Posted on 08/25/2007 2:26:58 PM PDT by DAVEY CROCKETT
Lowry: The CIA's record leading up to Sept. 11 was one of failure By Rich Lowry Article Last Updated: 08/25/2007 09:07:06 AM MDT
The new report from the CIA's inspector general about the spy agency's pre-9/11 failings could be titled, ''What We Did During Our Holiday From History.'' The stretch between the end of the Cold War and the Sept. 11 attacks was supposed to be a shiny new era of globalized peace and prosperity, to which an intelligence service was considered quaintly irrelevant.
The CIA conformed to the zeitgeist by remaining quaintly irrelevant. George Tenet presided over the agency, failing his way to the second-longest tenure of any director of central intelligence, a Presidential Medal of Freedom and a $4 million book advance. He made the Peter Principle work for him not just by advancing to his level of incompetence, but by benefiting from it handsomely.
Congressional Democrats pushed for the release of the scathing IG report, completed back in June 2005, to embarrass the Bush administration. But most of the failures identified in the report took place during the Clinton administration, which set the CIA's skewed priorities and selected Tenet in the first place. President Bush should be embarrassed only because he didn't fire Tenet upon taking office or after 9/11, while Bush also has failed to undertake a serious retooling of the sclerotic bureaucracy that is the CIA.
Tenet took terrorism seriously, ''sounding the alarm about the threat to many different audiences,'' in the words of the report. Maybe he should have gone on a lecture tour. Where Tenet fell down was in managing his agency. The thought may be father to the deed, but without the actual deed, the thought is only political cover in after-the-fact memoirs.
Tenet insists that he had a ''robust plan'' against al-Qaida. In reality, he only thought he had. He directed that such a plan be formulated, but according to the IG report, it never happened. Worse, Tenet did not ''work with the National Security Council to elevate the relative standing of counterterrorism in the formal ranking of intelligence priorities.''
In Tenet's defense, he operated within the context of a Clinton administration that basically was uninterested in intelligence. Tenet notes that the intelligence community lost 25 percent of its personnel in the 1990s and ''tens of billions of dollars in investment compared with the 1990 baseline.'' He implored the administration for funding increases in 1998 and 1999, but had to go ''outside established channels to work with then-Speaker Gingrich to obtain a $1.2 billion budgetary supplemental.''
Even with more resources, his managers repeatedly moved funds from counterterrorism programs to other needs, without ever raiding other programs to fund counterterrorism, according to the IG report. What could be more important than counterterrorism? Analytic resources were poured into addressing more pressing matters like the Balkans and the environment.
After 9/11, Clinton officials and Tenet argued whether the CIA had been granted the authority to kill Osama bin Laden, with the Clintonites, in a bout of retrospective bloodlust, insisting that it had. The IG report finds that restrictions on the CIA killing bin Laden had been ''arguably, although ambiguously, relaxed'' for a brief period in late 1998 and early 1999 (how Clintonian). But CIA managers refused ''to take advantage of the ambiguities,'' and even if they had, the agency didn't have the covert-action capability to kill bin Laden. Such was life during history's holiday.
What's more scandalous is how the CIA has escaped serious reform even today. Two CIA directors in a row have resisted the IG report's recommendation for an accountability board to evaluate the pre-9/11 performance of CIA officials. That word - not ''board,'' but ''accountability'' - raises hackles at Langley, where everyone is above-average at fighting al-Qaida. Even though as many as 60 CIA employees knew that two of the hijackers were in the U.S. before 9/11 and no one managed to get the word to the FBI, CIA Director Michael Hayden thinks holding anyone accountable for that or other failures would be ''distracting.'' And so the band plays on.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20071214TDY01301.htm
MSDF officer held over leak of Aegis data / Admits passing top-secret info to fellow cmdr
The Yomiuri Shimbun
Sumitaka Matsuuchi hides his face with his hand upon arriving by a car at a police station in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, on Thursday.
A 34-year-old Maritime Self-Defense Force lieutenant commander was arrested Thursday on suspicion of leaking top-secret information about key functions of MSDF Aegis destroyers.
The Kanagawa prefectural police and the MSDF’s Criminal Investigation Command arrested Sumitaka Matsuuchi, a former member of the MSDF’s vessel development team in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, on suspicion of violating the Law Concerning the Protection of Secrets for the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.
It was the first time for a person to be arrested under the law since its enactment in 1954. The law prohibits the leaking of information about weaponry and warships containing U.S. technology.
According to investigators, Matsuuchi used the SDF internal mail service to send a compact disc holding a computer file of top secret information to one of his colleagues around August 2002, at which time he was working for the vessel development division.
By doing so, he leaked secret material to the 43-year-old lieutenant commander, who was an instructor at the MSDF’s First Service School in Etajima, Hiroshima Prefecture, the investigators said.
Matsuuchi admitted the allegation. He told the investigators: “It’s true I handed it to a lieutenant commander who studied in the United States with me after he asked for it. I knew it was top secret material, but I sent it by the SDF’s internal mail delivery service anyway.”
continued.
Dec 13, 4:26 AM EST
Russia seizes 4 Japanese fishing boats in disputed northern waters, Japan says
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20071215TDY01305.htm
2 killed in gym rampage / Gunman also wounds 5 in shooting at Sasebo sports club
The Yomiuri Shimbun
NAGASAKI—Two people were shot dead and five others, including two girls, were wounded by a man who opened fire with what appeared to be a shotgun at a sports gym in Sasebo, Nagasaki Prefecture, on Friday evening, the police said.
The man apparently opened fire as he entered the building through the main entrance on the second floor. He fired several shots into the swimming pool on the same floor, where a swimming class for primary and middle school students was being held.
The gunman was still at large as of 12:20 a.m. Saturday, and officers of Nagasaki and Saga prefectural police were trying to find the assailant. The police described the assailant as being about 180 centimeters tall and wearing camouflage fatigues, a silver down jacket and a balaclava or full-face helmet.
About 50 customers and 20 gym employees were inside the gym at the time of the rampage.
Mai Kuramoto, a 26-year-old swimming instructor at the gym, was fatally shot in the chest, the police said. She was taken to a hospital in the city but was confirmed dead about 40 minutes later.
A 36-year-old male member of the gym was shot in the abdomen and chest, and later died, the police said.
A 48-year-old gym manager was hit in the leg by a stray bullet, and a 39-year-old gym member was injured in the back. A 46-year-old man, a 9-year-old girl and a 10-year-old girl also suffered leg and other injuries. Their wounds reportedly were not life-threatening.
A 10-year-old girl who was at the gym was taken to a hospital for shock.
At about 7:15 p.m., the police received an emergency call claiming that explosions had been heard inside Renaissance Sasebo.
The gym, which occupies the second to fourth floors of the building, is in a residential area about two kilometers north of JR Sasebo Station. A supermarket is on the first floor of the building.
A man in his 30s who was near the gym’s entrance at the time of the shooting said he saw a suspicious man enter the gym.
According to the witness, the man, wearing a camouflage-printed shirt and trousers, headed toward a swimming pool on the second floor. Shots rang out a few minutes later, prompting the witness to run away from the building.
“I heard many shots,” a 45-year-old colleague of Kuramoto said. “Children were frantically running around to escape. She was a devoted, hard worker. I have no idea why such a thing happened.”
A 46-year-old gym instructor who was on the fourth floor at the time, said: “I heard loud shots from downstairs. I was so startled and I told my students to escape.”
A 9-year-old boy in the swimming pool when the assailant entered the area said: “I heard noises like gunshots, so I went into the dressing room and hid there. Someone was screaming, and I was so scared.”
A couple who went to the gym to play squash with a friend saw a man walking to the poolside and firing several shots through the glass. After fleeing the building separately, the couple met up about an hour later.
“I didn’t know what to do,” the 28-year-old husband said. His wife said, “I was terrified.”
On the third floor, more than 20 people were doing aerobics. One man said he first heard several explosions coming from the swimming pool.
“After a while, I heard three more shots. Our instructor escorted us to an emergency staircase. We were too scared to go [downstairs] to see what was going on,” he said.
(Dec. 15, 2007)
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT
Peacebuilding in Haiti: Including Haitians from Abroad
Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 14 December 2007: To escape its “fragile state” status and consolidate the country’s stability, the Haitian government needs to implement a long-term diaspora policy with the support of the international community.
Peacebuilding in Haiti: Including Haitians from Abroad,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines how a sustained initiative to include three million Haitians living abroad could foster development and investment, strengthen state institutions and modernise the country’s political system. The diaspora is waiting for the government to move beyond rhetoric to action by removing formal and informal barriers to expanded engagement. The government must also clearly communicate to the public and key sectors within Haiti the reasons for encouraging returns, so as to decrease the risks of tensions in an already fragile country.
The government should set up a diaspora task force, mandated for one year and comprising Haitian officials, all political forces in parliament, civil society, and private sector and diaspora representatives, to draft a ten-year diaspora strategy backed by international support.
“Haiti’s diaspora policy should target state-strengthening, development, investment, political participation and reverse brain drain”, says Damien Helly, Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst in Port-au-Prince. “If implemented half-heartedly, it may fail to contribute to a smooth transition after President René Préval leaves office in 2011”.
The success of urgently needed structural and economic reforms depends on increased public and private capacities, and several hundred positions in the public administration could potentially be filled by skilled Haitians from abroad. Haitian expatriates have contributed an estimated $1.65 billion to the economy in remittances in 2006, and their economic contributions should be reflected in the political system by facilitating voting abroad, and allowing dual citizenship and diaspora representation in parliament, which is likely to require constitutional reform.
Remittances could be maximised through better access to credit, finance and savings. Other resources should be leveraged through hometown associations and Haitian lobbies in developed countries. Greater confidence in Haiti’s institutions will allow diaspora communities to invest more in Haiti. Some regulation of work force migration should be put in place through bilateral agreements negotiated with destination countries.
“The government has just over three years to implement an ambitious and long-term diaspora policy that will extend beyond Préval’s mandate and help Haiti achieve development and stability”, says Markus Schultze-Kraft, Crisis Group’s Latin America Program Director. “If this opportunity is not seized now, it may not present itself again in the foreseeable future”.
Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) 32 (0) 2 541 1635
Giulia Previti (Washington) 1 202 785 1601
To contact Crisis Group media please click here
*Read the full Crisis Group report on our website: http://www.crisisgroup.org
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_warfare
This page contains the history of Biological warfare.
It reads like a list of the items from China, that has been pulled from sale.
Most of these diseases are still active in the world today according to the WHO health bulletins.
granny
http://russianbiochemicalweapons.blogspot.com/
A report on Russian bio and chemical weapons, with links to the rest of the story.
[scientists for hire in 1999]
http://issues.org/15.3/p_tucker.htm
Jonathan B. Tucker
Bioweapons from Russia: Stemming the Flow
The U.S. must broaden its efforts to deal with the serious proliferation threat posed by the legacy of the Soviet biological weapons program.
For nearly two decades, the former Soviet Union and then Russia maintained an offensive biological warfare (BW) program in violation of an international treaty, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In addition to five military microbiological facilities under the control of the Soviet Ministry of Defense (MOD), a complex of nearly 50 scientific institutes and production facilities worked on biological weapons under the cover of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health, and an ostensibly civilian pharmaceutical complex known as Biopreparat. The full magnitude of this top-secret program was not revealed until the defection to the West of senior bioweapons scientists in 1989 and 1992.
Today, the legacy of the Soviet BW program, combined with continued economic displacement, poses a serious threat of proliferation of related know-how, materials, and equipment to outlaw states and possibly to terrorist groups. The three primary areas of concern are the “brain drain” of former BW specialists, the smuggling of pathogenic agents, and the export or diversion of dual-use technology and equipment. Although the U.S. government is expanding its nonproliferation activities in this area, far more needs to be done.
The Soviet BW complex
The nonmilitary Soviet BW complex comprised 47 facilities, with major R&D centers in Moscow, Leningrad, Obolensk, and Koltsovo (Siberia) and standby production facilities in Omutninsk, Pokrov, Berdsk, Penza, Kurgan, and Stepnogorsk (Kazakhstan). According to Kenneth Alibek (formerly known as Kanatjan Alibekov), the former deputy director for science of Biopreparat, a total of about 70,000 Soviet scientists and technicians were employed in BW-related activities in several state institutions. Biopreparat employed some 40,000 people, of whom about 9,000 were scientists and engineers; the MOD had roughly 15,000 employees at the five military microbiological institutes under its control; the Ministry of Agriculture had about 10,000 scientists working on development and production of anticrop and antilivestock weapons; the institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences employed hundreds of scientists working on BW-related research; and additional researchers worked on biological weapons for the Anti-Plague Institutes of the Soviet Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Public Culture, and other state institutions. Even the KGB had its own BW research program, which developed biological and toxin agents for assassination and special operations under the codename Flayta (”flute”). Ph.D.-level scientists were in the minority, but technicians acquired sensitive knowledge about virulent strains or the design of special bomblets to be used to disseminate biological agents.
According to defector reports, Soviet military microbiologists did research on about 50 disease agents, created weapons from about a dozen, and conducted open-air testing on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea. Beginning in 1984, the top priority in the five-year plan for the Biopreparat research institutes was to alter the genetic structure of known pathogens such as plague and tularemia to make them resistant to Western antibiotics. Soviet scientists were also working to develop entirely new classes of biological weapons, such as “bioregulators” that could modify human moods, emotions, heart rhythms, and sleep patterns. To plan for the large-scale production of BW agents in wartime, Biopreparat established a mobilization program. By 1987, the complex could produce 200 kilograms of dried anthrax or plague bacteria per week if ordered to do so.
The specter of brain drain
In April 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin officially acknowledged the existence of an offensive BW program and issued an edict to dismantle these capabilities. As a result of Yeltsin’s decree and the severe weakness of the Russian economy, the operating and research budgets of many biological research centers were slashed, and thousands of scientists and technicians stopped being paid. From the late 1980s to 1994, for example, the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (”Vector”) in Koltsovo lost an estimated 3,500 personnel. Similarly, between 1990 and 1996, the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology in Obolensk lost 54 percent of its staff, including 28 percent of its Ph.D. scientists.
Iran has been particularly aggressive about recruiting former Soviet bioweapons scientists.
This drastic downsizing raised fears that former Soviet bioweapons experts, suffering economic hardship, might be recruited by outlaw states or terrorist groups. In congressional testimony in 1992, Robert Gates, then director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, expressed particular concern about “bioweaponeers” whose skills have no civilian counterpart. According to Andrew Weber, special advisor for threat reduction policy at the Pentagon, about 300 former Biopreparat scientists have emigrated from the former Soviet Union to the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, but no one knows how many have moved to countries of BW proliferation concern. Despite the lack of information about the whereabouts of former bioweapons scientists, some anecdotes are troubling. For example, in his 1995 memoir, former Obolensk director Igor V. Domaradskij reported that in March 1992, desperate for work, he offered to sell his services to the Chinese Embassy in Moscow. He made a similar offer in May 1993 to Kirsan Ilyumzhin, president of the Kalmyk Republic within the Russian Federation, but reportedly received no response to either inquiry.
Some directors of former BW research centers have sought to keep their top talent intact by dismissing more junior scientists and technicians. Yet because of the Russian economic crisis, which worsened in August 1998 with the collapse of the ruble, even high-level scientists are not being paid their $100 average monthly salaries.
Iranian recruitment efforts
Iran has been particularly aggressive about recruiting former Soviet bioweapons scientists. The London Sunday Times reported in its August 27, 1995 edition that by hiring Russian BW experts, Iran had made a “quantum leap forward” in its development of biological weapons by proceeding directly from basic research to production and acquiring an effective delivery system. More recently, an article published in the December 8, 1998 edition of the New York Times alleged that the government of Iran has offered former BW scientists in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova jobs paying as much as $5,000 a month, which is far more than these people can make in a year in Russia. Although most of the Iranian offers were rebuffed, Russian scientists who were interviewed said that at least five of their colleagues had gone to work in Iran in recent years. One scientist described these arrangements as “marriages of convenience, and often of necessity.”
According to the New York Times, many of the initial contacts with the former Biopreparat institutes were made by Mehdi Rezayat, an English-speaking pharmacologist who claims to be a “scientific advisor” to Iranian President Mohammed Khatami. Iranian delegations who visited the institutes usually expressed interest in scientific exchanges or commercial contacts, but two Russian scientists said that they had been specifically invited to help Iran develop biological weapons. Of particular interest to the Iranians were genetic engineering techniques and microbes that could be used to destroy crops. In 1997, for example, Valeriy Lipkin, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry, was approached by an Iranian delegation that expressed interest in genetic engineering techniques and made tempting proposals for him and his colleagues to come and work for a while in Tehran. Lipkin states that his institute turned down the Iranian proposals.
Nevertheless, evidence collected by opposition groups within Iran and released publicly in January 1999 by the National Council of Resistance indicates that Brigadier General Mohammed Fa’ezi, the Iranian government official responsible for overseas recruitment, has signed up several Russian scientists, some of them on one-year contracts. According to this report, Russian BW experts are working for the Iranian Ministry of Defense Special Industries Organization, the Defense Ministry Industries, and the Pasteur Institute. Moreover, on January 26, 1999, the Moscow daily Kommersant reported that in 1998, Anatoliy Makarov, director of the All-Russia Scientific Research Institute of Phytopathology, led a scientific delegation to Tehran and gave the Iranians information related to the use of plant pathogens to destroy crops.
Novel forms of brain drain
Although the scale and scope of the Russian brain-drain problem are hard to assess from unclassified sources, early assumptions about the phenomenon appear to have been wrong. Some scientists have moved abroad, but the predicted mass exodus of weapon specialists has not materialized. One reason is that few Russians want to leave family and friends and live in an alien culture, even for more money. Some evidence suggests, however, that brain drain may be taking novel forms.
First, foreign governments are not merely recruiting Russia’s underpaid military scientists to emigrate to those countries but are enlisting them in weapons projects within Russia’s own borders. Former BW scientists living in Russia have been approached by foreign agents seeking information, technology, and designs, often under the cover of legitimate business practices to avoid attracting attention.
Second, some weapons scientists could be moonlighting by modem: that is, supplementing their meager salaries by covertly supporting foreign weapons projects on the margins of their legitimate activities. This form of brain drain is based on modern communication techniques, such as e-mail and faxes, which are available at some of the Russian scientific institutes.
Third, bioweapons scientists could be selling access to, or copies of, sensitive documents related to BW production and techniques for creating weapons. Detailed “cookbooks” would be of great assistance to a country seeking to acquire its own biological arsenal. Despite Yeltsin’s edict requiring the elimination of all offensive BW materials, a 1998 article in the Russian magazine Sovershenno Sekretno alleged that archives related to the production of biological agents have been removed from the MOD facilities at Kirov and Yekaterinburg and from a number of Biopreparat facilities and put in long-term storage.
Diversion of agents and equipment
Another disturbing possibility is that scientists could smuggle Russian military strains of biological agents to outlaw countries or terrorist groups seeking a BW capability. Obtaining military seed cultures is not essential for making biological weapons, because virulent strains can be obtained from natural sources. According to Alibek, however, Soviet bioweapons specialists modified a number of disease agents to make them particularly deadly: for example, by rendering them resistant to standard antibiotic therapies and to environmental stresses.
Because a seed culture of dried anthrax spores could be carried in a sealed plastic vial the size of a thumbnail, detecting such contraband at a border is almost impossible. Unlike fissile materials, biological agents do not give off telltale radiation nor do they show up on x-rays. The article in Sovershenno Sekretno claims that “Stealing BW is easier than stealing change out of people’s pockets. The most widespread method for contraband transport of military strains is very simple-within a plastic cigarette package.”
Smuggling of military strains out of secure facilities in Russia has already been alleged. Domaradskij’s memoir states that in 1984, when security within the Soviet BW complex was extremely high, a scientist named Anisimov developed an antibiotic-resistant strain of tularemia at the military microbiological facility in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg). He was then transferred to a Biopreparat facility, but because he wanted to get a Ph.D. degree for his work on tularemia, he stole a sample of the Sverdlovsk strain and brought it with him to his new job. When accused of the theft, Anisimov claimed innocence, but analysis of his culture revealed that it bore a biochemical marker unique to the Sverdlovsk strain. Despite this compelling evidence, senior Soviet officials reportedly covered up the incident.
The more than 15,000 viral strains in the culture collection at the Vector virology institute include a number of highly infectious and lethal pathogens such as the smallpox, Ebola, and Marburg viruses, the theft or diversion of which could be catastrophic. Because of current concerns about the possible smuggling of military seed cultures, the U.S. government is spending $1.5 million to upgrade physical security and accounting procedures for the viral culture collection at Vector and plans to invest a similar amount in enhanced security at Obolensk.
Another troubling development has been the export by Russia of dual-use technology and equipment to countries of BW proliferation concern. For example, in the fall of 1997, weapons inspectors with the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) uncovered a confidential document at an Iraqi government ministry describing lengthy negotiations with an official Russian delegation that culminated in July 1995, in a deal worth millions of dollars, in the sale of a 5,000-liter fermentation vessel. The Iraqis claimed that the fermentor would be used to manufacture single-cell protein (SCP) for animal feed, but before the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq used a similar SCP plant at a site called Al Hakam for large-scale production of two BW agents, anthrax and botulinum toxin. It is not known whether the Russian fermentor ordered by Iraq was ever delivered.
Efforts to stem brain drain
To counter the recruiting of Russian BW scientists by Iran and other proliferant states, the United States has begun to expand its support of several programs designed to keep former BW experts and institutes gainfully employed in peaceful research activities. The largest effort to address the brain drain problem is the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow. Funded by private companies and by the governments of Russia, the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and Norway, the ISTC became operational in August 1992. Since then, the center has spent nearly $190 million on projects that include small research grants (worth about $400 to $700 a month) so that former weapons scientists can pursue peaceful applications of their expertise.
The initial focus of the ISTC was almost exclusively on nuclear and missile experts, but in 1994 the center began to include former BW facilities and scientists. Because of dual-use and oversight concerns, this effort proceeded slowly; by 1996, only 4 percent of the projects funded by the ISTC involved former bioweapons specialists. In 1998, however, the proportion of biologists rose to about 15 percent, and they now constitute 1,055 of the 17,800 scientists receiving ISTC grants. Although the stipends are far less than what Iran is offering, U.S. officials believe that the program is attractive because it allows Russian scientists to remain at home. Even so, the current level of funding is still not commensurate with the gravity of the BW proliferation threat.
A disturbing possibility is that scientists could smuggle Russian military strains of biological agents to outlaw countries or terrorist groups.
Another ISTC program, launched in 1996 by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) with funding from the U.S. Department of Defense, supports joint research projects between Russian and U.S. scientists on the epidemiology, prophylaxis, diagnosis, and therapy of diseases associated with dangerous pathogens. Eight pilot projects have been successfully implemented, and the Pentagon plans to support a number of additional projects related primarily to defenses against BW. The rationale for this effort is to stem brain drain, to increase transparency at former Soviet BW facilities, to benefit from Russian advances in biodefense technologies, and-in the words of a 1997 NAS report-to help reconfigure the former Soviet BW complex into a “less diffuse, less uncertain, and more public-health oriented establishment.”
Other programs to engage former Soviet BW expertise are being funded by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Agricultural Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program, which promotes the development of marketable technologies at former weapons facilities. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is also interested in supporting Russian research on pathogens of public health concern. In fiscal year 1999, the Clinton administration plans to spend at least $20 million on scientist-to-scientist exchanges, joint research projects, and programs to convert laboratories and institutes.
Some conservative members of Congress oppose collaborative work between U.S. and Russian scientists on hazardous infectious diseases because they could help Russia to keep its BW development teams intact. But supporters of such projects such as Anne Harrington, Senior Coordinator for Nonproliferation/Science Cooperation at the Department of State, counter that Russia will continue to do research on dangerous pathogens and that it is in the U.S. interest to engage the key scientific experts at the former BW institutes and to guide their work in a peaceful direction. Collaborative projects have greatly enhanced transparency by giving U.S. scientists unprecedented access to once top-secret Russian laboratories. Moreover, without Western financial support, security at the former BW institutes could deteriorate to dangerous levels.
Given the continued BW proliferation threat from the former Soviet Union, the United States and other partner countries should continue and broaden their engagement of former BW research and production facilities in Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Moldova. Because the line between offensive and defensive research on BW is defined largely by intent, however, ambiguities and suspicions are bound to persist. To allay these concerns, collaborative projects should be structured in such a way as to build confidence that Russia has abandoned offensively oriented work. In particular, it is essential that scientific collaborations with former BW experts and facilities be subjected to extensive oversight, including regular unimpeded access to facilities, personnel, and information.
At the same time, the United States should continue to work through bilateral and multilateral channels to enhance the transparency of Russia’s past offensive BW program and its current defensive activities. An important first step in this direction was taken on December 17, 1998, when U.S. and Russian military officials met for the first time at the Russian Military Academy of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense in Tambov and agreed in principle to a series of reciprocal visits to military biodefense facilities in both countries. The U.S. government should explore ways of broadening this initial constructive contact. Finally, the United States should encourage and assist Russia to strengthen its export controls on sales of dual-use equipment to countries of BW proliferation concern.
ISTC programs are pioneering a new type of arms control based on confidence building, transparency, and scientific collaboration rather than negotiated agreements and formal verification measures. This approach is particularly well suited to the nonproliferation of biological weapons, which depends to a large extent on individual scientists’ decisions not to share sensitive expertise and materials.
Jonathan B. Tucker directs the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California.
http://www.issues.org/15.4/br_zilinskas.htm
Countering terrorism
America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, by Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998, 354 pp.
Raymond A. Zilinskas
In this thoughtful and provocative book, Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer argue that although the United States is well prepared to meet military threats from even the most powerful nations, its vulnerability to terrorists wielding nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons is its Achilles’ heel. In discussing and elaborating on four specific areas of vulnerability and making policy recommendations for dealing with them, the authors make a strong case. Policy in this area has been moving swiftly, however, and since the book was published many of its recommendations have been acted on. In the fall of 1998, the Clinton administration announced a wide range of measures aimed at preventing terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, but assessing the effectiveness of these measures will be difficult to do because their contents are mostly classified. Despite these steps, the policy debate will continue. Thus, although the book is somewhat dated, it will continue to remain an excellent source for background information and policy ideas.
According to Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, the first area of U.S. vulnerability is the lack of a coherent national strategy to deal with the NBC threat and of a federal agency with responsibility for developing a strategy and coordinating defensive activities. They recommend the establishment of an NBC Response Center, which would develop a national antiterrorism strategy, coordinate activities among executive agencies, and perform NBC threat assessments. The federal government would be given primary responsibility for meeting NBC threats, with the Department of Defense (DOD) as the lead agency.
The second vulnerability is inadequate intelligence and threat identification. Timely high-quality intelligence is critical to defense against the covert NBC threat. However, the U.S. intelligence community was set up to deal with Cold War threats and is not well equipped to detect covert NBC threats posed by nonstate actors. Thus, there is a need to reinvigorate the U.S. intelligence community, enhance cooperation between U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies, improve methods for detecting small NBC acquisition programs, and strengthen the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s epidemiological surveillance program.
The third vulnerability is insufficient domestic operational preparedness for NBC attacks. Currently, first responders (generally emergency medical personnel, firefighters, and police) are ill prepared to manage the aftermath of NBC attacks. Police must be trained to investigate NBC incidents, local and state emergency response capabilities must be enhanced by extending and strengthening the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (named after former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and current Senators Richard Lugar and Pete Domenici) domestic preparedness program, and the federal response resources must be improved and increased. In addition, they argue that the core U.S. military mission should include responsibility for responding to NBC events and that coordination among federal, state, and local agencies responsible for NBC response should be improved.
The fourth vulnerability is inadequate security for fissile materials stored in Russia. Criminals, terrorists, or proliferant governments could find it easy to acquire nuclear weaponsrelated materials from poorly guarded facilities there. To fix this problem, the authors say, the Department of Energy (DOE) and DOD should be provided with sufficient funding to ensure that this material indeed is secured, the purchase of Russian highly enriched uranium should be accelerated, Russia should be given assistance to convert three plutonium plants to civilian uses, excess stocks of plutonium in the United States and Russia should be destroyed, and programs to encourage Russian weapons scientists to stay home should be expanded.
Wake-up call
President Clinton’s wake-up call for action was probably the Oklahoma City bombing. Shortly after that, in June 1995, the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, which orders the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate interagency terrorism policy issues, names the State Department as the lead agency in dealing with overseas terrorism, and puts the FBI in charge of responding to domestic terrorist acts. Further, in July 1996, Executive Order 13010 was published, which established the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and asked it to develop a national strategy for protecting the country’s eight critical infrastructures from a wide spectrum of threats. On May 22, 1998, the administration issued two relevant PDDs. PDD 62 establishes the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism within the NSC and charges it with overseeing government activities such as counterterrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, and preparedness and consequence management for weapons of mass destruction. PDD 63 acts on the findings of the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection by ordering a series of actions whose objective is to significantly increase the security of government systems by 2000. The directives have come with a lot of money for agencies to spend. According to the General Accounting Office, spending on unclassified terrorism-related programs and activities rose from $5.6 billion in 1996 to $7. 6 billion in 1999 and is expected to rise to $8.6 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2000. In addition, $1.4 billion is slated for critical infrastructure protection.
Therefore, even as America’s Achilles’ Heel went on sale, the Clinton administration was upstaging its message. The authors’ first and third vulnerabilities are being dealt with in these ways: A national office to coordinate defenses against terrorism has been established; the Justice Department has been designated as the lead agency for domestic antiterrorism; coordination between agencies has been improved; substantial efforts to protect critical infrastructures are under way; networks at the national and local levels to detect and survey infectious diseases are being improved; many people at local and federal levels are being trained to respond to NBC events, including those of terrorist origin; and the awareness of the NBC terrorist threat is rising among the public and its representatives.
It is more difficult to assess what is being done to deal with the second and fourth vulnerabilities. Actions specified in the three PDDs could be correcting problems related to inadequate intelligence, but because these efforts are classified, we cannot know. We do know that DOE and DOD are providing substantial assistance to Russia to secure nuclear and chemical facilities (the status of Russian military biological facilities is not publicly known). For this reason, we can hope that it would be difficult for either unfriendly governments or terrorists to access supplies and materials stored at these facilities; however, we cannot be assured that this is so. The weakness of the Russian government and its unresolved suspicions of U.S. motives are likely to limit achievements in this area for some time.
How effective?
Some analysts worry about the effectiveness and appropriateness of government programs to suppress terrorism. Is the tremendous effort now under way to protect our society against NBC terrorism logically prioritized, well directed, and sufficiently funded? Unfortunately, because no measures exist to assess the quality and quantity of antiterrorism activities, we won’t be able to determine this until the unfortunate time when a NBC terrorist event occurs and the system is tested.
Nevertheless, U.S. society is reaping two major, if unintended, benefits from antiterrorism programs. First, although first responders have some knowledge of and training in how to manage chemical and nuclear events, they have had no such capabilities in the biological field. Had there been in the recent past an accident or deliberate act that liberated known or exotic pathogens, no agency at either the local or national level would have been qualified to manage the event. However, because of the new programs, there soon will be a sizable cadre of first responders who can quickly distinguish between biological and chemical attacks and do what is necessary to manage them.
The second benefit relates to emerging infectious diseases. A 1993 Institute of Medicine study found that the major shortcoming in our society’s ability to meet the threat of these diseases was the near-total absence of a sensitive and efficient infectious disease surveillance system. In the past, when outbreaks of diseases had occurred, their presence was not detected until a significant time had elapsed. But by then the diseases could have spread widely, causing many casualties and bringing about much suffering. The outbreak of AIDS is an example of delayed identification and response. However, as a consequence of actions being taken in response to PDDs 39, 62, and 63 (as well as PDD NTSC-7, which sets a national policy to meet the threat of emerging infectious diseases), funding for improving the nation’s disease surveillance networks has risen from less than $10 million in FY 1993 to almost $200 million in FY 1999. Detection of a dread new disease may now be possible much earlier. Ironically, the Clinton administration may be remembered for these actions rather than for its efforts to improve antiterrorist defenses.
In view of recent developments, is America’s Achilles’ Heel still worth reading? After all, many of its policy recommendations have been coopted. In addition, some readers may be put off by its length and sometimes excessive detail. Despite these problems, the authors have written a valuable book, useful to security analysts, policymakers, and others who are concerned with the threat of NBC terrorism. Since substantial weaknesses related to the second and fourth vulnerabilities remain and need to be fixed, my hope is that when administration officials plan for additional programs to deter and protect us from NBC terrorism, they will refer to Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer for ideas and guidance.
Daniel Barbiero is associate archivist at the National Research Council.
Rick Borchelt is lecturer in technology policy and communication at Vanderbilt University and a former manager of media relations at the Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Melvin A. Goodman, a former senior Soviet analyst at the CIA, is professor of international security at the National War College, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C., co-author of The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze (Penn State Press, 1996), and editor of Lessons of the Cold War (Penn State Press, forthcoming).
Raymond A. Zilinskas is senior scientist in residence at the Monterey Institute of International Affairs’ Center on Nonproliferation Research in Washington, D.C., and the editor of Biological Warfare (Lynne Rienner, forthcoming in fall 1999).
* Previous
* Table of Contents
December 14, 2007 PM Anti-Terrorism News - UnitedStatesAction.com
(Iraq) ID clues rare in mass graves in Iraq
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071214/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_graves_by_the_lake;_ylt=Apo6Iq5mEfztkagC8X8sfSis0NUE
U.S. Ups Reward for Osama Bin Laden
http://mnweekly.ru/world/20071213/55296543.html
Palestinians say Israel releases Hamas-linked mayor
http://www.reuters.com/article/middleeastCrisis/idUSL14369641
Hamas Threatening to Harm Kidnapped Soldier If Israel Invades Gaza
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,316844,00.html
Grenade kills 3, wounds 35 at Palestinian funeral: medics
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j056MOoqCqQemUa-l6WjVZVqpj_w
Hamas Police Arrest Aide to Palestinian Prime Minister
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/world/middleeast/15mideast.html
Algeria:’The Ultimate Soft Target’ - Bruce Hoffman on Al Qaeda’s intentions against U.N. and Europe
http://www.newsweek.com/id/77769
(Somalia) At Least 17 Dead in Somali Unrest
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5gKQ6Hm0yuq8jNqzJY4rRkn0qzwhQD8TH0FK00
(Russia) Gunmen attack military, police in troubled Russia region of Ingushetia
http://www.kyivpost.com/bn/28002/
(UK) Government loses terror decision - No appeal against order to take People’s Mujahideen Organisation of Iran (PMOI) off list of banned terror groups
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7145418.stm
Germany seeks to hold militants over 1970s murder
http://uk.news.yahoo.com/rtrs/20071214/tts-uk-germany-crime-5a1adea.html
(Spain) Basque Group ETA Vows to Act Against State Targets
http://www.javno.com/en/world/clanak.php?id=106701
Other News:
(UK) ‘We’ve become a global village’
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2007/12/13/do1303.xml
(UK) Guilding the Lily and Policy Exchange Report
http://hurryupharry.bloghouse.net/archives/2007/12/13/guilding_the_lily.php
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December 15, 2007 Anti-Terrorism News - UnitedStatesAction.com
(Iraq) Synchronized bombings in Baghdad kill 2 — northern and central Iraq Friday raids, US forces
detain 18, kill 4 Al Qaeda suspects
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071215/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_violence_1;_ylt=AiVqcoWyQO3s6TxunL7X.KlX6GMA
(Iraq) Militants strike Baghdad neighborhood patrols — killing 3, wounding 17
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20071215/ts_nm/iraq2_dc_1;_ylt=AixsHYyTyKFP1nhjLrAVRHJX6GMA
(Iraq) Bomb explosion wounds eight anti-al-Qaida group members in Baghdad
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/15/content_7255037.htm
(Iraq) US military says a soldier was killed by gunfire in northwestern Iraq
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/15/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-US-Casualties.php
(Iraq) Arrested in Kirkuk a gang specialized in kidnapping Christian doctors — say “according to sharia
taking money from a Christian is legitimate”
http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=11038&size
Iraqi Kurds: No Kurdish state but long term presence of US
http://www.thenewanatolian.com/tna-30099.html
(Afghanistan) Bombings, unrest kill 14 in Afghanistan — Taliban car bomb near Kabul police station kills 5
— other violence includes: 3 Afghan soldiers killed in Balkh, 3 Taliban killed while planting bomb in Paktika,
and 5 killed in Paktia in Taliban ambush
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071215/wl_sthasia_afp/afghanistanunrest_071215105405;_ylt=Aq8mlmm.nKsahMHA0oiuTszOVooA
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071215/ts_afp/afghanistanunrestkabul_071215092647;_ylt=ArNswaw53WY81k.H04RRdE7OVooA
(Afghanistan) Troops on patrol in former Taliban town (Musa Qala) in hopes of preventing another takeover
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/15/asia/AS-GEN-Afghan-Musa-Qala.php
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3054466.ece
(Pakistan) At least five dead in Pakistan suicide bombing: army — bicycle bomber attacks near
army facility in Nowshera
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071215/wl_sthasia_afp/pakistanunrestnorthwest_071215123843;_ylt=ApLYwHDGHLiCuTK.ZTwQNf3zPukA
(Pakistan) Militants attack security forces convoy in Waziristan, no casualties — Till area
http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/Story.aspx?Language=en&DSNO=1052061
(Pakistan) 14 militants including Fazlullah’s aide held
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\12\15\story_15-12-2007_pg7_1
(Pakistan) Centralized Taliban organization set up — in Pakistan’s NWFP — named movement “Tehrik
Taliban-i-Pakistan” for enforcement of Shariah and for joint war against US and NATO forces in
Afghanistan — appointed Baitullah Mehsud as their Central Amir
http://www.dawn.com/2007/12/15/top7.htm
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\12\15\story_15-12-2007_pg7_7
(Pakistan) 2 Khyber tribes bar women from voting
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\12\15\story_15-12-2007_pg1_4
(Pakistan) US helping Pakistan secure restive regions: Pentagon
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/The_United_States/US_helping_Pak_secure_restive_regions_Pentagon/rssarticleshow/2624720.cms
(Pakistan) Musharraf lifts emergency rule in Pakistan
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071215/wl_sthasia_afp/pakistanpolitics_071215123448;_ylt=AolbRHkGsXzVGepErP0zQUXzPukA
(Pakistan) A Conversation With Pervez Musharraf
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/14/AR2007121401229.html?hpid=opinionsbox1
(Pakistan) US aid to Pakistan to become conditional, but no financial cuts
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\12\15\story_15-12-2007_pg7_49
(Pakistan) Politics not to affect missiles sale to Pakistan: US firm — to provide Pakistan with
700 air-to-air missiles
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/Politics_not_to_affect_missiles_sale_to_Pakistan_US_firm/articleshow/2624532.cms
(India J&K) Three Army personnel injured in blast in J&K — in Sopore area
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Top_Headlines/Three_Army_personnel_injured_in_blast_in_JK/articleshow/2624535.cms
(India) Militants becoming unpopular in Manipur
http://news.webindia123.com/news/Articles/India/20071215/849347.html
(India Assam) ISI’s Assam top leader arrested
http://news.webindia123.com/news/Articles/India/20071215/849341.html
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Suspected_key_ISI_man_held_in_Assam/articleshow/2624749.cms
(U.S.) California: Ex-convicts admit planning terror attack
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071215/ap_on_re_us/terrorism_probe_2;_ylt=AnzTj5r2X8tI_iEgr6Dd6UoTv5UB
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22266418/
— updated AP story on Kevin James and Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh Jihadist prison gang
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/state/20071214-0709-ca-terrorismprobe.html
(U.S.) Man in N.Y. terror case gets less time - judge reduces sentence from 10 years to 9 years for one
of Lackawanna Six, Yahya Goba, for cooperation
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071215/ap_on_re_us/lackawanna_terrorism_case_1;_ylt=Av65x_FAy7MuRUDlg.ch4_UTv5UB
(U.S.) Terror insurance renewal seen via Senate bill
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN1431284420071214
(U.S.) Ex-worker: Air firm aided CIA renditions
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071215/ap_on_re_us/boeing_cia_suit
(U.S.) Attorney general won’t share info from CIA tapes inquiry
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/12/14/mukasey.cia.tapes/index.html
(U.S.) Bush threatens to veto anti-torture Bill - that bans the CIA from using harsh interrogation methods
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/12/15/wbush115.xml
(Iran/Germany) ‘Germany expelled Iranian who sought to buy parts for nuke program’ — story references
a “Mohraramali D”
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1196847345390&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Translated Der Spiegel page -
http://world.altavista.com/babelfish/trurl_pagecontent?lp=de_en&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.spiegel.de%2Fpolitik%2Fdeutschland%2F0%2C1518%2C523529%2C00.html
Original story (in German)
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,523529,00.html
(Iran) EU to support further Iran sanctions
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1196847343017&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Iran/Iraq) U.S. and Iranians postpone talks on Iraqi violence
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20071214/pl_nm/iraq_iran_dc_1;_ylt=AjPzbw3fAIdwu9WjzbmQyyJSw60A
(Lebanon) Western powers press Lebanon to fill vacant presidency
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071215/wl_afp/lebanonvote_071215124359;_ylt=Al_RKgZVeCt942Q7_h6ftL_agGIB
(Hamas) Celebrating anniversary, Hamas warns of Intifada
http://africa.reuters.com/world/news/usnL15260280.html
(Gaza) Hamas Threatening to Harm Kidnapped Soldier If Israel Invades Gaza
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,316844,00.html
(West Bank) Israel releases Hamas-linked mayor
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2007/December/middleeast_December230.xml§ion=middleeast&col=
PFLP urges Fatah to talk with Hamas
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1196847342072&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
US to pledge $500 million to PA
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?c=JPArticle&cid=1196847342679&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Somalia) Bomb wounds 12 soldiers near Somali parliament — two people were killed in violence
in Mogadishu on Saturday
http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnL15001543.html
Kenyan police probe ‘terror suspects’ over arms trafficking — update on Kenya raids on Friday - 32 arrested
http://www.afriquenligne.fr/news/daily-news/kenyan-police-probe-’terror-suspects’-over-arms-trafficking-2007121413445/
Algiers bomber’s family blames ‘ignorance’ — says poverty not factor — two of Bechla Rabah’s sons
were members of the Islamic Armed Group
http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnL15330517.html
(Algeria) UN raises toll in Algeria bombing to 17 dead
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/14/news/UN-GEN-UN-Algeria-Bombing.php
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breaking_news/breaking_previous.php#
(Tunisia) 4 Tunisians convicted on terrorism charges for trying to join insurgency in Iraq
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/14/africa/AF-GEN-Tunisia-Terror-Trial.php
Nigeria: Ten Killed, Three Churches Set Ablaze In Bauchi
http://www.compassdirect.org/en/display.php?page=lead&lang=en&length=long&idelement=&backpage=&critere=&countryname=&rowcur=
Azerbaijan: 15 convicted of ties with Iranian agents passed Israeli secrets
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1196847345681&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Canada) Last-ditch effort underway to derail suspect’s terror charges — Momin Khawaja seeks
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada
http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=54fddb63-c2d6-46a3-9254-3b037204664a&k=31886
German Anti-Terrorism Forces Go Online Looking for Extremists - updated report
http://news.softpedia.com/news/German-Anti-Terrorism-Forces-Go-Online-Looking-For-Extremists-73932.shtml
(UK) Scotland: Anti-terrorism operation launched — in Glasgow — random searches to make railways
a “difficult target” for terrorists — criticized by Muslim Council of Scotland
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/glasgow_and_west/7072882.stm
(UK) Terrorism accused thought camp trips ‘harmless fun’— Kader Ahmed reported to have
attended paramilitary training camps around the UK
http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/uk?articleid=3593626
(UK) Muslim bookshop considering legal action against think tank
http://www.ealingtimes.co.uk/news/asianspotlight/spotlight/display.var.1904043.0.muslim_bookshop_considering_legal_action_against_think_tank.php
(Spain) EU court partially accepts ETA’s Batasuna outlawing appeal
http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=81&story_id=46944
Italy: Knights of Malta rejects alleged link to military action — responding to Islamist websites urging
jihadists to carry out attack on embassy in Egypt
http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Religion/?id=1.0.1670211157
Romania won’t recognize unilateral Kosovar independence
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/14/europe/EU-POL-EU-Summit-Romania.php
(Indonesia) Radical cleric Bashir visits Bali bombers
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,22931396-1702,00.html
(Indonesia) Bashir: ‘Disaster’ if Bali bombers executed
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,22929770-23109,00.html
(Philippines) Bomb hurled at Cotabato polling place fails to explode
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/regions/view_article.php?article_id=107080
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=102556
(Philippines) Peace deal may be delayed as Philippines, Islamic rebels row over draft on Muslim homeland
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/15/asia/AS-GEN-Malaysia-Philippines-Muslim-Rebels.php
Sri Lankan military says 31 rebels, 1 soldier killed in fighting in the volatile north
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/15/asia/AS-GEN-Sri-Lanka-Civil-War.php
(North Korea) Bush to N. Korea: Disclose nuclear plans
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071214/ap_on_go_pr_wh/us_nkorea_7;_ylt=AptUN4fVbX00R2vLvKJIYqaCscEA
Ecuadoran police find arsenal, Osama bin Laden photos
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/15/content_7253616.htm
Colombia destroys mountain of weapons
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/theworld/2007/December/theworld_December519.xml§ion=theworld
Other News:
(Indonesia) Women soldiers wearing headscarves, Islamic fundamentalism’s next goal
http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=11033&theme=5&size=A
Iran: Rights situation deteriorating, says European MP after Tehran mission
http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.1670071036
(India J&K) 1 killed, 5 wounded as police fire on violent protesters in Indian Kashmir
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1196847344805&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(U.S.) Michigan: More Muslim girls bringing faith onto the field, court
http://www.wlns.com/Global/story.asp?S=7500980&nav=menu25_2
(U.S.) California: Muslim Bakery Sentencing
http://www.kfty.com/news/local/story.aspx?content_id=41891b3d-436a-4709-929f-ca36307b80f0
(UK) 11,000 security staff are working illegally
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article3048460.ece
Against Nazi News:
(France) National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen faces trial for defending Nazi record
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article3053779.ece
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/12/15/wlpen115.xml
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CIGUATERA TOXIN - USA: (MISSOURI) ALERT
***************************************
A ProMED-mail post
http://www.promedmail.org
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
http://www.isidi.org
Date: 12 Dec 2007
Source: News Inferno.com [edited]
http://www.newsinferno.com/archives/2192
Ciguatera from Fish Served at 2 Restaurants Sickens 10 in St. Louis
All of the people involved in the St. Louis ciguatera outbreak ate
amberjack, a tropical fish, at either the Blue Water Grill in
Kirkwood or Frazer’s Restaurant and Lounge in St. Louis.
Ciguatera is a food poisoning caused by toxins within fish that eat
other fish that have ingested toxic algae, sometimes called red tide.
Ciguatera toxin may be found in large reef fish, most commonly
barracuda, grouper, red snapper, eel, amberjack, sea bass, and
Spanish mackerel. The toxin that causes ciguatera cannot be cooked
out of fish, and there is no way to detect its presence.
While rare in the US, ciguatera is the most common type of fishborne
food poisoning in the world, and most cases occur in the Caribbean.
Ciguatera symptoms occur within 6 hours of consumption and range from
nausea, vomiting and diarrhea, to neurological symptoms including
headache, sensory disorientation, vertigo and muscular weakness. The
disease is rarely fatal, but in severe cases symptoms can linger for
months or years. There is no way to cure ciguatera, but the symptoms
can be treated while the disease runs its course. It is important
that ciguatera victims avoid dehydration, and sometimes intravenous
fluids are required.
Both St. Louis-area restaurants purchased the amberjack at Bob’s
Seafood in University City, MO. Bob’s Seafood in turn, had procured
the amberjack from a federally inspected facility in Louisiana. The
FDA is now trying to determine the source of the ciguatera
contamination.
The St. Louis Department of Health, which is expected to issue a
health alert today [12 Dec 2007], believes that there may be other
ciguatera victims in the area, and they are working with officials in
St. Louis County to get the word out to health providers so they can
spot ciguatera symptoms, which can sometimes mimic more serious
diseases, such as multiple sclerosis.
There have been no recorded cases of ciguatera in the St. Louis area
before now. The health department is asking anyone who ate amberjack
recently and is suffering from symptoms similar to ciguatera to call
the St. Louis Department of Health at 314-612-5289.
—
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail Rapporteur Brent Barrett
[Although the toxin is formed within the fish, one wonders about the
origin
of the fish as well as the person who processed the fish prior to
shipping. Hopefully the investigation will determine this.
Background information on ciguatera poisoning can be found at the FDA
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition website:
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~mow/chap36.html
“Ciguatera is a form of human poisoning caused by the consumption of
subtropical and tropical marine finfish which have accumulated
naturally occurring toxins through their diet. The toxins are known
to originate from several dinoflagellate (algae) species that are
common to ciguatera endemic regions in the lower latitudes.
“Manifestations of ciguatera in humans usually involves a combination
of gastrointestinal, neurological, and cardiovascular disorders.
Symptoms defined within these general categories vary with the
geographic origin of toxic fish.
“Clinical testing procedures are not presently available for the
diagnosis of ciguatera in humans. Diagnosis is based entirely on
symptomatology and recent dietary history. An enzyme immunoassay
(EIA) designed to detect toxic fish in field situations is under
evaluation by the Association of Official Analytical Chemists (AOAC)
and may provide some measure of protection to the public in the future.
“Marine finfish most commonly implicated in ciguatera fish poisoning
include the groupers, barracudas, snappers, jacks, mackerel, and
triggerfish. Many other species of warm-water fishes harbor ciguatera
toxins. The occurrence of toxic fish is sporadic, and not all fish of
a given species or from a given locality will be toxic.” - Mod.TG]
[see also:
2006
Defeated in Iraq, Al Qaeda Migrates to Maghreb - Next Stop: Europe
http://www.defense-update.com/analysis/analysis_161207_algire.htm
Defeated in Iraq, Al Qaeda Migrates to Maghreb -
Next Stop: Europe
David Eshel
The twin blasts that caused such devastation in Algeria this week posted a grim announcement that an Islamic group, once thought to have been defeated, is back in its bloody business. Poised to extend its ruthless tactics throughout North Africa, it is making the first stop towards its ultimate target - the European continent. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, (AQIM) is becoming a dominant element in Osama Bin Laden’s global terror ambition.
This will be the first prolonged stay of a Russian carrier to the eastern Mediterranean in waters dominated with regular patrolled by the US Sixth Fleet and in vicinity of Israel’s shores. On its decks Admiral Kuznetsov carries 47 warplanes (mostly Su-33) and 10 helicopters. The Russian Black Sea Fleet contingent, which has already set out for its new mission from Sevastopol, will rely on the naval facilities at Syria’s Tartous port. Its presence for several months will be a complication for the Israel navy’s operations opposite the Lebanese and Syrian coasts, especially if the Russians could be joined at Tartous by Iranian extended Kilo class submarines armed with the Russian-made “Sizzler” Klub-S (3M54) missile, as some unofficial Israeli sources reported. The Rusian Kuznetsov carrier group will conduct three tactical exercises, including real and simulated launch of missiles, said Serdyukov, adding 11 port visits are expected to be made.
Sending such powerful Russian warships onto the Mediterranean, for any amount of time, is no small matter. With the Mediterranean having been a “NATO lake” for the past 15 years, since the demise of the Soviet Union, the simple presence of a naval Russian force will require reviewed strategy and tactics of many of western and Israeli navies.
The attack in Algeria last Tuesday seems clearly linked to the regional strategy of weakening the secular governments in North Afirca, the Maghreb, resuming the 1990s warfare against Kuffar (infidel) institutions, society and administrations. But unlike in the past decade, these operations are now strategically coordinated with Al-Qaeda central direction, not only in terms of operations, but by distinct policies and international decision-making. The Jihadist incitement against the Algerian authorities, including mostly via the al-Jazeera shows, usually indicates the trends to come. Algiers was accused by the Salafi forces as “betraying the Muslim world and associating with French kuffar.” The recent visit by French President Nicholas Sarkozy to Algeria may well have contributed to the strikes which came already in line with this incitement.
AQIM emerged in 2006 from the remnants of the Salafist “Group for Preaching and Combat”, an Islamic group best known in the 1990s for its grisly tactic of wiping out entire villages it considered insufficiently fervent in their religious beliefs. The group was believed to be virtually eliminated by 2001, when Algerian security forces cracked down on their leaders. But last year, on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks, Al-Qaeda lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri released a videotape announcing that the group had joined forces with Osama bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri praised the “blessed union,” declared France an enemy and urged Al-Qaeda’s newest franchise to fight against French and American interests.
In January 2007, the group announced that it had changed its name to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Soon after, the resurgent group went on the offensive April 11, detonating two car bombs. One car bomb exploded close to the prime minister’s office in Algiers, resulting in the death of 33 people and more than 150 wounded. In September the AQIM targeted President Abdelaziz Bouteflika himself, when a suicide bomber blew himself up in the middle of a crowd waiting for the Algerian president.
Analysts believe that one of the reasons for the rise in Al Qaeda’s terrorist activities in the Maghreb stems from the group’s defeat in Western Iraq earlier this year.
On October 22nd, Osama bin Laden surprisingly admitted that al Qaeda had lost its war in Iraq. In an audiotape speech titled “Message to the people of Iraq,” bin Laden complained of disunity and poor use of resources. He admits that Al-Qaeda made mistakes, and that all Sunni Arabs must unite to defeat the foreigners and Shia Moslems. Two months later it was Abou Omar Al Baghdadi the supposed leader of the “Islamic State in Iraq” which is actually Al-Qaeda there, said that only 200 Mohajeroon (”immigrants” in Arabic) are left in Iraq. In fact, Al-Qaeda fighters have been migrating to northern areas of Iraq after being chased out of safe havens in Baghdad and other volatile regions. Sunni and Shia warlords got tired of Americans spinning their wheels, while building up the surge, seized and chased out Al-Qaeda from Anbar province.
“We will not be in peace until we set our foot again in our beloved al-Andalus,” an Al-Qaeda leader in the Islamic Maghreb said on claiming responsibility for an attack which killed at least 24 people in Algiers.
As for their new Algerian venue, the creation of AQIM was not Al-Qaeda’s first attempt to establish a branch in North Africa. In 2005, Moroccan security forces exposed and captured a cell of Al-Qaeda operatives. The cell’s leaders had close relations with Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi and with other top Al-Qaeda commanders. According to Moroccan and European security sources, they confessed that they were planning to establish what was to be called “The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Arab Maghreb” - and the name as that eventually authorized by bin Laden for the new Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC) or Salafist Group for Call and Combat. French counter-terrorist agents are concerned with the group’s considerable strategic depth in the Sahara and geographical proximity to Europe. Al-Qaeda’s new North African wing threatens to turn the western Mediterranean basin into a live front in the global jihad.
The blowback effect with Algerian fighters, who have honed terrorist skills in attacks in Iraq and are now returning to Algeria with the intention of replicating similar atrocities is boding a somber outlook. It is very much the way the previous generation returned hardened from the Afghanistan experience during the Soviet occupation in the mid-1980s. But not only in Algeria is Al-Qaeda establishing its new stronghold. Counter-insurgency experts said this week that Al-Qaeda Organization for the Islamic Maghreb — the product of a 2006 merger with the Salafist Brigade for Combat and Call, or GSPC — has been franchised to virtually every Arab state in North Africa. They said the networks maintained contact and coordinated major strikes. “GSPC has become, as it were, a sort of regional branch of Al Qaeda its mission being to federate all the radical, Salafist organizations in North Africa — Moroccan, Libyan and Tunisian have already joined forces with bin Laden’s global terrorist groups.
The Algerian GSPC is led by ‘Abd Al-Wadoud, whose real name is Abdelmalek Droukdal, whom a top secret French intelligence report classified as the main terrorist threat to France and Europe. In fact, never in the past has Al-Qaeda had such a solid territorial base in such proximity to Western states, and it has already threatened to employ this base to attack Europe. The unification of the North African jihad groups under the banner of Al-Qaeda, the use of the Sahara for training and arms-smuggling, and the number of North African cells discovered in Europe in the past all indicate the magnitude of the threat. “An attack perpetrated by local or international networks remains likely,” warned Gilles de Kerchove, newly appointed in September to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts among EU member states, told the European Parliament.
The emergence of a new Al-Qaeda-linked organization in Northern Africa is particularly alarming to Spain, which is concerned about Islamists’ calls for the reconquest of the country they regard as a lost part of the Muslim world. “We will not be in peace until we set our foot again in our beloved al-Andalus,” an Al-Qaeda leader in the Islamic Maghreb said on claiming responsibility for an attack which killed at least 24 people in Algiers. Andalus is the Moorish name for Spain, parts of which were ruled by Muslims for about eight centuries until the last Moorish bastion, Granada, succumbed to the Christian Reconquest in 1492. The reference to al-Andalus was not the first by Al-Qaeda, which has also vowed to put an end to the Spanish ‘occupation’ of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan coast. Such announcements worry the security services in Spain, where 29 mainly Moroccan suspects are on trial for the 2004 Madrid train bombings that killed 191 and injured about 1,800 people.
“Today, the threat posed by this alliance of the GSPC and Al-Qaeda constitutes a heightened threat to the countries of Northern Africa, which have been destabilized and can be destabilized even more, but also to France, which is considered as a priority target…” said Jean-Louis Bruguiere, France’s top anti-terrorism judge, in a recent interview. The United States also has long been concerned about the GSPC and is working with Algeria and its neighbors to combat the perceived threat through a program called the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership, worth an estimated $600mn over the next five to seven years.
Al-Qaeda may have lost its grip in some areas, but certainly has grown into dangerous proportions in another highly strategic environment, creating “clear and present” threat to European nations, which already have a significant portion of unstable Muslim immigrants, an ideal breeding ground for local terrorist and insurgency.
For further reading we recommend:
* Holy War Inflames Strategic Horn of Africa (12/2006)
* The Zaidi Shi’a in Yemen - Iran’s Next Objective (1/2007)
* Al Qaeda spurs Gaza carnage to create Hamastan (5/2007)
Israel: US report on Iran may spark war
Israel: US report on Iran may spark war
By LAURIE COPANS, Associated Press Writer
Israel’s public security minister warned Saturday that a U.S.
intelligence report that said Iran is no longer developing nuclear
arms could lead to a regional war that would threaten the Jewish state.
In his remarks — Israel’s harshest criticism yet of the U.S. report —
Avi Dichter said the assessment also cast doubt on American
intelligence in general, including information about Palestinian
security forces’ crackdown on militant groups. The Palestinian action
is required as part of a U.S.-backed renewal of peace talks with
Israel this month.
Dichter cautioned that a refusal to recognize Iran’s intentions to
build weapons of mass destruction could lead to armed conflict in the
Middle East.
He compared the possibility of such fighting to a surprise attack on
Israel in 1973 by its Arab neighbors, which came to be known in Israel
for the Yom Kippur Jewish holy day on which it began.
“The American misconception concerning Iran’s nuclear weapons is
liable to lead to a regional Yom Kippur where Israel will be among the
countries that are threatened,” Dichter said in a speech in a suburb
south of Tel Aviv, according to his spokesman, Mati Gil. “Something
went wrong in the American blueprint for analyzing the severity of the
Iranian nuclear threat.”
continues.............
Kosovo independence ‘a matter of weeks’: Thaci
http://au.news.yahoo.com//071215/19/159yq.html
Saturday December 15, 11:56 PM
Kosovo independence ‘a matter of weeks’: Thaci
SOFIA (AFP) - Kosovo’s incoming prime minister Hashim Thaci said
independence for his southern Serbian province was “a matter of weeks”
away, in an interview published Saturday.
He told the Bulgarian daily Trud, as he has other newspapers, that any
declaration of independence would be coordinated with the United
States and the European Union.
And he repeated that he would aid Kosovo’s minority Serbs, many of
whom are fearful of remaining in the province, to get along with the
majority ethnic Albanians.
continued........
Germany Admits Year-Long Surveillance Of Islamist Groups Online
December 14, 2007 5:02 p.m. EST
http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7009458749
Vittorio Hernandez - AHN News Writer
Berlin, Germany (AHN) - German police and intelligence officers
regularly
surf the Internet to monitor Islamist activities on the web and to
analyze
contents of Islamist websites. The news comes after Federal Prosecutor
General Monika Harms admitted surveillance of Islamists online
activities is
vital to Germany’s war against terrorism.
“The Internet has developed into the decisive means of communication
within
international Islamist terrorism,” Deutsche Welle quoted Harms.
Harms explained politically and culturally controversial measures, like
Internet surveillance, are need because the Internet “provides a
technical
platform for new forms of telephony and written communication” by
providing
encryption techniques that makes it difficult to be intercepted by
third
parties.
She said authorities must gain access to communications of suspected
terrorists. Across Germany there is an ongoing debate if the police
should
use software to read files on computers of people suspected of serious
crimes.
The identification of the Islam religion with terrorism is not limited
among
Germans. Across the European continent, there is a growing sentiment
certain
tenets of Islam does not reconcile with European values.
Patrick Goeman, a bar owner in Antwerp, observed Islamic criticisms of
Islam
or discussions on Muslim immigration sparks threats of violence.
Protesters
against violence perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalist has spread from
the
far right to centrists, he said.
Muslims are worried many are crossing the thin line between open
criticism
of Islam and bigotry. Imam Wahid Pedersen, a Dane who converted to
Islam,
told the International Herald Tribune, “It has become politically
correct to
attack Islam, and this is making it hard for moderates on both sides to
remain reasonable.”
http://www.azstarnet.com/metro/215678
http://www.azstarnet.com/metro/215678
Published: 12.11.2007
Invader at home of U.S. agent found dead
By Dale Quinn
ARIZONA DAILY STAR
A man found dead on the South Side Sunday morning was fatally shot by a
U.S.
Border Patrol agent after he and three other armed intruders burst into
the
agent’s house, an official said Monday.
continued....
War-hero pigeon is remembered
A County Antrim pigeon who received a medal for his war-time bravery is being remembered at a special ceremony in England.
Paddy the pigeon was bred in Moyleen, Carnlough.
He was decorated for being the first bird to fly back with news of the D-Day landings in Normandy in World War II.
Paddy is one of 62 animals who received the PSDA Dickin Medal, the animal equivalent of the Victoria Cross, for bravery in the war.
Like many homing pigeons, he was “volunteered” by his owners in response to an appeal by the government to support the war effort.
As radio signals could compromise operations, carrier pigeons were used to ferry important messages back to Britain. The pigeons formed the National Pigeon Service.
Paddy even had his own number - NPS.43.9451.
The Germans rumbled the importance of the winged courier service and stationed a flight of hawks at Calais to intercept the Allied pigeons.
Paddy, however, wasn’t only a brave pigeon, he was also incredibly quick.
He received the PDSA Dickin Medal on 1 September 1944 for recording the quickest time to return with information from the D-Day landings at Normandy on 6 June that year while he was serving with the RAF.
Dogs, horses, pigeons and a cat received medals because they helped save thousands of lives in the war.
They are buried at the PDSA animal cemetery in Redbridge, Ilford and all are being remembered at a special ceremony.
Veteran military personnel who served with the animals will stage a march past and a bugler will sound the Last Post.
A fly-past by pigeons will commemorate the 32 birds who were honoured for their bravery.
Actress Jenny Seagrove is to formally reopen the cemetery. Restoration work was carried out over the past year with the help of a £50,000 grant from the Big Lottery Fund’s People’s Millions.
Paddy’s medal was sold to a pigeon fancier for almost £7,000 at an auction in Dublin in September 1999.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/northern_ireland/7141013.stm
Published: 2007/12/13 07:21:39 GMT
© BBC MMVII
British national escapes custody
British national Rashid Rauf has escaped police custody following a court appearance in Pakistan.
Charges laid against him by Pakistan were dropped last month but he had not been released.
Khalid Pervez, a police spokesman, said two policemen were being questioned.
Mr Rauf is wanted in the UK by police investigating the murder of his uncle.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/7146418.stm
Published: 2007/12/15 20:13:00 GMT
Italy ‘mafia boss’ held in Naples
A mafia boss considered one of Italy’s 30 most dangerous fugitives has been arrested in Naples, police have said.
Edoardo Contini, aged 52, was detained in a suburb of the southern city on Friday night.
Investigators believe he is one of the most powerful bosses of the Neapolitan Mafia, the Camorra.
Italy has seen a number of high-profile arrests since last month’s seizure of the Sicilian Mafia chief, Salvatore Lo Piccolo, know as “the boss of bosses”.
“Edoardo Contini was perhaps the most dangerous boss in Naples,” Italian Interior Minister Giuliano Amato said in a statement.
Board member
Mr Amato said police had been on Mr Contini’s trail for more than a year.
We said that we would catch them one-by-one. That’s what we’re doing
Giuliano Amato
Italian Interior Minister
Francesco Forgione, president of the Italian parliament’s anti-Mafia commission, described Mr Contini’s cartel as “one of the most dangerous and violent”.
Mr Contini had been on the run since 2000, and is reported to have spent some of his years in hiding in northern Europe.
The Reuters news agency reported that large quantities of underwear and socks had been found in the villa where Contini was hiding, suggesting he used to throw away his dirty laundry rather than having it washed, for fear of being caught.
He is suspected of running extortion rackets and drug trafficking for the Camorra and being a member of the organisation’s ruling board, or “cupola”.
His arrest appears to be the latest success for Italian police fighting organised crime.
“We said that we would catch them one-by-one. That’s what we’re doing,” Mr Amato said.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7145953.stm
Published: 2007/12/15 15:01:05 GMT
© BBC MMVII
Russia’s deep suspicion of the West
Rupert Wingfield Hayes reports on Russia’s view of the outside world after its foreign minister accuses Britain of deliberately sabotaging relations with Moscow.
Living in Moscow, you often get the feeling Russia would really prefer it if the rest of the world just went away and left Russia alone.
Take Moscow itself for example. It is Russia’s biggest, most developed and most cosmopolitan city.
But if you can’t read the Cyrillic alphabet getting around is almost impossible.
Only in the last year has the immigration department finally relented and starting printing immigration cards in English.
Before that foreign tourists arriving at Moscow’s ghastly Sheremetyevo airport could be seen scratching their heads and muttering things like: “What the hell does this mean?”
Lack of trust
And it is not just tourists that find it hard.
I was recently chatting to the manager of a large Scandinavian company that is investing hundreds of millions of pounds in Russia. I asked him how his company was treated by the authorities.
“Well, it’s not so easy,” he said with a grin and a shrug. “You often get the feeling they don’t really want us here.”
“That’s extraordinary,” I said. “You are bringing investment and jobs and technology to Russia.”
“Yes,” he agreed.
Russia’s attitude to the outside world could be summed up as: “We don’t trust you” and, “Thank you, but we can do it ourselves.”
Deep suspicion
Take the announcement this week that almost all the British Council’s offices in Russia are to be closed.
In the 1990s Britain spent millions of pounds setting up 15 British Council centres across Russia.
They established English teaching programmes, set up libraries, helped local schools improve their language teaching, and gave out scholarships to study in Britain.
It was part of a grand post-Soviet plan to engage Russia, to pull it out of its isolation and into the Western sphere.
But from the outset the British Council was viewed by the authorities with deep suspicion.
The KGB, or FSB as it had now become, clearly saw it as a front for British spying. In other words: “We don’t trust you.”
Teenage zealots
In the last few weeks Russian suspicion of the outside world seems to have reached a new level of hysteria.
The day after Russia’s parliamentary elections last week we awoke to find thousands of fanatical young Putin supporters patrolling the streets of Moscow.
They had been told by their Kremlin masters to take control of “key buildings” to prevent any attempt at a political take-over by “foreign-backed groups”.
Among the buildings targeted for special attention were the British Embassy and the BBC bureau.
When I went outside to ask them why they were picketing us, the group of callow youths were hard put to come up with an answer.
“We are here to make sure no-one tries to steal our victory,” one young woman tried.
Her comrades looked sullen and cold. I felt sorry for them.
I wondered if they really believed their own rhetoric. Where was all this paranoia coming from?
Inferiority complex
It just so happens that the day Russia ordered the British Council offices to close down this week, I was sitting down inside the massive granite edifice that is the Russian foreign ministry, to interview Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Mr Lavrov is tall and urbane. He speaks beautiful English, French, and according to his biography, Sinhalese, which he learned while posted to Sri Lanka in the 1970s.
He spent more than 15 years living in New York. Surely no xenophobe he.
Russia is in a deep funk about its position in the world. It is a huge country with an equally large inferiority complex
But to hear Mr Lavrov you would think the Cold War had never ended.
He described a world in which America is seeking to contain Russia.
He said Russia had watched as America has pushed the borders of Nato ever further eastwards, swallowing up Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Next it will be Georgia.
He described Washington’s plans to build missile bases in Poland and the Czech Republic as part of a network of new missile bases from Alaska to Japan, all designed to encircle Russia.
Blame game
What is clear is that Russia is in a deep funk about its position in the world. It is a huge country with an equally large inferiority complex.
In the 1990s it lost an empire, and with it, the respect and prestige it feels it deserves.
It blames the West and particularly America and Britain.
Last week Andrei Lugovoi, the man wanted in Britain for the poisoning murder of Alexander Litvinienko, was elected to parliament as an ultra-nationalist MP.
At the time the sole surviving MP from Russia’s pro-Western liberal parties lost his seat in parliament.
Speaking afterwards one of his colleagues put it to me this way: “In the 1990s we had an opportunity to turn Russia outwards towards the West. But we failed. Now it’s gone, and it won’t be back for at least a generation.”
From Our Own Correspondent was broadcast on Saturday 15 December, 2007 at 1130 GMT on BBC Radio 4. Please check the programme schedules for World Service transmission times.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/7144560.stm
Published: 2007/12/15 12:07:34 GMT
© BBC MMVII
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