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The issue before the bar was not secession, but the ownership/payment of the bonds. As with EVERY court case, the court has to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction - a majority of the court holding that it did. Chase's comments about the permanence of the union are obiter dicta - the constitutionality of secession was not before the court. What was argued, and decided, was the ownership status of the bonds.

In 1795 the court held that secession was legal. In Penhallow, et al. v. Doane's Administrators, 3 Dall. 54 (1795), 3 of the 4 justices held opinions similar to Patterson, who stated,

'If she [the state of New Hampshire] would not submit to the exercise of the act of sovereignty contended for by Congress, and the other states, she should have withdrawn herself from the confederacy.' [Ibid, 3 Dall. 54, 82].

Justices Blair and Patterson were both framers, cognizant of what was debated and agreed to in convention. So I can just as easily argue that the doctrine of unilateral secession had been upheld by the Supreme Court in 1795.

Chase's comments about the permanence of the union are obiter dicta - the constitutionality of secession was not before the court.

Complete nonsense. The defense claimed that Texas had seceded and had not completed reconstruction, hence they were not a state and could not sue in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the question of the legality of their acts of secession was most certainly a matter before the court at the time and the court's ruling was most certainly binding.

In 1795 the court held that secession was legal.

You really do not understand the concept of obiter dictum, do you? Who had seceded in Penhallow?

Do you really think that even if you packed SCOTUS with the most strict constructionist jurists that they would not unanimously rule it unconstitutional if a state tried to secede?