Experts detail risks of bioagent program

The Los Angeles Times ^ | October 5, 2007 | Jia-Rui Chong

[ZacandPook]

The growth in research meant to protect the U.S. from bioterrorism is overwhelming the oversight system, a House panel is told.

WASHINGTON -- Rapid growth in the number of biodefense laboratories researching deadly pathogens has overwhelmed the government's ability to adequately monitor the program, federal investigators told Congress on Thursday.

Officials said the expansion of the program over the last few years, coupled with a lack of training of lab workers and poor reporting of lab accidents, posed a potential threat to national security and public health. *** It was the first time Congress had held a hearing on the safety and security of biodefense research laboratories. *** Experts say the accidents are an outgrowth of the increase in biodefense work since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the still-unsolved anthrax mailings that took place a week later. Five people died and 17 were infected by anthrax spores sent in ordinary-looking letters.

Funding for biodefense research from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases has grown dramatically, from $187 million in 2002 to $1.6 billion in 2006.

Rhodes said the FBI was particularly concerned about its burgeoning workload in conducting background checks on scientists applying to work on a group of 72 dangerous pathogens. These "select agents" include the Ebola virus and the plague bacterium Yersinia pestis.

"As the number of laboratories balloons, [the FBI's] workload balloons," he said.

[ZacandPook]

Great article, most notable for the example it did not give.

Microbiologist Ali Al-Timimi worked in the same building with famed anthrax bioweaponeers and was sentenced to life plus 70 years for sedition. Yet, GMU just received a $25 million federal grant from NIH for a BL-3 lab for work with anthrax near the capitol while major issues remain unaddressed by the University or federal officials.

Al-Timimi at one point had an office about 15 feet from Ken and former USAMRIID head Charles Bailey, a prolific researcher who has published on the Ames anthrax strain.

Ali had a high security clearance for mathematical support work for the Navy, as explained by Milton Viorst in his article "The Educaiton of Ali Al-Timimi."

To not address this issue -- and provide answers bearing on this matter -- is like talking about how the skies were sunny on December 7, 1941 and great for flying.

[ZacandPook]

Pork fueled funding is bad enough. But when spending involves dealing with BL-3 and BL-4 pathogens in major urban centers, and when Al Qaeda has already proved itself so adept at infiltration, it’s time for good men and women to stop doing nothing.

Two words provide the historical context of the USG’s track record in these areas: Ali Mohammed.

http://www.anthraxandalqaeda.com

[ZacandPook]

Monday, October 8, 2007
‘Can’t seem to find my car keys, or my bacteria’

By Scott Hollifield
COLUMNIST
http://www.journalnow.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=WSJ%2FMGArticle%2FWSJ_ColumnistArticle&c=MGArticle&cid=1173353030900&path=!living&s=1037645509005

[ZacandPook]

http://www.commondreams.org/news2007/1004-04.htm

Alan Pearson Testifies about Risks of Proliferation of Bioweapons Laboratories
 
“The very labs designed to protect against bioweapons may become a source for them. The easiest way for a sub-state enemy such as Al Qaeda to obtain a bioweapons capability is for it to penetrate an existing research project that uses bioweapons agents.”

—Dr. Alan Pearson, Director of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation