[colorado tanker]

Another thing that didn’t work in the Japanese favor was the lack of British interference in the conduct of the Pacific war; we were the only big guns in the fight, and got exactly what we wanted. That was definitely not the case in the Europe and Med theater.

Excellent point. In the Pacific we could be nimble and imaginative with the island hopping strategy bypassing many big but strategically less important Japanese bases.

In Europe we were stuck with the stupid idea of fighting up the entire Italian peninsula, mountain by mountain, and with the broad front approach after D-Day that produced such gems as the completely unnecessary but extremely bloody Hurtgen Forest campaign.

[SunkenCiv]

Churchill also (for political reasons, but perhaps as much for some odd personal reason) removed troops and capabilities from N Africa on the verge of victory there, in order to vainly pursue the defense of Greece against the Germans. It delayed Axis defeat in N Africa by at least a year, and of course likewise delayed implementation of Churchill’s ridiculous “soft underbelly” strategy in Europe, which was, in Italy, as you pointed out some of the most difficult and costly fighting of the war.