I have often been a Mugwump about Ron Paul:
I have appreciated his views against the United Nation’s in general and it’s, and it’s supporters attempts at social policy incursions into U.S. domestic policies; like in education for instance.
At the same time, I have seen some of his views of our sovereign federal government in general as “libertarian purest” - an approach that, in my own personal view, submits an often modern view of our founders intentions that imparts purest-libertarian views that are in part (not in whole) late twentieth and early 21st century re-interpretations of fine-line distinctions between state and federal sovereignty that in fact, in ALL U.S. history has never been a pure and fine line. My objection there is not always a philosophical disagreement about what would be best - in a pure philosophical sense - but whether or not it is in fact a historically correct view of accepted political philosophy delivered by the founders or historically correct interpretation of their views.
Has federal authority greatly, and incorrectly encroached on authority AND RESPONSIBILITY of the states? No doubt. Has every single such encroachment been completely outside the bounds permissible by the Constitution, in the Context (Constitutional as well as political) of each and every such instance? Many purest-libertarians say yes; I say no, not always, not in every instance.
I saw Ron Paul telescope his view of “sovereignty”, with the projection of the philosophy behind that view into the international arena in the last debate, when he claimed, falsely (and more like a Netroots’ zealot) that our invasion of Iraq was against international law because it somehow was an illegal offense against Iraq’s sovereignty. (My paraphrasing of what he said - not a quote, is: The invasion was an offense of international law because Iraq was a sovereign nation.).
Like some purest-libertarian views in our domestic arena, the position is not historically factual and the lack of factual basis stems from a denial of history.
Saddam Hussein signed agreements (the truce [not a peace tretay, but truce]) that placed, by his agreement, his ability to freely and without question make some national decisions, by his “sovereign” right alone.
He placed certain actions of his nation, by his agreement, under International scrutiny, review, approval and sanction. He did not have a peace treaty from his aggression, that resulted in the first Gulf War.
He agreed to place his nation (his sovereignty) under the terms of the truce, terms he had to follow and follow to the resolution of the demands and goals of those terms; if he was to obtain a peace treaty and get “his sovereignty” out from under the internationally sanctioned conditions.
A few factual lessons of international law are derived from this.
He did not have to place his sovereignty (his ability to act without international sanctions) under limits imposed from outside Iraq - he could have attempted to continue the Gulf War in 1991, hoping to reach a conclusion more favorable to him; in which the mission we belatedly started in 2003 would have been concluded before 2001 and before Iran had another ten years to subvert more Iraqi Shias to its fundamentalism.
The truce did not end the state of war with Iraq. The truce , as long as it was in affect, (1) truncated, by his agreement, the range of his sovereign activities, and (2) provided a lull (truce) in the fighting. The means to the end of that truncation of his activities (lifting of the limitations he agreed to on his sovereign abilities) was the successful completion of the demands sought by the sanctions imposed by the truce.
The truce, in international law, meant there was a lull in the fighting, from the first Gulf War, not yet a permanent end to it and it meant that that lull would continue as long as the parties that obtained the truce believed its enforcement was being achieved (and was only required to be continued by those parties as long as they accepted that sufficient enforcement of the truce actually continued).
And that lull (truce) would continue until either (a) its enforcement was no longer needed (the goals the truce sought had been met) and a final peace treaty signed, or (b)the parties that obtained the truce from Saddam believed its full enforcement was never to be met by Saddam.
Saddam was constantly in violation of any number of the terms of the truce (violations of “international law”), from day one and continuously. The coalition partners that turned back Saddam’s invasion of Iraq could have, under international law, taken the conclusion (that they finally took) that not only was the truce agreement not being adhered to by Saddam, but that there was every evidence that Saddam had no intention to adhere to it in a way that the goals of the truce could be met.
In other words, the coalition partners could have, under international law, acknowledge (and finally did), at many points in time (as there were many points in time that it was true) that the truce was broken and that Saddam no longer had grounds to retain the lull in the fighting that only the truce agreement provided to him.
During any point in the twelve years of failed diplomacy regarding the failed goals of the international sanctions on Iraq, the coalition that turned back the invasion of Kuwait could have ended the fiction of their truce being enforced and served notice that hostilities would resume.
The terms of the final UN resolutions on Iraq affectively served that notice.
Was anyone, the United States or the U.N. required to find WMDs in Iraq? No. Saddam was required by the truce to make the answer to that question completely and unconditionally transparent. Saddam played a game of international chicken, running two disinformation campaigns simultaneously. In one he publicly proclaimed he had no WMDS and in the other he provided enough constant obstruction and false intelligence for the international community to (a)have no assurance he was telling the truth and (b) sufficient grounds to believe he was not telling the truth.
There would have no grounds for getting rid of Saddam (for recognizing the truce from the Gulf War was no longer in force or enforceable) if he had taken the WMD-program-destruction approach of South Africa and the Ukraine - total and complete transparency and cooperation.
He played chicken with George Bush senior, Bill Clinton and the U.N. and bought twelve years of time. He played chicken with George Bush and lost.
Ron Paul is 100% wrong about projecting a pure, perpetual, constant inviolability of “sovereignty”, without any conditions, ever, in “international law”. It is a U.S.-domestic (among purest-libertarians) and international legal fiction.
An international agreement in the form of a truce/armistice, is by its legal nature and definition not a peace treaty and not an achievement of peace between warring parties. It is an agreed-on lull in the fighting under conditions agreed to and imposed by the truce; nothing more.
An international truce to a conflict is an international agreement that can, in international law, truncate, by terms placed in that agreement, the sovereign ability to act, if the terms of that truce make such impositions and the party against whom that truce was made wants the lull in fighting that the truce provides to continue.
When the parties that sought that truce declare its terms are not being met and they hold no prospect that they will be met, it is not a breach of international law to announce the resumption of hostilities that had been held only in abeyance by that truce.
By any standard of international law, the diplomatic course of the United States met all the obligations required by the truce with Saddam and by that same course acknowledged, finally, Saddam’s inability to live up to that truce and our ability, under international law, to no longer maintain the lull in hostilities that only the broken truce had previously provided.
Ron Paul cannot distinguish his own purest political philosophy of sovereignty from the actual and factual history - in practice and philosophically - of its agreed on limitations that may be obtained under international law - such as in a truce agreement; such as in the truce agreement Saddam failed to live up to.
Well articulated and researched.
“By any standard of international law, the diplomatic course of the United States met all the obligations required by the truce with Saddam and by that same course acknowledged, finally, Saddam’s inability to live up to that truce and our ability, under international law, to no longer maintain the lull in hostilities that only the broken truce had previously provided.”
Sorry, This would have been accurate if we had the UN permission to break the truce. But we didn’t.
I respectfully disagree. The position is historically factual:
-----
Article I / Section 8 / Clause 10
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
*****
Law of Nations Emmerich de Vattel
§ 8. It is immutable Since therefore the necessary law of nations consists in the application of the law of nature to states, — which law is immutable, as being founded on the nature of things, and particularly on the nature of man, — it follows that the Necessary law of nations is immutable.
§ 9. Nations can make no change in it, nor dispense with the obligations arising from it. Whence, as this law is immutable, and the obligations that arise from it necessary and indispensable, nations can neither make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in their own conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance of it.
Trying to 'treaty' a sovereign into good behavior sounds like a wonderful idea, but the question becomes- When the 'treaty' was broken, why wasn't war declared?
-----
He did not have to place his sovereignty (his ability to act without international sanctions) under limits imposed from outside Iraq
As Vattel stated above, the laws of Nature and the laws of Nations are similar.
How can a sovereign treaty away something that he holds in trust?
It would be like you or I giving away our right to pursuit of happiness by contract.
Its not possible
-----
No, the reason we let Saddam get away with his actions for so long is that we put him there. I also distinctly remember the US considering Saddam a tolerable ally at one point.
Iraq-gate anyone?
-------
As a further historical note, the basis for Mideast 'stabilization' is this insidious piece of work passed in 1957;
Middle East Stabilization
Pub. L. 85–7, §§ 1–6, Mar. 9, 1957, 71 Stat. 5, set out as chapter 24A (§ 1961 et seq.) of Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, authorizes the President to provide economic and military assistance, and, if he determines it necessary, to use armed forces under certain circumstances to maintenance of national independence in the Middle East.
-----
Could someone point out the authorization for stabilizing a geographical area not even under Congressional control?
Or where Congress gets its ability to take an authority delegated to it and pass that authority to another branch?
------
BTW - I'd like to say a sincere 'Thank you' for your well reasoned post. It's greatly appreciated.