Chaplain. You are correct.
The only other thing I would add is that much of the difficulty stems from a particular advocacy concerning strategic power that had been growing in acceptance with politicians starting with the administration of George H. Bush.
The U.S. Air Force had been pushing the idea that conflicts could be fought almost exclusively with dominant air power (and long-range ordinance) and that we only needed a smaller land component (Army and Marine Corps) to “mop up” after the air forces (Air Force and Navy) had pummeled the enemy into submission. The advocates of this idea used the first Gulf War and Kosovo as evidence to support their assertion. (Note: previous U.S. military doctrine was that fire power (air, naval, long/short range missiles) supported land forces as coordinated and needed by the land component commander)
The Army and Marine Corps offered that the only true strategic forces were land forces because until you put a flag in the ground you have not won anything. Also, the short history of air power showed that devastating air power often did not achieve the effects they were thought to have. Even after mind-boggling drops of ordinance enemy forces would suffer only a fraction of the casualties we thought because they learned to entrench.
Politicians from both parties jumped on board with enthusiasm because the theory was that we could fight and win with almost no casualties. DoD budgets reflected the growing acceptance of the concept, with the Army budget annually coming in a distant fourth in DoD funding... behind the Defense Nuclear Agency (Air Force, Navy, Defense Nuclear Agency, Army). The Marine Corps portion of the Navy budget also kept shrinking.
Donald Rumsfeld (and NeoCons in general) drank the kool-aid in a big way and had no use for the Army, and especially its pesky generals and high-level civilian authorities who disagreed with the entire concept. The Army was effectively muted and sent off to the back room by his DoD.
Hence, when the conflict kicked off with “Shock and Awe” it was expected that within days the whole thing would be over. There was no need for post-war planning because the will to resist would be completely destroyed. The Army and Marine Corps would simply mop up.
The fatal flaw in the theory, in this case, was that the land component was too small to lock down the country and prevent the insurgency from starting. We had won the campaign but not planned for winning the war. The holes in the Swiss cheese were too large and the would-be insurgents were able to get started. If we had gone in with overwhelming land power (sounds like the Weinberger Doctrine) we would have likely prevented the insurgency or at least got to where we are today years earlier.
Unfortunately, the failure of this concept overshadows the fact that President Bush was, and is, absolutely correct in his vision for defeating radical Islamic terrorism. He was simply not well-served by his strategic planners and has suffered the political consequences of that error.
To continue my thought... There are any number of documents from the several military war colleges that discuss the “Rumsfeld Doctrine” (to coin a phrase.. otherwise known as Rapid Dominance or Shock and Awe) as the replacement for the “Weinberger” and “Powell” Doctrines. I offer this from the Army War College publication PARAMETERS (article written by Donald Chisholm, Professor of Operations in the Joint Military Operations Department of the US Naval War College) :
The Risk of Optimism in the Conduct of War: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/chisholm.htm
SNIP
“The advocates of Rapid Dominance believe that these factors, taken together, mean that “overwhelming or decisive force,” as advocated by former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell, is going to be neither possible nor desirable, and a different approach is therefore required.”
SNIP
“Rapid Dominance offers powerful enticements, bound to appeal to high-level defense decisionmakers. It exploits the US technological advantage over potential opponents in information and precision weapons. It employs lighter forces, more readily deployed using less lift. It emphasizes air over ground forces. It promises to achieve military objectives at higher speed and lower cost than through the use of overwhelming force, with fewer casualties (ours and theirs, military and civilian), and with less damage to the adversary’s physical infrastructure, lessening post-conflict expenses.”
SNIP
“...the theory’s assumptions about the US ability to instrumentally manipulate the will of its adversaries reflect a fundamentally optimistic approach to the conduct of warfare.10 The problem with optimism in any endeavor, but with especially profound consequences in war, is that it “restricts anticipation of error, minimizes its probability, and leads to the concealment of both its occurrence and the severity of its effects.”11 Under a regime of optimism, errors may accumulate without recognition to a level that ultimately negates our ability to respond effectively, or requires a cost we may be unwilling to pay. Given the long lead time in the development of weapon systems and force structures, compounded by the dual problems of sunk costs and opportunity costs, in the domain of armed conflict this may translate to an unnecessary loss of blood and treasure if not actually to losing the war.”
I’m in total agreement with you.
Overwhelming force was the purpose for the large contingent that Shinseki recommended.
One would have expected Powell to go to the mat over the concept, but he was surprisingly docile throughout this whole thing. He seemed to have lost his voice.