Replies

I'm not an attorney and I don't know a single thing about city ordinances in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Neither am I inclined to go searching for an ordinance that Craig's behavior broke. But I have no doubt that one exists, nor will you if you think carefully about the situation. It must be the case that Karsnia had a lawful justification for arresting Craig simply on the basis of Craig's solicitation of a sex act.

I'm not a lawyer either, but I can quote someone who is. Read this:

What really seems to have happened is that the airport police had received complaints about sexual activity and were acting over-zealously to deter it, regardless of the niceties of state criminal law.

And I absolutely object to the contention that if the police arrest someone that is sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested has comitted a crime.

No big city police force sets up a sting operation without being sure about the legal niceties of what's required for a bust.

LOL! Happens every day.

And, again, it's clearly not enough for it to be illegal only to actually perform a sex act in the restroom. The solicitation of such an act must also be illegal in order that vulnerable individuals be protected by law from predators. And I'm surprised that Ben Stein appears not to have recognized that the simple solicitation of a sex act can be a crime (whether the sex act is gay or straight being irrelevant).

See this:

Minn. Stat. 617.23, the indecent exposure statute, covers lewd or lascivious conduct in a public place. Sex and masturbation count as lewd and lascivious acts. There is, however, some Minnesota case law suggesting that public restrooms aren't "public places" once you close the door to your stall. State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800, 803-04 (Minn. 1970).
Even if the completed act would be a crime, it's doubtful that merely asking for sex in the restroom would be a crime.
Minnesota, unlike some jurisdictions, does not have a general solicitation statute. Mere solicitation of a crime is not a crime. State v. Lowrie, 54 N.W.2d 265, 266 (Minn. 1952); State v. Johnson, 2005 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 352 at *9. Minnesota does of course have an attempt statute, 609.17, but that requires a substantial step toward completion of the crime, plus the specific intent to commit the crime. I think it's possible but doubtful that Craig's acts would count as a substantial step, and it's also possible but doubtful that you could infer such a specific intent. Or rather — there's some inference there, but it's not strong enough to support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.