Read the case. Parental notification was considered to be such a pitifully minor “regulation” that it did not count. But any significant regulation of the “right” of abortion is prohibited. And I would also point out that the courts have even been very prolific in striking down even parental notification laws.
I’ve read the case a number of times. You’re statement that abortion cannot be regualted is 100% incorrect. Read the case law after Rvw. Finally, again, the express language of the holding permits state/federal action at the point of viability, which as Justice O’Connor wrote about in a later case, is getting sooner and sooner during pregnancy. This is how and why we’re able to ban late term abortion, which, by the way, is regulating abortion. If abortion was not regulated, women would be able to abort up to 8 months. Seriously, you misstated the holding and it’s impossible to argue otherwise. Please don’t make me waste my time by pulling up the case and copy/paste the language that refutes your post. It should be simple enough to know you’re wrong and accept that by looking at the post-Roe case law and the partial birth abortion.
From the westlaw case summary:
410 U.S. 113
The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Blackmun, held...subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester the state may regulate abortion procedure in ways reasonably related to maternal health, and at the stage subsequent to viability the state may regulate and even proscribe abortion except where necessary in appropriate medical judgment for preservation of life or health of mother.
“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical **732 fact, referred to above at 725, that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.”
“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion *164 during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”
Again, I’m sorry, but you’re simply wrong to say there can be no regulation. You went to far. Even your post “such a pitifully minor ‘regulation’ that it did not count” acknowledge it’s regulated, though you discount the extent to which it’s regulated. Moreover, you completely misstate the Court’s opinion of these regulations. The Court, particularly the dissenters in those cases, find this to be intrusive and not a minor regulation.
From the westlaw case summary:
410 U.S. 113
The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Blackmun, held...subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester the state may regulate abortion procedure in ways reasonably related to maternal health, and at the stage subsequent to viability the state may regulate and even proscribe abortion except where necessary in appropriate medical judgment for preservation of life or health of mother.
“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical **732 fact, referred to above at 725, that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.”
“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion *164 during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”
Again, I’m sorry, but you’re simply wrong to say there can be no regulation. You went to far. Even your post “such a pitifully minor ‘regulation’ that it did not count” acknowledge it’s regulated, though you discount the extent to which it’s regulated. Moreover, you completely misstate the Court’s opinion of these regulations. The Court, particularly the dissenters in those cases, find this to be intrusive and not a minor regulation.
The holding:
“Measured against these standards, Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal abortions to those ‘procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother,’ sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single reason, ‘saving’ the mother’s life, the legal justification for the procedure. The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here.”