“Like I said, the UK forces reductions are faster than the IA expected.”
And I’ve already showed you how Al-Maliki initially envisaged the handover being at the end of 2006. Maybe he kept it secret from the Army, and they don’t watch the news.
“The UK politicians are saying Basrah is ready.
The Iraqi Army is saying they are not.”
Here’s a thread from the start of the month with Al-Maliki announcing the final handover of security responsablities ib Basra Province by the end of 2007:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1905365/posts
“We are prepared to take over security of Basra within two months and we will,” al-Maliki said, after the meeting in his Green Zone office. “Basra will be one of the provinces where Iraqi forces will completely take over security”
“Military leaders hope that Britain will remain in charge only of training Iraq troops and border guards, securing key supply lines and responding to emergencies when called on by local commanders.”
“The Iraqi MoD elements that are willing to comment make it clear that they did not expect the UK draw-down to be this fast.”
Who are these people and where are they commenting? Or are we just talking about anonymous ‘military sources’ cited in MSM reports? Probably along with the spin stories about Basra being in the grip of Shiite militias and death squads.
1. I have never said anything about the militias and Basrah. I have made it clear that I consider the problems in Basrah to be principly the criminal side (primarily smuggling gangs, think Chicago during prohabition). And that the early hand-off of Basrah is forcing a diversion from the combat provinces.
2. The ones that have commented adversly include Deputy MoD, IGFC Dep CoS, and the new General commanding Basrah Operational Command. The MoD and uniformed side are the ones that are scrambling on this. You know, the ones that actually have to do the job. As I said: “operational” side vice “political”.
3. The PM of Iraq may have the job of CINC but, he is not Iraqi MoD and he is not IA. The PM has been saying much and not necissarily doing the same. He is a politician and you know how you tell if a politician is lying? His lips are moving. A classic example is how he always says that he did not authorize a raid on JAM in Sadr City when all ISOF raids work from a target list that he approves. The PM is playing “good cop” to the MNF-I “bad cop” in public and much of what he says is BS.
4. The announcement of plans to turn over a province are meaningless until it actually happens. A year ago all 18 provinces were to be turned over by end year. Karbala was to turn over in Jul, then Aug, then Sep and now it to turn over on Monday. Ninawa was to turn over in Aug, Sep and they are still debating it. I have seen Anbar listed as due to turn over by end-year. The announcements of provincial turnovers are wrong more often than they are right. (Note: Basrah is listed as “partially ready” for turnover in the last Quarterly report. Link is in previous comments.)
5. Does the UK and Iraqi PMs want the turnover ASAP?
- Yes, the politicians want the turnover.
That is a very different question than: Is Basrah ready for turnover?
- Not according to the Iraqi Army and MNF-I. They need to clean up the IPs and finish getting the 14th IA Division on line. And they are diverting combat units from primary combat zones to do that. The Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense was not planning to stand up the 14th Division until mid-2008 as of seven months ago and are scrambling to fix the mess that the politicians (UK and Iraqi) have dumped on them.
All of your cites go to politicians with an adgenda that wants to hand off Basrah. I a refering to the personnel that actually have to do the job.
The IA in Basrah, the third largest city in Iraq was all of one brigade until the 5-10 formed in Apr and the 5-10 is green. This compares to Mosul’s 2nd Division (4 experienced Bdes) with 3rd Divison (3 experienced Bdes and 4th planned) supporting. Basrah is not that much smaller than Mosul and clearly has insufficient forces.
Since the IA started jugling forces to cover this premature political move:
- the 1-10 Bde (corrupted) has been replaced with one of the only three cat 1 brigades (3-8 from Wasit),
- one of the three heavy brigades in the IA has been sent from Baghdad (3-9 Tank Bde from Baghdad),
- the headquarters assets from new forming 12th (Salahadin) have been diverted to the 14th,
- ISOF assets have been pulled from Ninawa, Anbar and Diwaniyah to form a new ISOF battallion in Basrah,
- a very senior (corps level) General has been sent from IGFC staff and has stood up the Basrah Operational Command,
- 3-14 IA Brigade has been moved up in que to be formed by end-year (vice Bde for Kirkuk), and
- A new IP Chief of Police has been appointed to clean up Basrah IP.
I am looking at this from the operational standpoint and you are quoting politicians. Politicians always ask for the impossible and then blame the operators when they do not get it...
P.S. I am not an amature at gathering information. I spent 22 years as a USN Intelligence Specialist and used to joke that I should get pro-pay for understanding “army-ese”. Much of my time was in the mid-east.