor, William Patrick, about Hatfill. Id. at 287:9 - 295:12. These meetings were prompted by discussions ABC News had in January 2002 with eight to twelve former colleagues of Hatfill at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (“USAMRIID”). Id. at 242:7 - 246:14. Hatfill’s former colleagues found him to be “highly suspicious because of a number of things he had done when he worked at [USAMRIID], and this behavior was strange "and unusual and they felt that he was a likely candidate.” Id. at 242: 7-17. These meetings were also prompted by ABC News’s own investigative reporting into Hatfill’s background; the more ABC News learned “the more interested [they] became” in Hatfill. Id. at 264: 14-15.
Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun also spoke to Hatfill in February 2002. Shane also spoke to USAMRIID employees who had worked with Hatfill. Ex. 9. These employees stated that they had been questioned by the FBI and “asked about a former Fort Detrick scientist” – Hatfill – “who returned a few years ago and took discarded biological safety cabinets, used for work with dangerous pathogens.” Id. at 1. These employees claimed that Hatfill “ha[d] expertise on weaponizing anthrax and ha[d] been vaccinated against it[.]” Id. Shane also called one of Hatfill’s former classmates, who was “plagued” by questions from the Baltimore Sun and others within the media regarding Hatfill’s “alleged involvement with the large anthrax outbreak in Zimbabwe[.]” Ex. 10. According to Hatfill, this classmate was told by Shane that Hatfill was purportedly responsible for “mailing the anthrax letters and also starting the [anthrax] outbreak in Zimbabwe/ Rhodesia twenty years before.” Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014; see also e-mail to Hatfill fr. DF Andrews, dated Mar. 1, 2002, Ex. 10. Hatfill told Shane in February 2002 that he had been “questioned by the FBI” and that “he considered the questioning to be part of a routine effort to eliminate people with the knowledge to mount [the] attack.” Ex. 9. Hatfill also confirmed for Shane that he had taken an FBI polygraph. Ex. 12, at 2. In March 2002, Hatfill left Shane a frantic telephone message reportedly stating how he had “been [in the bioterrorism] field for a number of years, working until 3 o’clock in the morning, trying to counter this type of weapon of mass destruction” and fearing that his “career [was] over at [that] time.” Ex. 13, at 2. According to Hatfill, Shane later Case 1:03-cv-01793-RBW Document 232-2 Filed 04/11/2008 Page 17 of 73
____ Hatfill did not sue either Shane or Rosenberg, even though Hatfill has stated that Rosenberg “caused” the focus on him. Ex. 14, at 10. Because Hatfill believed that the portrait Rosenberg painted at the February 2002 Princeton conference and in her website postings was so identifying and incriminating, however, Hatfill advised Rosenberg through his lawyers that “before [she] get[s] close to describing him in the future, by name or otherwise, [that she] submit [her] comments for legal vetting before publishing them to anyone.” Ex. 15. There is no evidence that the agency defendants bore any responsibility for the media presence. Information about FBI searches is routinely shared with a variety of state and local law enforcement authorities. Roth Dep. Tran., Ex. 16, at 163:5 -165:21; Garrett Dep. Tran. Ex. 17, at 79: 8-18. ______
compounded Hatfill’s problems by calling his then-employer, Science Applications International Corporation (“SAIC”), and accusing Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks, Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014, which, according to Hatfill, cost him his job as a contractor at SAIC. Id. 1
The media frenzy surrounding Hatfill intensified upon the search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, and the search of a refrigerated mini-storage facility in Ocala, Florida on June 26, 2002. Both were witnessed by the media, and the search of his apartment was carried live on national television. In addition to the television coverage, the searches generated a slew of articles about Hatfill throughout the media, one fueling the next. The Associated Press, for example, detailed in an article, dated June 27, 2002, Hatfill’s (1) work as biodefense researcher, including studies he had conducted at SAIC, and the work he had done at the USAMRIID; (2) his educational background; (3) where he had previously lived; and (4) security clearances he had held and the suspension of those clearances. Ex. 18. The Hartford Courant reported these same details, and additional information regarding Hatfill’s purported service in the Rhodesian army. Ex. 19. The next day -- June 28, 2002 -- the Hartford Courant reported details about Hatfill’s background in biological warfare, his vaccinations against anthrax, questioning that purportedly had occurred among Hatfill’s colleagues, his educational background (including the claim that he had attended medical school in Greendale), and lectures that he had given on the process of turning biological agents into easily inhaled powders. Ex. 20. None of this information is attributed to a government source.
B. Hatfill’s Public Relations Offensive
In July 2002, after these reports and after the first search of Hatfill’s apartment on June 25, 2002, Hatfill retained Victor Glasberg as his attorney. Glasberg Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 12: 16-19. Glasberg believed that “any number of people in the media [had] overstepped their bounds. . . . prior to July of 2002 .” Id. at 141:1 - 142:6. To counter this information, Hatfill set out on a “public relations offensive” of his own to “turn [the] tide.” Id. at 138: 20-21, 178: 12-13.
Recognizing that Hatfill “continue[d] [to] get[] killed with bad press, national as well as local[,]” Hatfill drafted a statement and Glasberg forwarded that statement in July 2002 to Hatfill’s then-employer at Louisiana State University (“LSU”). Ex. 11, at 1. The statement detailed Hatfill’s background, including his medical training and employment history, and provided details about Hatfill’s involvement in the anthrax investigation, including how he had been interviewed by the FBI and had taken a polygraph examination. Id. at AGD29SJH00002-13. Hatfill’s statement corroborated the conversations that Hatfill reportedly had with Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun in February 2002, and how that interaction had purportedly cost Hatfill his job at SAIC in March 2002. Id. at AGD29SJH00014.
In his July statement, Hatfill was careful not to blame DOJ or the FBI for his troubles or for any wrongdoing for the information about him that had made its way into the press. He touted the professionalism of the FBI, noting that “[t]he individual FBI agents with whom [he had come] in contact during this entire process are sons and daughters of which America can be justifiably proud. They are fine men and women doing their best to protect this country.” Id. at AGD29SJH00016. Hatfill’s objection lay with the media, whom he labeled as “irresponsible[,]” for trading in “half-truths, innuendo and speculation, making accusations and slanting real world events . . . to gain viewer recognition, sell newspapers, and increase readership and network ratings.” Id.
As the investigation proceeded, however, Glasberg publicly criticized investigators on the date of the second search of Hatfill’s apartment, August 1, 2002, for obtaining a search warrant rather than accepting the offer Glasberg had allegedly made to cooperate. Ex. 22. So angry was Glasberg with investigators that he wrote a letter, dated the same day as the search, to Assistant United States Attorney Kenneth C. Kohl, denouncing the fact that the search had been conducted “pursuant to a search warrant.” Ex. 23. Glasberg forwarded a copy of this letter to Tom Jackman of the Washington Post, and to the Associated Press, the morning of August 1st. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 24, at 265:12 - 266:5; see also Ex. 25 (Glasberg memorandum to file, stating, among other things, that Glasberg showed Jackman Kohl letter on August 1, 2002).
On the day of the search, an FBI spokeswoman at the Bureau’s Washington field office, Debra Weierman, “confirmed that the search was part of the government’s anthrax investigation.” Ex. 25. Weierman added, however, that “she was unable to confirm that [investigators were acting on a search warrant] or to provide any further information about the search.” Id.
The next day – August 2, 2002 – Glasberg faxed the Kohl letter to members of the media. Ex. 26. In the fax transmittal sheet accompanying the Kohl letter, Glasberg also advised the media that: Dr. Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI earlier this year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI. He and his lawyer Tom Carter were told that the results were all favorable and that he was not a suspect in the case. Id. at AGD16SJH03106. Subsequent to the fax transmittal by Glasberg, Weierman confirmed that the search had been conducted pursuant to a search warrant, but only after receiving appropriate authorization from her superiors. Weierman Dep. Tran., Ex. 27, at 93:16 - 94:14.
Hatfill had also accompanied Glasberg for his interview with Jackman the day before to address the “media feeding frenzy.” Ex. 28. Glasberg provided Jackman with the promise of an “[e]xclusive personal statement” from Hatfill and the promise of “[n]o other press contacts pending publication” of the article. Id. Glasberg thus provided Jackman background information about Hatfill, Rosenberg’s statements, and other publications. Ex. 25. Hatfill reportedly complained to the Washington Post in the interview about the media feeding frenzy, and about how his “friends are bombarded” with press inquiries. Ex. 29, at 1. Hatfill also complained about the “[p]hone calls at night. Trespassing. Beating on my door. For the sheer purpose of selling newspapers and television.” Id.
C. Attorney General Ashcroft’s Person of Interest Statements
Following this “media frenzy,” not to mention the two searches of Hatfill’s apartment, former Attorney General John Ashcroft was asked on August 6, 2002 (at an event addressing the subject of missing and exploited children) about Hatfill’s involvement in the investigation. Jane Clayson of CBS News asked General Ashcroft about the searches and whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 30, at 2. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person of interest.” General Ashcroft cautioned, however, that he was “not prepared to say any more at [that] time other than the fact that he is an individual of interest.” Id. At the same media event, Matt Lauer of NBC News also asked General Ashcroft whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 31. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person that – that the FBI’s been interested in.” Id. at 2. General Ashcroft cautioned that he was “not prepared to make a . . . comment about whether a person is officially a . . . suspect or not.” Id.
General Ashcroft made the same comments at a news conference in Newark, New Jersey on August 22, 2002, stating that Hatfill was a “person of interest to the Department of Justice, and we continue the investigation.” Ex. 32, at 1. As in his previous statements, General Ashcroft refused to provide further comment. Id. When asked upon deposition why he referred to Hatfill as a “person of interest” in the anthrax investigation in response to these media inquiries, General Ashcroft testified that he did so in an attempt to correct the record presented by the media that he was a “suspect” in the investigation, which he believed served a necessary law enforcement purpose. Ashcroft Dep. Tran., Ex. 33, at 81: 5-12; 103:18; 108: 9-13; 138: 5-7; 125: 18-21; 134:22 - 136:8. Prior to making these statements, General Ashcroft did not review or otherwise consult any investigative record, id. at 128:14 - 129:12, much less any record pertaining to Hatfill.
General Ashcroft’s initial statements on August 6, 2002 were followed, on August 11, 2002, by the first of Hatfill’s two nationally televised press conferences. Ex. 34. During his press conference, Hatfill lashed out at Rosenberg and other journalists and columnists who he believed wrote a series of “defamatory speculation and innuendo about [him].” Id. at 3. In apparent response to the “person of interest” statements, by contrast, he stated that he did “not object to being considered a ‘subject of interest’ because of [his] knowledge and background in the field of biological warfare.” Id. at 4. This was consistent with Hatfill’s statement to ABC News earlier in 2002 in which he stated that “his background and comments made him a logical subject of the investigation.” Ex. 35. As noted, moreover, Glasberg told the media -- almost a week before the first of General Ashcroft’s statements -- that “Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI [earlier that] year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI.” Ex. 26.
Hatfill’s second press conference was held on August 25, 2002. In the flyer publicizing the conference, Hatfill identified himself to the media -- in bold lettering -- as “the ‘person of interest’ at the center of the federal Government’s [anthrax] investigation.” DA, Exhibit 36.
D. Clawson’s “Sunshine” Policy
Patrick Clawson joined the Hatfill team in early August 2002 as spokesperson and “fielded hundreds of inquiries from members of the press worldwide regarding Dr. Hatfill[.]” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson believed it best to employ a media strategy that would, in his words, “let it all hang out.” Id. at 50:10. Clawson felt that “permitting maximum sunshine into . . . Hatfill’s existence would do both him and the public the best good.” Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 50:16-18.
“The majority of Clawson’s communications with the press regarding this case have been oral and by telephone and he did not keep a press log or any other regular record of such contacts with the press.” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson nonetheless admitted upon deposition that he revealed numerous details about Hatfill’s personal and professional background to members of the press (Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 101:9 - 105:21), including Hatfill’s professional expertise (id. at 103:10 - 105:21), use of Cipro (id. at 123:16 - 130:11, 248: 8-13), whereabouts on the days of the attacks (id. at 148:12 - 158:10, 361:15 - 362:3), expertise in working with anthrax (id. at 194:13 - 195:8), former service in the Rhodesian Army (id. at 210:9 - 211:10), and drunk driving arrest (id. at 795: 7-9, 798: 4-6). Clawson also told reporters what had been purportedly removed from Hatfill’s apartment during the two searches of his apartment on June 25, 2002 and August 1, 2002 (including medical books and a jar of bacillus thuringiensis (“BT”)) (id. at 121: 6-12, 131:2 - 131:12, 14:8 - 147:3, 313: 3-10). Clawson also freely relayed to the press that bloodhounds had been presented to Hatfill during the investigation (id. at 200: 15-19); that Hatfill had been the subject of surveillance (id. at 123:12-15, 428: 19-21); that Hatfill had taken polygraphs (id. at 135:16 - 137:17); and that he had submitted to blood tests (id. at 137:18-138:5, 347: 6-10).
In furtherance of Clawson’s “sunshine” policy, Hatfill, Clawson, and Glasberg, together, provided countless on-the-record, on-background (i.e., for use, but not for attribution), and off-the-record (i.e., not for attribution or use) interviews to counter misinformation. Although Hatfill repeatedly claimed upon deposition not to remember what he said during these interviews, he acknowledged in his responses to the Agency Defendants’ interrogatories having such conversations with, in addition to Mr. Jackman, Judith Miller of The New York Times, Jeremy Cherkis of the City Paper, Guy Gugliotta of the Washington Post, David Kestenbaum of National Public Radio, Rick Schmidt of the LA Times, Rob Buchanan of NBC Dateline, Jim Popkin of NBC News, Dee Ann David and Nick Horrock of UPI, Gary Matsumato of Fox TV, Bill Gertz of the Washington Times, and David Tell of the Weekly Standard. Ex. 12, at 3-4. With respect to the Matsumato interview, Glasberg warned Hatfill before the interview that he “should not be quoted, nor should Matsumato say or imply that he spoke with him.” Ex. 38, at 1. Glasberg warned Hatfill that “Matsumato must be willing to go to jail rather than reveal word one of anything [he] says on ‘deep background.’” Id.
All of these disclosures became too much even for Glasberg, who attempted to put a stop to them. In August, when Jackman aired his exclusive interview with Glasberg and Hatfill, Glasberg heralded the success of his public relations strategy noting that “Rosenberg, Shane and Kristof are, [each] of them, in varying stages of sulking, licking their wounds, reacting defensively and changing their tune.” Ex. 39. Slowly Glasberg advised both Hatfill and Glasberg to observe “the rule of COMPLETE SILENCE regarding anything and everything about the case[.]” Ex. 40 (emphasis in original). Ultimately, in September 2002, Glasberg ordered Clawson to stand down, noting “[w]hat you know, you know, and you have put virtually all of that into the public record. Fine. That is where we are, and for good or ill we can and will deal with it. But we must put a full stop to any further conveyance of substantive data about ANYTHING from Steve to anyone [but his attorneys].” Ex. 41 (emphasis in original). To no avail. On October 5, 2002, Hatfill and Clawson appeared together at an Accuracy in Media Conference. Hatfill was asked about the reaction of bloodhounds, and stated, I’m not supposed to answer things against . . . but let me tell you something. They brought this good-looking dog in. I mean, this was the best-fed dog I have seen in a long time. They brought him in and he walked around the room. By the way, I could have left at anytime but I volunteered while they were raiding my apartment the second time, I volunteered to talk with them. The dog came around and I petted him. And the dog walked out. So animals like me (laughter). Ex. 42, at 2.
Disclosures from the Hatfill camp to the media continued. For example, between late 2002 and May 8, 2003, Hatfill’s current attorney, Tom Connolly, and CBS News reporter James Stewart had multiple telephone conversations and two lunch meetings. Ex. 43. According to Stewart, Connolly told Stewart that the investigation was focusing on Hatfill, and detailed at great length the FBI’s surveillance of Hatfill. In virtually every one of these conversations, Connolly encouraged Stewart to report on these subjects. Id. at 96.
E. Louisiana State University’s Decision To Terminate Hatfill
At the time of the second search of his apartment in August 2002, Hatfill was working as a contract employee at the Louisiana State University (“LSU”) on a program to train first responders in the event of a biological attack. This program was funded by the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (“OJP”) as part of a cooperative agreement. Ex. 44. Under the terms of the cooperative agreement, OJP “maintain[ed] managerial oversight and control” of the program. Id. at 2. Following the second search of Hatfill’s apartment on August 1, 2002, Timothy Beres, Acting Director of OJP’s Office of Domestic Preparedness, directed that LSU “cease and desist from utilizing the subject-matter expert and course instructor duties of Steven J. Hatfill on all Department of Justice funded programs.” Ex. 45. LSU, meanwhile, had independently hired Hatfill to serve as Associate Director of its Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education. Following the second search, LSU placed Hatfill on administrative leave. Ex. 46. LSU then requested a background check of Hatfill. Ex. 47. During the course of that investigation, the University became concerned that Hatfill had forged a diploma for a Ph.D that he claimed to have received from Rhodes University in South Africa. Hatfill explained to Stephen L. Guillott, Jr., who was the Director of the Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education at LSU, that “[h]e assumed the degree had, in fact been awarded since neither his [thesis advisor] nor Rhodes University advised him to the contrary.” Ex. 48. LSU’s Chancellor, Mark A. Emmert, made “an internal decision to terminate [LSU’s] relationship with Dr. Hatfill quite independent of [the DOJ e-mail] communication.” Ex. 51.
Hatfill has now testified that in fact he created a fraudulent diploma with the assistance of someone he met in a bar who boasted that he could make a fraudulent diploma. Hatfill Dep. Tran., Ex. 49 at 19:20 - 20:12. Glasberg, moreover, has stated under oath that Hatfill’s earlier attempted explanation was untrue. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 314:10 - 317:2. In a nationally televised 60 Minutes episode that aired in March 2007, Connolly confirmed that Hatfill forged the diploma for the Ph.D from Rhodes University. Ex. 50, at 3.
F. Hatfill’s Amended Complaint
Hatfill claims lost wages and other emotional damages resulting from General Ashcroft’s “person of interest” statements and other for-attribution statements by DOJ and FBI officials. He also seeks to recover for certain other alleged “leaks” by DOJ and FBI officials. Hatfill additionally asserts that the defendants violated the Act by purportedly failing to (1) maintain an accurate accounting of such disclosures, which he asserts is required by section 552a(c) of the Act; (2) establish appropriate safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of the records that were purportedly disclosed, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(10); (3) correct information that was disseminated about him that was inaccurate or incomplete, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(5); and (4) establish adequate rules of conduct, procedures, and penalties for noncompliance, or to train employees in the requirements of the Act, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(9). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.”
One story that ran concerned a novel that Dr. Hatfill wrote. A draft was found on his computer. As I recall, Mr. Clawson had wanted to know how some reporter had a copy in advance of Dr. Hatfill’s press conference. But it should be appreciated that the novel was available to anyone who went to the at the Copyright Office at the Madison Building and requested it.
The partial, uncompleted novel, titled “Emergence,” was deposited by his co-author at the Library of Congress, and CNN has described its contents in detail. A terrorist with vague international ties is opposed by a brave American researcher — who fits Dr. Hatfill’s profile — who battles against government bureaucracy to solve the mystery. The novel did not involve anthrax, but plague (”Yesinnia Pestis”). The plague was cultured from the fleas of Prairie Dogs. The outbreak begins in Antarctica but the researchers are dead before rescuers arrive. The medical investigation is then stymied by the U.S. State Department and the government of South Africa, which runs the Antarctic base. The book then moves forward eight years to Washington. A Palestinian terrorist with the research skills of a cancer specialist — both Dr. Hatfill and more than one of his accusers are cancer specialists — uses fleas from prairie dog tunnels and mice to culture the plague bacteria in hotel rooms. Cost: $387. Memories? Priceless.
The perpetrator’s misdeeds have been financed by Iraq. The terrorist then goes on a public tour of the White House, using a specially equipped wheelchair to spray the bacteria culture on the carpet. CNN reports: “Soon, the president, his staff, members of Congress and the general public begin coming down with sore throats and dementia.” The terrorist — who in the novel was Palestinian — dies from the infection in a hospital, where he had been taken after being hit by a cab.
The novel’s protagonist, a CDC researcher from Antarctica, is then put on the case. Picture Steve Segal in the role, giving early and long lectures to his superiors about the dangers of stockpiling such weapons. He goes back to Antarctica to fearlessly tackle the medical mystery, though his team members die in the process.
In the sketchy end of Hatfill’s novel, the United States dropped a nuclear bomb on Baghdad. The novel by Hatfill and Akers “features long and detailed scientific passages and talks extensively about the Soviet Union’s bioweapons program.” It also makes the point that a single terrorist would have formidable hurdles to overcome in launching such an attack. In the book, the CDC is described as suffering from poor leadership and budget constraints with an irrational focus on industrial accidents and inner-city violence.
One anthrax thriller that was published was by a pediatrician, who was an epidemiologist and former Army colonel. It is called Medusa Strain. Another was a riveting adventure by a New York Times correspondent titled “The Faithful Spy” (who now has a sequel in hardcover). Maybe Dr. Hatfill will finish Emergence which likely would have a wide audience and could be salted with interesting asides that parallel real life.
Another story that I seriously doubt anyone in the government was advancing focused on an imagined remote cabin that people could not visit unless they first took Cipro. If anyone doubted that Dr. H was on Cipro due to nasal surgery his doctor for the September 2001 is listed. The story was bogus and hugely prejudicial. As with the other “evidence”, it quickly turned out to stem from what Hafill’s attorney has fairly described as an out-of-control game of telephone. In the June 19, 2002, “The Anthrax Case: What The FBI Knows,” Dr. Rosenberg, wrote: “Remote Location-The Suspect had access to a conveniently-located but remote location where activities could have been conducted without risk of observation.” The finding that the tape used to seal all the letters came from the same roll indicates that the containment set-up used for making the anthrax and filling the letters must have remained accessible from before Sept. 18 until close to Oct. 9 (otherwise the roll used in the first instance would have been destroyed in decontaminating the first set-up) suggests the perpetrator had confidence in his clandestine arrangements. There is also evidence, which can’t be cited publicly at this time, that the Suspect knew in October that the remote site was contaminated with anthrax.” Oh, brother. The rumor being told by others by telephone and email was that there was a remote cabin he would go to — and he would only allow people to visit if they first took Cipro. The suggestion was implausible from the start. If it were true, the person would be complicitous and not telling the story. As it turns out, it was a house owned by a communications lawyer where Hatfill once joined some friends and engaged in some male banter about reasons his friends might have to take cipro. The question had arisen because Mr. Clawson’s boss, Oliver North, had received a hoax anthrax letter. George R. Borsari Jr., the communications lawyer who owns the house, says the “cabin” is a three-bedroom house. It does appear to be pretty remote, judging by the mapquest map for house owned by George Borsari in Fort Valley, Virginia. He told reporter Shane that he advised the agent that Hatfill had visited the house a few times but had to call from the road in October to get directions. “Boy, if it’s a safe house,” Baltimore Sun reporter Shane quoted him saying, “the CIA is way behind on the rent,” he said. But the silly cabin in the woods story has nothing to do with the Privacy Act claim.
Another silly story that may or may not bear on a Privacy Act or government disclosures related to “Greendale School”.
On June 26, 2002, ABC’s Brian Ross first reported on the Morning Show,
“Hatfill, who has worked closely with the military and CIA anthrax experts, has frequently shocked colleagues with his statements and demonstrations of how easily terrorists could make biological weapons. In this photo in 1998, he demonstrated how a terrorist could make a deadly plague in a common kitchen.
INVESTIGATORS also are intrigued by the fact that Hatfill lived for years near a Greendale Elementary School while attending medical school in Zimbabwe. Greendale School, as you recall, was the phony return address used in the anthrax letters. Hatfill has told ABC News he had nothing to do with the deadly anthrax mailings, but he says he understands his background and comments make him a logical subject of the investigation.”
Now who told them that? Investigators? Or someone from outside the investigation. Hatfill’s friend Stan Bedlington reports that he came up with the Greendale point and was describing it to CNN.
Dr. Bedlington, in the Fall of 2001, political scientist and former senior CIA counterterrorism analyst, said: “Frankly, when I heard the news [of 9/11], I thought, ‘It’s got to be biochemical.” “This is frightening enough and yet, you could take a small plane and sprinkle anthrax over New York City and wipe out half the population.” He wrote a very insightful Op Ed piece in the Washington Post, dated October 28, 2001, in which he discusses the importance of piercing Osama Bin Laden’s myth of invincibility. He evidenced the sophistication of his knowledge by pointing to the influence of the Egyptian writer named Qutb on the Al Qaeda leaders.
But by August 2002 (in an interview with CNN’s Paula Zahn) he was talking about anthrax-smelling bloodhounds and the fact that Dr. Hatfill lived near a place (Greendale) used in the return address. He curiously said the “evidence was mounting.”
From an August 4, 2002 interview:
BLITZER: Stan Bedlington, take a look at this, I want to put it up on the screen, the return address of one of the letters. Look at this, fourth grade, Greendale School, Franklin Park, New Jersey, then the zip code. Greendale School — there is no Greendale School in Franklin Park, New Jersey. But, Greendale, as far as you know, did ring an alarm bell, when you heard that mention of that word.
BEDLINGTON: Yes, it did. Steve Hatfill got his MD at what is now the University of Zimbabwe. It had another name in those days. And I looked it up on the Internet. And, in fact, it is located in Greendale, which is a suburb of Harare. So you have what I think is an amazing coincidence between the two names.
Dr . Bedlington knew Dr. Hatfill from weekly lunches at a bistro in McClean where former work colleagues get together to swap stories, and once had been shown, privately, a scrapbook of mock pictures of Dr. Hatfill preparing plague in his kitchen (Dr. Bedlington recalls the discussion as relating to anthrax).
There is no Greendale School in Zimbabwe — even though there are many in the United States. No Greendale Primary School or Greendale Elementary School. There never has been. ABC led the pack repeatedly getting it wrong in suggesting that there was a Greendale School that Hatfill lived nearby, in a neighborhood of Harare. ABC’s Brian Ross has relied on a source named Pete Velis who has spent his own money urging his biodefense insider theory with a twist. Velis argued that the CIA was framing Hatfill. Hartford Courant followed on the Greendale point, relying on ABC. My posting of the City Atlas listing and the numbers of the two Greendale schools did little to stem the false reports. The closest in name is Greengrove, which was a considerable ways from the University. And if you started counting Greendales rather than Greendale Schools, then perhaps most people in the United States are just as closely connected to some Greendale. Most important of all, a perp simply has zero reason to use a name from his past. Indeed, the only reason to use the same address on both envelopes — which helped the second letter be identified before being received — is if something is being intentionally communicated.
There are 18 Greendales in the US. 6 Greendale Elementary Schools. As well as a Greendale Elementary School in Maryland near Andrews AFB in Prince George’s County that was closed.
On coincidences what about “Franklin Park?” Franklin Park is the name of a small neighborhood in an unincorporated area next to Fort Lauderdale. It is sometimes called “Fort Lauderdale” but is not part of the city proper. At 2542 Franklin Park Drive is Masjid Al-Iman mosque. It is a mosque where Jose Padilla of WMD (though radiological - as far as we know) fame worshipped. Also worshipping there was Islamic Group member Adham Hassoun and the hotly sought “Jafar the Pilot”, who was acquainted with MIT-educated Aafia Siddiqui. In a May 2001 letter to his followers, Ayman Zawahiri, head of Al Qaeda’s ten-year quest to weaponize anthrax, used “school” as code to refer to his militant group the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Green is symbolic of Islam. Dale means “river valley.” Ayman is very nostalgic for the Nile Valley that he needed to leave after being imprisoned after Sadat’s assassination.
Coincidences can be surprising. But the Greendale conjecture always seemed an unsound point to rely on in publicly suggesting that a medical doctor was guilty of murdering people. As Richard Spertzel, who has told the Baltimore Sun that he has met Hatfill but does not know him well, said: “He’s being railroaded.”
As it turns out, the FBI’s interest in Dr. Hatfill stemmed significantly from his work on a mock-up of an anthrax lab for the purpose of training Special Operations personnel. F.B.I. agents pulled the lab over as it was being hauled to Ft. Bragg to check it again even though they had spent two weeks examining it. The Pentagon was allowed to keep and use the trailer in preparation for the war with Iraq. Training sessions were by Dr. Hatfill sometimes and other times by Dr. Patrick. Dr. Hatfill responds to an interrogatory response in his civil rights litigation: “William C. Patrick III, once a very close friend and colleague of Dr. Hatfill has broken off communication with him for fear of being associated with Dr. Hatfill and the Anthrax attacks.” Col. Bill Darley, spokesman for the United States Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla., told the New York Times: “We are not growing anthrax or botulinum toxin. None of this equipment is functional. It looks like — it is — the real stuff, but it’s nonfunctional.” The nonfunctional mock-up was built on an 18-wheel trailer and outfitted with specialized, commercially available, lab equipment.
“No way in the wildest dream could it have been used to make anything,” William C. Patrick III is quoted as saying. Dr. Hatfill planned the design and supervised its construction at a shop in Frederick, about a mile from his apartment. For some training sessions, he reportedly used the anthrax simulant called Bacillus globigii, which would commonly be used for such purposes. The mock-up was known as “the can.”
So in the Fall of 2002, while the FBI was investigating him, Hatfill trained Defense Intelligence Agency employees on ways to search for biological weapons, worked with Army’s Delta Force, and sat in on a State Department meeting on embassy security in postwar Afghanistan. He received letters of commendation for his work from officials at the DIA and the State Department. In Iraq, DIA and CIA agents worked with the 75th Exploitation Task Force in the search for biological weapons.
“If the facts were known, most Americans would be deeply grateful to Dr. Hatfill for his service to our nation,” spokesman Pat Clawson is quoted as saying. “Steve Hatfill knows nothing about the anthrax attacks. He is a loyal American and patriot who loves his country. At the DIA’s request, he did this work even though he had been terminated by Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) at the considerable frustration of FBI agents who thought he was responsible for the anthrax mailings.
It might be very difficult to find someone who fit a “bioevangelist” theory better than Dr. Hatfill. Even a Dr. Berry theory always seemed a Hatfill-lite. Absent Al-Timimi sharing the same fax number and maildrop as the leading anthrax scientist and the former deputy of USAMRIID — who had working pursuant to the biggest biodefense award in history using Delta Ames under a contract with USAMRIID — a Hatfill Theory might be expected to go the distance and cross the goal line. But all those who, upon being apprised of the facts of Al-Timimi and his connections to this AQ sheik or this jihad recruiter or this EIJ founder or this “911 imam” etc., have not changed their mind, are suffering from cognitive rigidity. They might start by doing some background reading on the militants, for example, by reading Berger or Wright or Scheuer. For work more narrowly on this issue of infiltration, there is Lance’s TRIPLE X. For those whose mind is not open to considering the alternative hypothesis — like Ed who hasn’t gone his keen observation that the hijackers were all dead — let’s hope you don’t work for the Amerithrax Task Force.
http://www.dailypress.com/news/local/virginia/dp-dc—terror-paintball0516may16,0,6552723.story
ALEXANDRIA, Va. - A federal judge Friday said the government is abusing its discretion to classify documents in the case of a U.S.-born Islamic scholar from Virginia who was convicted of soliciting treason.
***
In a recently unsealed defense motion, al-Timimi’s lawyer, Jonathan Turley, said it is obvious that the government was running wiretaps on al-Timimi after Sept. 11 because he was long suspected by the U.S. government of having ties to al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden. Despite that, Turley says the government is claiming it has no relevant wiretap recordings from any time between Sept. 11, 2001, and Feb. 1, 2003.
The evidence that Dr. al-Timimi was subject to undisclosed surveillance is obvious,” Turley wrote, citing the fact that al-Timimi was interviewed by the FBI in 1994 in its investigation of the first World Trade Center bombing, as well as the fact that al-Timimi was explicitly mentioned in the notorious Presidential Daily Briefing of August 2001 titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.”
***
Turley is mostly operating in the dark about what the government has in its possession, though, because the government has been communicating in secret with the judge about what evidence exists. Turley has been excluded even though he holds top security clearances.
At Friday’s hearing, U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema said Turley has been unfairly excluded from information he should have, and that the government is improperly marking some evidence and legal motions as classified.
***
She said she will have a meeting with prosecutors and intelligence agencies to hammer out what information can be disclosed to the defense and what might be able to made public”
“Some of the material claimed to be classified cannot be claimed as classified under any rational system,” Brinkema said.
Turley said he appreciated Brinkema’s efforts to grant him access to information, but he bristled at her suggestion that he might only receive redacted versions of some documents.
“I’ve had (top-level security clearances) since the Reagan administration,” he told Brinkema.
Comment:
Under one way of thinking, it is not rational to classify it given that it is disclosed here:
Sheiks and Bioweaponeers
http://www.anthraxandalqaeda.com
Most intelligence information is open source. But the government deems that even where information is already out there, it is the government corroboration that makes the difference. Fair enough — except don’t think for a minute the bad guys are fooled. It’s only the public that is being misdirected.
Professor Turley blogs today (”Court Rules with Defense on Access to Classified Material in the Case of Dr. Ali Al-Timimi”):
“Due to the classified status of the case, I have been limited in what I can report about the progress in the case of Dr. Ali Al-Timimi. However, today’s hearing was public and thus some additional information can be disclosed.
Today was a very positive day for the defense. We have been trying for two years (since a remand from the Fourth Circuit) to gain access to material that we believe was withheld by the government during the trial. This material includes interceptions and other forms of evidence conducted under national security programs. In November, Judge Leonie Brinkema threatened to order a new trial for Dr. Al-Timimi in light of the government’s refusal to give me, as lead counsel, access to ex parte material.
Today, the government sought to end the case after completing its own review of material — without giving the defense (which includes Will Olson from Bryan Cave) access to any of the material. We filed papers seeking such access. Judge Brinkema refused and ruled with the defense that access must be given. She further threatened again that she is considering a new trial unless things change.
Notably, Judge Brinkema confirmed that the government had used classification to hide purely legal argument — an abuse of such rules. She noted that much of the ex parte filing is composed of legal argument without any possible claim that it is classified. That would be a flagrant abuse of ex parte rules and it is precisely what the defense has warned about: the use of these filings to avoid the adversarial process. She noted that I have a clearance and should be able to see the material. She ordered a conference with the government and the security officer to arrange for such a disclosure. She, however, declined our request that Will Olson be given access with me due to the government’s concerns over the sensitivity of the material and limiting those with access to the fewest possible individuals.”
Note: It was Will Olson who I called and asked whether he and his firm had considered this question whether there was an appearance of a conflict of interest (which is different from a conflict of interest) due to the fact that his distinguished co-counsel’s father had pled the Fifth in leaking information about the “POI” of the other FBI investigative squad that derailed public understanding of Amerithrax investigation (if not the investigation itself). A “POI” of the other squad, according to Professor Turley was none other than Al-Timimi. Much of the classified information the USG does not want defense counsel to see relates to wiretaps gathering evidence for the Amerithrax investigation. No one is doubting the good faith of any of these attorneys — not even the fellow who worked for blind sheik Abdel-Rahman who arranged the pro bono assistance for the Virginia Paintball defendants (and presumably Al-Timimi).*/ Certainly they are all very accomplished and playing an important role in ensuring constitutional safeguards are protected. But the appearance of conflict regulations are part of the equation and administration of justice too — and no one should be dismissive of the issue unless they have read Mr. Seikaly’s deposition from last Fall and understand the importance of the leaks. There is a lot that goes on within the beltway involving the revolving door that to the rest of America creates an appearance of a conflict of interest.
It really, first, is a question for the relevant partners at Bryan Cave to consider after informing themselves of the background of the leaks (by reading Mr. Seikaly’s deposition).
*/ “The Go-To Lawyer of ‘Northern Virginiastan,’” ABA Journal, September 2007
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/the_go_to_lawyer_of_northern_virginiastan/
Ed, how does your much belabored discussion of silica square with the image and discussion of anthrax powder simulant in an envelope in the NATO book that used silica? The book relates, in part, to work done at Leeds and Durham Universities in the UK.
http://www.springerlink.com/index/3j833v8g912117l7.pdf
But I digress. Let’s get back to the Hatfill exhibits concerning leaks of Amerithrax law enforcement information by the father of Al-Timimi’s current pro bono counsel.
In early August 2002, the head of the FBI District of Columbia Field Office initiated a leak investigation related to Amerithrax information. The first leak investigation concerned leak of bloodhound story to Newsweek (according to email discussed in deposition of lead prosecutor Daniel Seikaly in which he repeatedly pled the Fifth Amendment). A memo from DC Field Office head Van Harp read:
TO: OPR
NSD
From: Washington Field
ADIC’s Office: Harp Van A (202) xxx-xxxx
***
Title: UNSUB
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE AND/OR
MEDIA LEAK IN CONNECTION WITH THE
AMERITHRAX INVESTIGATION
***
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
The appearance of this information in the media affects the conduct of this investigation as well as the morale of the dedicated personnel who have expended enormous energy and effort on this investigation.
As such, I am requesting that either a media leak or OPR investigation be initiated. In the event a leak investigation is initiated then the enclosed LRM should be hand delivered to AAG Chertoff. [REDACTED]
The investigation was closed in October 2002. The memo read:
Date: October 8, 2002
To: Mr. H. Marshall Jarrett
Counsel
Office of Professional Responsibility
United States Department of Justice
From: David W. Szady
Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Division
Subject: [REDACTED[
The purpose of this memorandum is to notify your office of the closing of the FBI’s criminal investigation of the captioned media leak matter. It is the understanding of the FBI that your continUed investigation of this matter will be pursued by your office.
[REDACTED]
***
After a January 9, 2003 “exclusive” report by ABC’s Brian Ross that the FBI was focusing on Hatfill and was going to conduct a second round of interviews with other former and current government scientists so that they might rule them out by the process of elimination, the FBI initiated a second media leak investigation. This time it was to proceed with “extreme zeal.”
The memo read:
Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 1/13/2003
To: Director’s Office
Washington Field
From: Washington Field
Contact Richard L. Lambert 202-xxx-xxxx
Approved by: Harp Van
Lambert Richard L
Title: AMERITHRAX
MAJOR CASE 184
00: WFO
Synopsis: To request the opening of new OPR media leak investigation regarding captioned case.
[large redacted passages]
To demonstrate the seriousness with which the FBI views this matter, it is requested that the OPR inquiry commence with an interview of IIC Rick Lambert who will waive all Fifth Amendment privileges and accede to a voluntary polygraph examination to set a tone of candor, forthrightness and cooperation.
[redacted]
The instant matter is the second unauthorized media disclosure to occur in this investigation. Its potential detriment to the effective prosecution of the case is substantial. Accordingly, in the interests of both specific and general deterrence, the Inspector in Charge requests that this OPR inquiry be pursued with unprecedent zeal.”
A June 2003 email then shut the barn door long after the horse had left the barn door:
From: DEBRA WEIERMAN
To: Lisa Hodgson
Date: Wed, June 4, 2003 12:18 PM
Subject: AMERITHRAX INVESTIGATION
Lisa: Please disseminate to all WFO employees. Thanks, Debbie
For the information of all recipients, Director Mueller has ordered that no one discuss the AMERITHRAX case with any representative of the news media. The WFO and Baltimore Media Offices have released several media advisories, which were coordinated with the US Attorney and FBIHQ, to explain specific milestones in the case. However, NO FBI WFO EMPLOYEE, INCLUDING MYSELF AND INSPECTOR RICK LAMBERT, WHO IS IN CHARGE OF AMERITHRAX, IS TO RESPOND TO ANY MEDIA INQUIRIES, THE ONLY EXCEPTION IS DEBBIE WEIERMAN IN THE MEDIA OFFICE. All inquiries from reporters or journalists received by any WFO employee are to be immediately referred to Debbie at xxx-xxxx, and she will handle.
I thank everyone at WFO for their dedication to the job and to this office. I also thank you for your cooperation in this very important matter.
Mike Rolince
In October 2007, the former Criminal Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, Daniel Seikaly — Al-Timimi’s pro bono counsel’s father — was deposed in the civil rights action by Steve Hatfill about whether he was the source of leaks relating to Steve Hatfill in connection the use of bloodhounds in the anthrax investigation and the draining of ponds in Frederick, Maryland. Key stories appeared in Newsweek and Washington Post. Attorney Seikaly pled the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination in connection with most substantive questions.
Here are some excerpts from the deposition:
“Q. ... calls this article, quote ‘An exclusive look at the search for the perpetrator of America’s worst bioterror attack.” Did you tell Mr. Klaidman [of Newsweek] that you were giving him an exclusive on this information?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Did you tell Mr. Klaidman that the FBI was acting on a tip when it searched the pond in Frederick?
...
Q. Did you tell Mr. Klaidman that FBI agents had interviewed the acquaintance of Dr. Hatfill’s that was supposedly the tipster?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Did you tell Mr. Klaidman that the acquaintance had told the FBI that Dr. Hatfill said toxic bacteria could be made in the woods and the evidence could be tossed in the lake?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Did you tell Mr. Klaidman that the FBI might drain the entire pond the month after this report?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
[Lawyer defending deposition] Mark, let me say something on the record so we all understand the assertion because the manner in which — or the type of questions you’re asking here. My client has been instructed to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege regardless of whether or not the answer to the question would be yes or no, because even if the answer were to be no, if he answered no to certain questions, I think an inference could be drawn from that as to what he does or doesn’t know.
So I just want to make sure you understand in terms of our Fifth Amendment assertion here is that he’s asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege to questions that may have a yes or no answer, and it’s not fair to assume that the answer to every one of these questions would be yes or no if he were to answer the questions. Does that make sense?
Q. It makes sense, but we will be seeking an adverse inference as to all questions where the fifth amendment is taken.
***
Q. Mr. Seikaly, do you deny any of the statements attributed to you by Mr. Klaidman with respect to the [Newsweek bloodhound story]
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q Is it actually even true whether the search of the pond was prompted by a tip?
Q. Are you aware of any information that might have been used as a predicate for the pond search having been obtained as the fruits of electronic surveillance?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q Did you tell Mr. Klaidman that agents might be looking for a wet suit that could have been used to dispose of — that could have been used and disposed of by the anthrax attacker?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q. Did you give Allan Lengel of The Washington Post any information reflected in this article?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Mr. Lengel has testified that you told him the FBI search of the pond in Frederick was tied to Steven Hatfill and that it was triggered by a hypothetical statement Dr. Hatfill has made about anthrax; is that correct?
A. That Mr. Lengel testified about that?
Q. Is it correct that you told Mr. Lengel about those things?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. How did you know that the FBI’s search of the pond in Frederick was tied to Steven Hatfill?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q. Why did you decide to disclose information to Mr. Lengel about the pond search?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q Did you tell Mr. Lengel that the items recovered from the pond up to that point included a clear box with holes that could accommodate gloves?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q Did you tell Mr. Lengel that the items recovered from the pond up that point included vials wrapped in plastic?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Do you specifically deny making any statement that Mr. Lengel has attributed to you?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q. How did you know that tests for the presence of anthrax bacteria on the equipment were continuing after two rounds of tests produced conflicting results?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Why did you disclose that information to Mr. Lengel?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q Did you tell Mr. Lengel that the search of the pond in Frederick netted nothing but a hodgepodge of items that did not appear to be linked to the case?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q If we take the dates from Exhibits É, it appears that you disclosed investigative information to Mr. Lengel for articles that appeared in January 2003, May 2003, June 2003 and August 2003. Is that right?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q. É Do you know whether you ever saw this e-mail before?
A. I don’t believe I have.
Q. Okay. Let’s look at the partially redacted paragraph. It says, quote, “WFO [Washington Field Office] has opened a leak investigation in an attempt to find out who spoke to Newsweek Magazine over the weekend about the bureau’s use of bloodhounds in the anthrax investigation,” closed quote. Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And the date of the email is August 5th, 2002.
A. That’s correct.
Q. The investigation that’s referenced here is about the story that you gave Mr. Klaidman, is it not?
A. Assert my Fifth Amendment Privilege in response.
***
Q. Okay. In the bottom e-mail, when Blier begins, “here is a summary of my conversation with Glen about the anthrax leak investigation.” Now, Bill Blier worked for you, did he not?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know what Mr. Blier was referring to when he referred to, quote, the anthrax leak investigation?
A. I believe that it was an investigation involving the possible compromise of classified information is my understanding. I did know about an investigation in that.
***
Q And do you know whether that had anything to do with bloodhounds or Newsweek?
A I don’t believe it did but I don’t know.
***
Q You were aware of an anthrax investigation, yes?
A. I was — I was aware that there was a discussion of an investigation involving the compromise of classified information arising from the anthrax investigation, the Amerithrax investigation. I do recall knowing that we were — we and the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Justice Department were concerned about this and were seeking to find out who compromised the classified information.
***
Q. Did you think it remarkable in any way that bloodhounds could track a scent from anthrax letters that were ten months old to a Denny’s in Louisiana where someone had eaten the day before?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
A disqualification due merely to an “appearance” (rather than an actual conflict) due to a “close family relationship” in connection with a representation that was “substantantially related” is personal and would not serve to disqualify the law firm, Bryan Cave. Moreover, here, the representation at issue was prior and not contemporaneous. But given that it was deemed appropriate to plead the Fifth Amendment, the circumstances requiring withdrawal are compelling. Think of the mess that would result upon a claimed leak of Al-Timimi information. Although she has co-authored with the former NSA General Counsel on requirements re security clearances — and thus would be a valuable addition to the team — I am sure there are others at the firm who would be willing to work on such an interesting case.
“We have cordoned off all New Jersey playgrounds and are asking all First Graders to show us their best block printing. It was very regrettable that intelligence about the Catholic “R” was revealed because now some youngster may be able to spoof his handwriting and avoid this telltale signature. We are leaving no stone unturned and are vigorously pursuing all leads and all #2 lead pencils. Some children may be prosecuted for spitwads for lack of clear proof that they wrote the anthrax letter. At the same time, we have two dozen agents scouring letters to Santa in hopes of a break as we did when we pursued the “Nathan R” lead in the UNABOM case.”
The United States National Commission on Terrorism, in “Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism,” dated June 7, 2000, discussed the issue of foreign students working in areas of sensitive technology.
The report noted:
“The U.S. Government should not be confronted with the dilemma of unconditionally disclosing classified evidence or allowing a suspected terrorist to remain in the United States. At the same time resort to use of secret evidence without disclosure of even cleared counsel should be discontinued, especially when criminal prosecution through an open court proceeding is an option.”
Aware of the balancing required, the report highlighted a quote by Sun Tzu: “Nothing should be as favorably regarded as intelligence; nothing should be as generously rewarded as intelligence; nothing should be as confidential as the work of intelligence.”
With equally keen foresight, Kenneth Katzman in “Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001,” CRS Report for Congress, September 10, 2001 explained that past plotting by the bin Laden network suggests that “the network wants to strike within the United States itself.”
Mr. Katzman explained in the September 10, 2001 report to Congress:
“The following Egyptian Islamist figures have been named SDT’s: (1) Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, who was acquitted in 1984 of inciting Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s assassination, is in a medical detention facility in Missouri following his October 1995 conviction for planning terrorist conspiracies in the New York area; (2) Ayman al-Zawahiri, about 50, who is a top lieutenant of bin Ladin (see below) and was convicted in Egypt for the Sadat assassination, (3) Rifa’i Taha Musa, about 47, another top aide of bin Ladin; (4) Abbud al-Zumar, leader of the remnants of the original Jihad who is serving a 40 year sentence in Egypt; (5) Talat Qasim, about 44, a propaganda leader of the Islamic Group; and (6) Muhammad Shawqi Islambouli, about 46, the brother of the lead gunman in the Sadat assassination. Islambouli, a military leader of the Islamic Group, also is believed to be associated with bin Ladin in Afghanistan.”
Muhammad Islambouli is a key to solution of the Amerithrax mystery. He is connected to both Midhat Mursi (aka Abu Khabab and blind sheik’s son Mohammed. Islambouli was a former student of blind sheik Abdel-Rahman. They go way back. The CIA and FBI knew all of this on September 10, 2001. Thus, if the FBI did not have a FISA wiretap on the microbiologist who had spoken alongside blind sheik Abdel-Rahman’s son — and who had lectured alongside an AQ recruiter and the “911 imam” as recently as July and August 2001 in Canada and England — that would be disappointing given that the IANA charity was promoting the views of Bin Laden’s sheiks who had been expressly the subject of the 1996 Declaration of War.
Handing over the “keys to the kingdom” to the man working with Bin Laden’s sheik and actively supporting the Taliban is not a good idea.
FBI Director Robert Mueller At The National Press Club, May 16, 2008
http://www.c-span.org/video_rss.aspx?MediaID=36311
Appl Environ Microbiol. 2008 Apr 4.
Bayesian Integrated Microbial Forensics.
Jarman KH, Kreuzer-Martin HW, Wunschel DS, Valentine NB, Cliff JB, Petersen CE, Colburn HA, Wahl KL.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, P.O. Box 999, Richland, WA 99352.
In the aftermath of the 2001 anthrax letters, researchers have been exploring ways to predict the production environment of unknown source microorganisms. Culture medium, presence of agar, culturing temperature, and drying method are just some of the broad spectrum of characteristics an investigator might like to infer. The effect of many of these factors on microorganisms is not well understood, but the complex way in which microbes interact with their environment suggests that numerous analytical techniques measuring different properties will eventually be needed for complete characterization. In this work, we present a Bayesian statistical framework for integrating disparate analytical measurements. We illustrate its application to the problem of characterizing the culture medium of Bacillus spores using three different mass spectral techniques. Results of our study suggest that integrating data in this way significantly improves the accuracy and robustness of the analyses.
This fascinating article is about how a Washington Post journalist found a suspect for whom there is a $5 million bounty in Yemen.
“Finding a Terror Suspect in Yemen,” Washington Post, May 16, 2008
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/16/AR2008051602389.html
See also
“Yemeni court orders FBI-wanted suspect arrested,” Monster and Critics, May 18, 2008
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/middleeast/news/article_1406029.php/Yemeni_court_o
The proffer in support of the guilty pleas of the defendants from Buffalo explained while at a guest house before going to the al-Farook camp, they “were shown, among other things, a movie about the destruction of the USS Cole, and how al-Qaeda committed that particular terrorist act.” “In their statements to the FBI, Defendants Alwan and Al-Bakri described the workings of the al-Farooq camp. Upon arrival at the camp or at the “guest house,” each individual began using code names. Green uniforms were worn everyday except Friday, when civilian clothes were worn so that the uniforms could be washed.” The New York Times had an excellent long and in-depth story about the young men from Buffalo. The article contained a startling account of the CIA’s capture of one defendant at his wedding. Because Al Qaeda operatives allegedly use the word “wedding” as code for event, the guy was hauled away from the altar in Bahrain on his wedding day.
The district court, in denying bail, recounted that one of the Buffalo defendants admitted to sending an e-mail, while visiting the Middle East, regarding a planned attack by al-Qaeda on Americans. The e-mail message, the “Big Meal” e-mail, was translated as follows:
“How are you my beloved, God willing you are fine. I would like to remind you of obeying God and keeping him in your heart because the next meal will be very huge. No one will be able to withstand it except those with faith. There are people here who had visions and their visions were explained that this thing will be very strong. No one will be able to bare [sic] it.”
The fellow who recruited the Buffalo boys, the late Mr. Derwish (a cruise missile targeted and hit the car he was in), was in contact with KSM’s nephew, Khallad (Attash). Khallad had a prosthetic leg. He had been the emir of a guesthouse in Kandahar and was Bin Laden’s assistant. Attash was at the January 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur (and planned the Cole bombing). Attash had intended to be part of 9/11 but, like Ramzi Binalshibh, was unsuccessful getting into the country. The 9/11 Commission Report notes that Khallad had grown up in Saudi Arabia where his father knew the Blind Sheikh. It was likely learning of that contact between Derwish and Attash that got the authorities, particularly the CIA, especially animated over the potential threat posed by the fact that the Buffalo fellows had spent some time in an Afghanistan training camp.
Jaber Elbaneh was being sought in connection with the case involving the young men from Buffalo. He had travelled to Afghanistan with them. There was up to a $5 million dollar reward for his capture before he was located and detained in Yemen. Agents Edward Needham and David Britten, of the Joint Terrorism Task Force of Western New York, believe Elbaneh may have returned briefly to Lackawanna but left for Yemen prior to the September 11, 2001. In June 2001, he had sold property he owned at 20-24 Wilkesbarre Ave., Jaber Elbaneh to Ahmed Umar for $15,000. The week before 9/11 (ending September 7, 2001), Jaber Elbaneh sold the property he co-owned a 28 Wilkesbarre Ave to a relative for $20,000. (He may have acted through his wife and apparently was not present for the closing.)
Elbaneh, 37, is the married father of 7 children. His uncle Albanna was the vice-President of the American Muslim Council of Western New York. In federal district court, his uncle faced felony charges that were filed against him in December 2002, alleging that he illegally sent money to Yemen. Albanna was interviewed on an excellent PBS documentary called “chasing the sleeper cell” and has denied any wrongdoing in the case. As for the reward offered for the capture of his nephew, Albanna commented:
“I’ve just spoken to his parents. They’re stunned. They’re resigned to the fact that they have no way of contacting him, and the U.S. government has all the power. They leave it in the hands of Allah. “
“Five million dollars is a lot of money. You could probably overturn a government in that part of the [world].”
Elbaneh’s uncle, Mohamed, said. “I can’t believe al-Qaeda would rely on somebody like Jaber. He’s a very timid man. He wouldn’t even pick up a pistol. He has seven children. . . . He is one of the most harmless people I’ve ever met.” Ahearn, U.S. Attorney Michael A. Battle and other law enforcement officials said they believe Elbaneh while in Yemen was associating with major al Qaeda figures.
The Buffalo News reports that before leaving the region, Elbaneh had worked for several years at Sorrento Cheese. Before that, he worked at a warehouse operated by his uncle, agents said. Ahmad Elbaneh of Holland Avenue, Jaber A. Elbaneh’s elderly father, said his son had rented a house in Sana and drove a taxi. “He went to Yemen for his children to put them in an Arabian school to learn about Islam,” his father said.
He has since been detained in Yemen, broken out of prison, been detained, been released, and as explained by the wonderful article in the Washington Post linked above, made 5 court appearances since having been released. Yemen officials had refused to extradite him but the newest headline today is that maybe the Yemeni judge has ordered him rearrested (again).
Sorrento is part of the Lactalis American Group, Inc. is the U.S. Operations of Groupe, Lactalis, which is a family owned dairy business, headquartered in Laval, France. Groupe Lactalis is the 2nd largest dairy company in the world with annual sales of $10.4 billion. All told (including its Lactalis USA operation), Groupe Lactalis produces 1.7 billion lbs. of cheese, 3.4 billion lbs. of milk for consumption, 660 million lbs. of fresh products and 610 million lbs. of butterfat and cream. It is one of the world’s largest processors of whey and lactose. It operates 122 plants (44 inside France, 78 outside in 16 countries).
The U.S. Operations of Lactalis American Group, Inc. consists of 3 operating companies: Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., Lactalis USA, Inc., and Mozzarella Fresca, Inc. LAG has 5 manufacturing plants: Buffalo, NY, Nampa, ID, Belmont, WI, Merrill, WI and Tipton, CA and 3 corporate offices: Buffalo, NY, Manhattan, NY, and Concord, CA. LAG total net sales for 2006 were $616 million.
The Dugway simulant used in the Canadian experiment reported September 10, 2001 that performed similar to the Daschle product (leaking before opening; immediately dispersing across the room) was made at a Wisconsin dairy processor. See Matsumoto’s Science article.
The January 2000 meeting attended by Attash was also an anthrax planning meeting.
Ayman named his program “curdled milk” (Zabadi). TrebleRebel and Ed have argued for a half decade about lactose particles.
Question: what did Elbaneh do at Sorrento? Why is there a $5 million reward for him? If he is cooperating with Yemeni intelligence (to their way of thinking) and not currently associating Al Qaeda leaders, why not leave him in peace so he can provide for his 7 children?
Transcript of May 5, 2008 oral argument, United States of America v. Maureen Stevens
http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/transcript/07-1074.html
SC07-1074
>> ALL RISE.
HEAR YE HEAR YE, SUPREME COURT
OF FLORIDA IS NOW IN SESSION.
DOJ -
>> I DON’T THINK IT IS POSSIBLE
TO FASHION A RULE THAT WOULD
APPLY ONLY TO A SUBSTANCE LIKE
ANTHRAX —
PANELIST -
>> WHY NOT?
>> BECAUSE ANTHRAX IS NOT THE
ONLY SUBSTANCE THAT IS DANGEROUS
ANTHRAX LIKE A LOT OF OTHER
SUBSTANCES HAS SOCIALLY
BENEFICIAL USES AND ANTHRAX IS
STUDIED BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE FOR AGRICULTURAL
INDUSTRY STUDIED FOR THE
IMPORTANT USE OF DEVELOPING
COUNTER MEASURES TO PROTECT OUR
CITIZENS. AND IN THE EVENT TERRORISTS OR
ENEMIES MIGHT OBTAIN ANTHRAX.
LOTS OF SUBSTANCES ARE DANGEROUS
AND ANTHRAX ACTUALLY IS MUCH
LESS DANGEROUS THAN A LOT OF
SUBSTANCES STUDIED ALL OVER THE
PLACE AND THE INFLUENZA —
PANELIST -
>> WHAT CONSTRUCTIVE POSITIVE
USES WERE BEING MADE OF THE
SUBSTANCE IN THIS INSTANCE?
DOJ -
>> *** THE UNITED STATES DOES
NOT HAVE, HAS NOT FOR DECADES
HAD ANY KIND OF BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS PROGRAM, THE ONLY USES
WERE DEFENSIVE RESEARCH USES FOR
MEDICAL PURPOSES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF OUR CITIZENS AND
FEDERAL LAW STATUTES CITED IN
THE 1969 STATUTE, SPECIFICALLY
CONTEMPLATES THAT LOTS OF
ENTITIES ACROSS THE COUNTRY
SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO ANTHRAX
AND A LOT OF OTHER ALSO
DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES IN ORDER TO
PERFORM BASIC SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH AND TO PERFORM RESEARCH
SPECIFICALLY TO DEVELOP COUNTER
MEASURES —
PANELIST -
>> WHY SHOULD THE INNOCENT PARTY
BE THE ONLY ONE TO CARRY THE
BURDEN?
>>
PANELIST -
>> I’M MORE INTERESTED WHAT WAS
YOUR LAB DOING WITH THE ANTHRAX.
BATTELLE -
>> OUR LAB USES ANTHRAX FOR,
AMONG OTHER THINGS, VACCINE
EFFICACY TESTING AND DO ANIMAL
CHALLENGES TO DEVELOP VACCINES
TO PREVENT PEOPLE EXPOSED FROM
ANTHRAX TO GETTING SICK AN
ANTIDOTES TO HELP PEOPLE IF THEY
ARE EXPOSED TO ANTHRAX AND IT IS
NOT ONLY ANTHRAX, IF IT IS USED
AS A TERRORIST WEAPON BUT THOSE
PEOPLE WHO WORK IN INDUSTRIES
WHERE THEY MAY BE EXPOSED TO A
SUBSTANCE, SO, THERE IS A
SOCIALLY BENEFICIAL USE AND
SOMETHING THAT SHOULDN’T BE
CHILLED IN TERMS OF LABORATORIES
DOING THAT.
YES, THEY SHOULD BE CAREFUL IN
HANDLING THE MATERIALS, AND
THOSE MATERIALS ARE ONLY HANDLED
HANDLED IN LABS THAT ARE CALLED
BIOLOGICAL LEVEL-3 LABS.
OR HIGHER.
[COMMENT: THIS IS NOT ACCURATE. ANTHRAX WAS A BL-2 AGENT IN LIQUID FORM, THE FORM IN WHICH IT VERY LIKELY WAS STOLEN.]
PANELIST TO BATTELLE:
>> LET ME ASK YOU, IF THE — THE
PERSON DISSEMINATED THIS
ANTHRAX, ACTUALLY WORKED FOR
YOUR LAB, THEN WOULD WE HAVE A
DIFFERENT — WOULD THAT
ESTABLISH THAT THE SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP SO THAT YOU WOULD
HAVE A DUTY AND POSSIBLY BE —
>> EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE IS COVERED
BY THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP,
BATTELLE -
YES.
STEVENS -
>> MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, I’M
HERE ON BEHALF OF MAUREEN
STEVENS AND WITH ME ARE TRIAL
COUNSEL RICHARD SCHUELLER AND
JASON WISER, ONE THING I NEED TO
CLARIFY E ABOUT THE ALLEGATIONS,
THE SUGGESTION OF ANTHRAX
GENERICALLY BEING THE CAUSE AND
THAT WE JUST — THE LABORATORY
SUCH AS BATTELLE IS NOT CORRECT
WITH THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT.
WHAT WE ALLEGE IN THE COMPLAINT
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IS THAT
THIS PARTICULAR STRAIN OF
ANTHRAX IS THE ONE WE ARE
FOCUSING ON.
THIS PARTICULAR STRAIN OF
ANTHRAX IS ONE THAT HAS BEEN
GENETICALLY TRACED BACK TO FORT
DETRICK.
NOT ONE THAT OCCURRED IN NATURE.
***
>> WE KNOW ENOUGH TO SAY IT WAS
ULTRA HAZARDOUS, IT WAS DESIGNED
TO KILL PEOPLE.
THEY KNEW IT HAD GOTTEN OUT OF
THEIR LAB.
>> DOES THE SAME THING HAPPEN
IF, FOR INSTANCE, A MILITARY
DEPOT IS STORING CLAYMORE MINES
AND — [INAUDIBLE] MINE, YOU
KNOW, COMES UP MISSING AND, YOU
KNOW, AND LATER 5,000 MILES AWAY
THE CLAYMORE MINE IS USED TO
KILL SOMEBODY?
***
>> I JUST WANT TO SAY ONE OTHER
THING, AND THAT IS THE CONCERN
ABOUT OPENING THE FLOODGATES OF
LITIGATION AND EXTENSIVE
LIABILITY WHICH EVERY DEFENDANT
RAISES, HAS TO BE CONSIDERED
IN — TO MAKE THE GOVERNMENT
LIABLE TO THE SAME EXTENT AS A
PRIVATE ENTITY WAS A DECISION
MADE BY CONGRESS.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT BE
CONCERNED WITH WHETHER A PRIVATE
INDIVIDUAL’S LIABILITY IMPOSED
ON THE GOVERNMENT CREATES
CONCERNS ABOUT THE SCOPE OF IT.
THAT IS FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO
DEAL WITH LEGISLATIVELY AS THEY
DID IN THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
ACT, AND WE ARE SIMPLY TRYING TO
SEEK JUSTICE FOR OUR CLIENT IN
WHAT WE BELIEVE WE HAVE PROVED
IN EXISTENCE OF A DUTY.
“Al-Qaeda suspect Elbaneh imprisoned,” Yemen Observer, May 18, 2008
http://www.yobserver.com/front-page/10014269.html
Justified as being implementation of verdict of first court which had sentenced Elbaneh to 10 years. The political security personnel arrested al- Elbaneh immediately and took him from the court hall to the political security prison.
Wanted Al Qaeda Operative Jailed in Yemen [but won’t be extradited]
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/18/AR2008051800968.html
He resurfaced nearly three months ago, on Feb. 23, when he walked unannounced into a cramped Sanaa courtroom, escorted by four bodyguards.
Interrupting a trial of other al-Qaeda suspects, he told the judge his name and declared that all charges against him were bogus. “I haven’t committed any crimes in this country or in the United States,” he said.
He dropped another bombshell by saying he had personally surrendered to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and was under his protection. Then he walked out of the courtroom. Stunned court officials did nothing.
***
Rashad al-Alimi said the case against him was weak. Alimi said that Elbaneh was cooperating in other investigations and that the government was inclined to treat him leniently.
***
“It’s a very traditional thing in Yemen,” Iryani said. “You surrender yourself to a high-ranking official. His surrender was accepted on the basis that he would cooperate.”
***
Khaled al-Anesi, a defense attorney who represented Elbaneh before his prison breakout, said the U.S. reward had caught some people’s attention in Yemen.
***
“Five million for a bounty is an awful lot of money,” Anesi said. “If I were him, I’d say, ‘I give up, but give this $5 million to my family.’ “
From Demon in the Freezer (pages 214-216):
He went back to work. A minute later the, he glanced over at the tube. The anthrax was gone again. He tapped the cap, and the anthrax fell to the bottom. He stared at the bone colored particles. Now he saw them climbing the walls of the tube, dancing along the plastic, heading upward.
His assistant, Denise Braun, was working nearby, “Denise, you’ll never believe this.”
The anthrax was like jumping beans; it seemed to have a life of its own.
He began preparing a sample for the scope. He opened the tube and tapped a little bit of the anthrax onto a piece of sticky black tape that would hold the powder in place. But the anthrax bounced off the tape. The particles wouldn’t stick. Eighty percent of the Daschle particles flittered away in air currents up into the hood. That was when he under- stood that the Hart Building was utterly contaminated.
He somehow managed to get some of the particles to stick to the tape. He hurried the sample into the scope room, put it under a scanning scope, and zoomed in.
What he saw shocked him.
The spores were stuck together into chunks that looked like moon rocks. They reminded him of grinning jack-o’-lanterns, skeletons, hip sockets, and Halloween goblin faces. The anthrax particles had an eroded, pitted look, like meteorites fallen to earth. Most chunks were very tiny, sometimes just one or two spores, but there were also boulders. One boulder looked to him like a human skull, with eye sockets and a jaw hanging open and screaming. It was an anthrax skull.
The skulls were falling apart. He could see them crumbling into tiny clumps and individual spores, smaller and smaller as he watched. This was anthrax designed to fall apart in the air, to self-crumble, maybe when it encountered humidity or other conditions. He had a national-security clearance, and he knew something about anthrax, but he could not imagine how this weapon had been made. It looked extremely sinister. He started feeling shaky.
He called Jahrling. “Pete, I’m in the scope room. Can you come up here, like right now?”
Jahrling ran upstairs, closed the door, and stared at the skull anthrax for a long time. He didn’t say much. Geisbert’s security clearance was rated secret, and the details of how this material could have been made might be more highly classified.
Not long afterward, Jahrling apparently went to the Secure Room and had the classified safe opened. He studied a document or documents with red-slashed borders that would appear to contain exact technical formulas for various kinds of weapons-grade anthrax. In the papers, there almost certainly secrets for making skull anthrax of the type he had just seen in the scope.
Jahrling refers to the secret of skull anthrax as the Anthrax Trick, although he won’t discuss it. Could this stuff have been made in Iraq? Could this be an American trick? Who knew the Anthrax Trick?
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