http://www.meforum.org/article/510
Poisoned Missiles: Syria’s Doomsday Deterrent
by Dany Shoham
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2002
(snipped)
. . . What follows is a controlled speculation as to how Syria might actually use its CBW, in a scenario of sharply heightened conflict in the Middle East, and particularly against Israel.
• First strike. A first strike, launched at a country as small and densely inhabited as Israel, could be crippling. The implementation of chemical weapons against Israel, especially in a first strike, would be designed to impair Israel’s fundamental military superiority by striking its retaliatory capabilities, especially airfields and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) command and control installations. Other likely targets would be mobilization centers, equipment warehouses, and transportation intersections. In the early stages of the war, the mission would be to prevent the arrival of reserve forces at the northern front and exert pressure on Israeli forces at the front. Were Syrians to cross the chemical Rubicon, they might also strike at population centers and industrial areas.
According to satellite imagery, the operational alignment of Syria’s Scud-C missiles is such that Syria is positioned to launch a surprise chemical attack. The missiles in those photographs were aimed at the nuclear reactor in Dimona and at Israel’s airports and large cities.[26] For Syria, a first strike is a first-rate strategic option—depending on its objectives and provided Syria is prepared to absorb the counterblow.[27] Syrian ballistic missiles armed with chemical warheads could neutralize a substantial number of Israel’s military installations and tie up its major population and industrial centers around Tel Aviv and Haifa. The effect would be even greater if the missiles were implemented in a first strike, and even more so in a surprise attack.[28]
• Golan grab. A more limited version of this scenario postulates a Syrian attack limited to northern Israel in an attempt to conquer the Golan Heights. Syria would deploy long-range launch systems and long-lasting chemical warfare agents in order to neutralize military targets (air force bases, command and control centers, radar stations, reserve mobilization and assembly areas, and equipment warehouses). Short-range launch systems would implement volatile chemical warfare agents at the front in order to ease the rapid penetration of Syrian ground forces. The idea would be to enable Syria to achieve its goal of seizing the Golan Heights before the IDF could complete the mobilization of its reserves, presenting the international community with a fait accompli.
• On the brink of defeat. Were Syria on the verge of conventional defeat, it might also resort to chemical weapons in order to avoid disaster. This option was non-existent in the previous wars between Arab states and Israel. The Syrians would justify the use of chemical weapons by claiming that their very survival was at stake. If Syria were on the brink of military defeat, any use of chemical weapons would almost certainly be aimed at the source of the immediate danger: Israeli forces, other targets at the front, and air force bases. Civilian centers would be a lower priority. But also in these circumstances, a chemical attack on civilian targets cannot be ruled out, especially if it promised to accelerate superpower intervention for a ceasefire.
• Restoring deterrence. Syria’s chemical weapons are meant to deter strikes against strategic targets deep in Syrian territory, especially highly sensitive targets like government installations, dams, and civilian infrastructure. Were the Syrians to conclude this deterrent were failing, they could use chemical weapons in order to restore it. An example of this scenario was given in Kuwait’s Al-Qabas newspaper in a report from its Damascus bureau. There it is suggested that Syria would fire chemical-tipped missiles were Israel to make even limited bombing attacks against Damascus.[29]
One could add still more scenarios to this brief list. The point is that there is no dearth of scenarios, and that they are increasingly realistic.
New Strategic Balance?
Syria’s acquisition of a CBW option has not occurred in a vacuum. It also has to be viewed in the context of Syria’s own alliances. And the most important of Syria’s strategic ties are not with its “brother” Arab states. For fifteen years, Syria’s closest strategic and military bond has been with Iran—a large, powerful Muslim state, one that is close to acquiring nuclear weapons and that has missiles capable of reaching Israel.
Could Syria one day find itself under an Iranian nuclear umbrella?
If it did—and the road to that point may not be so long—Syria’s threshold for first use of CBW could be lowered. For example, in a grab for the Golan, Syria might contemplate a limited chemical exchange with Israel, on the assumption that Israel would not retaliate with a nuclear escalation. Given the futility of all past Syrian attempts to gain military superiority over Israel by means of conventional forces, the CBW option might grow legitimate in Syrian eyes.
And if a nuclear Iran gave assurances to Syria, it might diminish Syrian fears and inhibitions in choosing its weapons. . .
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/2/FDD0EA6C-1B71-4FA3-A682-532F0E8A20C6.html
Ahmadinejad Says After Chaos There Will Be God
February 2, 2007 — French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy has quoted Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad as saying that one should really hope for “chaos” because “there will be God” afterward.
Douste-Blazy writes in his new book that Ahmadinejad made the comment on the sidelines of the 2005 UN General Assembly, during nuclear talks with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Britain. In the book, which was published February 1 in France, Douste-Blazy writes that the EU ministers were “stunned” by the Iranian president’s comment.
Ahmadinejad stirred controversy by saying that he felt surrounded by light when he delivered his speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2005. Ahmadinejad has also called for the return of al-Mahdi, a messiah-like figure in Shi’ite Islam, whose reappearance is supposed to restore justice before the end of the world.
(AFP)
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1183901655986&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Despite warnings of war, gas masks are severely lacking
Yaakov Katz, THE JERUSALEM POST Jul. 8, 2007 (excerpt)
While tension is mounting in the Golan Heights and senior defense officials are warning of the possibility of imminent war with Syria, less than 50 percent of the population will have their gas masks renewed by the end of the year, The Jerusalem Post has learned. . .
Syria is believed to have a large stockpile of chemical and biological weapons. According to the Global Security Web site, the Syrian arsenal is comprised mostly of large amounts of Sarin and mustard gas and is reportedly producing and weaponizing VX. The US, the report says, has estimated Syria to possess several hundred liters of chemical weapons with hundreds of tons of agents produced annually.
Acknowledging that the population’s gas masks will not be renewed and effective for at least another two years, defense officials told the Post Sunday that the IDF Home Front Command was currently considering proposals, if the need arises, to make emergency purchases of gas masks from Israeli and American companies. If war were to break out in the coming months, the Home Front Command would only have enough gas masks for 1.5 million adults and half-a-million children.
The shortage in gas masks stems from a 2003 Defense Ministry decision to collect the public’s gas masks, a project that only began at the beginning of 2007. Due to a lack of funds, the project was recently suspended and is expected to be renewed - following Sunday’s government decision - in the coming weeks. “This situation could be interpreted as neglect,” a senior official told the Post. “If war breaks out and non-conventional weapons are used then we could find ourselves in a major crisis.” . . .
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/08/AR2007070801307_pf.html
Tunneling Near Iranian Nuclear Site Stirs Worry
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, July 9, 2007; A01 (excerpt)
The sudden flurry of digging seen in recent satellite photos of a mountainside in central Iran might have passed for ordinary road tunneling. But the site is the back yard of Iran’s most ambitious and controversial nuclear facility, leading U.S. officials and independent experts to reach another conclusion: It appears to be the start of a major tunnel complex inside the mountain.
The question is, why? Worries have been stoked by the presence nearby of fortified buildings where uranium is being processed. Those structures in turn are now being connected by roads to Iran’s nuclear site at Natanz, where the country recently started production of enriched uranium in defiance of international protests.
As a result, photos of the site are being studied by governments, intelligence agencies and nuclear experts, all asking the same question: Is Iran attempting to thwart future military strikes against its nuclear facility by placing key parts of it in underground bunkers? . . .
U.S. officials at several military and intelligence-gathering agencies said they are aware of the construction and are watching it closely, though none would comment publicly or speculate on the purpose of the tunnels.
A tunnel complex would reduce options for a preemptive military strike to knock out Iran’s nuclear program, according to U.S. officials who closely follow Iran’s nuclear activities. It also could further heighten tensions between the Bush administration and the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has said he is committed to pursuing a peaceful use of nuclear power. . .