Just to set aside any doubt about Gen Downing, he was our overall JSOC commander when we went into Panama. That was during GHW Bush's presidency, so the man got his stars under Reagan and Bush. Clinton was FORCED to use Downing, because of his stellar reputation and because Downing was the acknowledged expert on security. Downing led from the front, and was with us in Panama when it was hot, he grieved with us over the fallen, and he didn't play pantywaist army games handing out awards like candy. He expected his Special Forces to be brave. You pretty much had to be dead to get a "V" out of Wayne Downing. He was tough as nails.
At Khobar Towers the enemy packed a truck with the equivalent of about 30000 pounds of TNT and got within mere meters of our barracks DURING A THREATCON CHARLEY period of time! Some leader was negligent. There is no doubt. Who every approved walls being no further away than 30 meters in an anti-American culture? Who didn't have watchers available around the perimeter of an American compound? Who hadn't extended the perimeter by the use of barriers and the blocking of roads during a threatcon Charley? Absolutely unbelievable.
Whoever had approved such a security plan in an anti-American culture had to be either crazy or grossly negligent. The same with anyone who perpetuated it.
30 METERS -- That's about the length of an average American house and garage. Unbelievable.
Finally, Downing was in charge of a security firm because he was an expert in SECURITY.
You obviously knew the general and/or served with him - and I do wish in any way to disparage his service or his memory.
I will, however, take issue with some of the things you said in regards to the entire Khobar Towers incident.
I spent many nights there while flying as a pilot in theater. I never worked for Gen Schwalier or his staff - I was flying airlift aircraft and my time in Khobar Towers was usually about 24-48 hours or so before I would fly back to pick up more cargo and passengers.
Who every approved walls being no further away than 30 meters in an anti-American culture? Who didn't have watchers available around the perimeter of an American compound? Who hadn't extended the perimeter by the use of barriers and the blocking of roads during a threatcon Charley? Absolutely unbelievable.
Gen Schwalier, people on his staff, and even then Sec of Defense Perry told Gen Downing that they had requested the Saudis allow them to move the perimeter to 100 feet. Gen Downing interviewed the Saudis, and they claimed they were never asked. Gen Downing chose to believe the Saudis.
Moreover, Gen Downing said on the McLeher News Hour on PBS that the Saudis would not relinquish control of security outside the fence. So he knew this. And he knew that Gen Schwalier had tried to tighten security, but he faulted him greatly in the report for the distance of the perimeter fence.
With any "Blue Ribbon" panel, like the 911 Commission, you are bound to have a lot of Monday morning quarterbacking. I am not trashing these panels altogether, but the temptation is to write these reports with hindsight as 20/20. Moreover, panels have to make "recommendations." The Downing report came up with some these in spades. Here are a few:
Designate a general officer-led Air Staff organization to oversee Force Protection; Expand/develop Force Protection doctrine and policy; Develop a Force Protection field organization to integrate Force Protection programs; Integrate technology/tactics/training to increase capabilities; Provide trained/ready deployment base for Force Protection resources; Expand Air Force Planning and Programming Guidance to integrate Force Protection; Exhibit aggregated Force Protection resources in budget submission; Develop Air Force Instructions (AFI) supplementing DoD guidance on Force Protection; Expand the JCS Vulnerability Assessment Rating System to highlight Force Protection oversight and resource allocation; Expand AFI guidance to Air Component Commanders; Include requirements for a Force Protection structure on their staffs; Consider extending tour-lengths for key personnel, including Force Protection personnel; Direct theater-specific, predeployment training; Expand rules of engagement (ROE) for Force Protection during deployment to countries without a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); Inculcate Force Protection awareness through education and training at all levels; Accession through separation, with annual refreshers; Develop blocks of instruction for officer and enlisted Professional Military Education (PME); Incorporate Force Protection into enlisted Promotion Fitness Examinations (PFE); Provide cultural and language orientation for key officials; Support the streamlined intelligence/counterintelligence structure for Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA); Review capability to disseminate counterintelligence (CI) and antiterrorist (AT) information to Force Protection officials; Provide operational control (OPCON) of CI personnel to deployed wing commanders in areas of increased threat and attach to Security Police (SP) squadrons for Force Protection purposes; Assign, when appropriate, Air Force Intelligence personnel to the SPs along with CI personnel to complete a tactical SP ground intelligence cell within the Security Police; Clarify guidance on sanitizing/releasing Force Protection information and encourage its broadest use; Review interpreter/translator requirements and capabilities; Enhance Air Force's medical readiness; Include cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training in self aid/buddy care training for all members; Include biological warfare/chemical warfare (BW/CW) casualties in mass casualty training/exercises; Expand advanced trauma life support training to all physicians on mobility; Review automated patient administration capability for mass casualties; Develop requirements for surveillance systems for installation security and Force Protection; Procure commercially available pagers, in the near term, for alerting/warning systems in deployed locations; Explore advanced technologies for this capability.
Whew!
The problem I see with all these "fixes" is that they watered down the underlying problem - we were sitting ducks in the middle of a place controlled largely by the Saudis, and no one wanted to point the finger at them.
Also, I can greatly appreciate Gen Downing being a security expert. But, it gave the appearance of a conflict of interest for him to recommend the military purchase security equipment that he was selling. No judge in the land would ever, ever be allowed to do this and not be asked to recuse himself. I don't care how someone tries to justify it - but you don't chair a report that tells the government to buy what you are selling. It doesn't wash, period.
I am not alone in my assessment of the faults of Gen Downing's report. As I stated, his actions resulting in Gen Ronald Fogleman, an Air Force 4 star and a man I have met personally - to resign. Fogleman is a straight an arrow as they come - and I admire him as much as you undoubtedly admired Gen Downing.
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The idea that Schwalier and his wing staff were not motivated or had somehow failed to make Khobar Towers as secure as possible became the dividing line in Washington's reaction to the tragedy and the source of conflict between the Air Force and Cohen. What really happened at Khobar Towers prior to June 25, 1996, however, told a story very different from the quick conclusions of the Downing report. It was the story of a commander whose motivation helped the wing save lives, even in the face of the biggest terrorist bomb ever directed against Americans. ________________________________________________________________________
President Clinton said afterward that he would aggressively punish the perpetrators of the Khobar Towers bombing, which was a joke. He never did. Obviously, that was not the fault of Gen Downing.