The tribal areas are not politically homogeneous - that is, after all, a part of being tribal. But those portions who are in bed with al-Qaeda can count on sufficient hostility to outsiders to keep the area safe on the part even of their nominal enemies. That is one reason that the Pakistani army, with its own Pushtun component, has had such a difficult time mounting operations there.
To a very great deal the Taliban have been run to ground there. Despite breathless celebration on the part of the anti-American international media they do not control Afghanistan and are highly unlikely to regain that control in the imaginable future. Waziristan is their redoubt and a formidable one at that. But if they are confined to that location they may be isolated and constitute a diminishing international threat over time.
If, however, they manage to expand their control to that of Pakistan proper, the potential for mischief is enormous. Current strategic objectives are to prevent that control from ever happening and to mitigate their ability to throw that country into chaos despite a failure to take control. The latter is the scenario that seems to loom largest at the moment. Efforts to consolidate democratic influence that was thought (by some in the State Department at least) to further that objective have hit a rock in the assassination of one of its chief proponents in Benazir Bhutto.
It is entirely possible that we may yet see a field army in Waziristan - it that does eventuate I am going to have to send a note of apology to one B. Hussein Obama. But that isn't, at the moment, the primary arena of engagement. All IMHO and with the usual disclaimers, of course.
Sorry, that’s Richardson. And the last paragraph should read “IF that does eventuate.” I need a proofreader. ;-)