Free Republic
Browse · Search
News/Activism
Topics · Post Article

To: EdLake
Every weekend, TrebleRebel has been posting images addressed to you, images which look like wimpering messages from a love-sick teenager you once met in Paris. I couldn't tell if he was using this thread to write some fanciful form of love poetry or if he was pleading with you to help him in some way. So, I think everyone was waiting to see how you would respond.

Actually, he sends me those images because he knows I have an interest in phallic architecture.

BTW Ed, did you look real close at any of those pictures? were they real people with real body parts, or were they fake and need their reputations sanitized?

635 posted on 09/17/2007 8:01:37 AM PDT by Badabing Badablonde (New to the internet? CLICK HERE)
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 634 | View Replies ]


To: Badabing Badablonde

Hi Badablondie. I should have told you that Ed get’s over excited looking at images of what he knows he could never have. I think that’s why he took up exposing fake nude celebrities in the first place.

D’ailleurs, quand allons-nous à Paris ? Je connais une barre gentille appelée le Violon Dingue.


636 posted on 09/17/2007 8:13:30 AM PDT by TrebleRebel
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 635 | View Replies ]

To: Badabing Badablonde

“Q: Could someone expert in making dried milk make the product used in the Daschle and Leahy letters?
A: Let me answer it this way — yes, it would be the same technique to make a powderized anthrax.” — Ken Alibek, March 31, 2003 Washington Post chat

“It is also important to note that the people who participated in that exercise used all open source information, they used the U.S Patent Office and they used out of print microbiology textbooks. It is a scary incredible thing, and it is not just theoretical, it has already been capitalized both in laboratory modelling and in actual experience. I refer you back to the intelligence community’s information on the American anthrax attack in 2001, which we won’t discuss here.” -Dr. Michael V. Callahan, Director, Biodefense & Mass Casualty Care, CIMIT/Massachusetts General

Given the wholesale changes Ed has just made to Wikipedia, I’ll substitute this in its place on the method of weaponization. Please leave it up for 5 minutes so I can show my brother-in-law who has promised me a $1 for every minute it remains up.

Made in America: The Cell Culture

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, who runs the Federation of American Scientists’ chemical and biological arms control program, announced in December 2001. “I’m certain it’s someone connected with a government program, or who works in a laboratory connected with a government program,” she said. “The grapevine has it that the results of an experiment on genetic variation at certain locations suggest that this material was made in a very small batch, and that suggests that the material was not made in some old weapons program on a large scale,” she said, citing sources inside and outside the government. “All the available information is consistent with a U.S. government lab as the source, either of the anthrax itself or of the recipe for the U.S. weaponization process,” wrote Rosenberg on a webpage.

Scientists have determined that anthrax spores mailed to Capitol Hill last fall were made less than two years ago before being mailed. Moreover, contrary to what has often been implied or assumed, the technique to weaponize the anthrax used in the Fall 2001 was not the one used by the US Army in weaponizing anthrax in the 1950s. William Patrick’s process for weaponizing anthrax involved freeze drying and chemical processing whereas it was the process contemplated by Al Qaeda that involved spraydrying. “We made little freeze-dried pellets of anthrax,” Donald Schattenberg explained, “then we ground them down with a high-speed colloid mill.” The finding cast doubt on the hypothesis that the spores could have been stolen from a lab a long time ago.

Commenting on the fine powder sent Senator Daschle and Leahy, “Only nations, probably, have figured out how to do this,” Professor Matthew Meselson at Harvard said at the time. But, he adds, this means “how to do it is in the minds of people,” including former employees of weapons programs in the Soviet Union and the US. Dr. Spertzel, the U.N. Special Commission chief biological inspector from 1994 to 1998 told the Washington Post: “In my opinion, there are maybe four or five people in the whole country who might be able to make this stuff, and I’m one of them. And even with a good lab and staff to help run it, it might take me a year to come up with a product as good.” At a break from a briefing before a Congressional subcommittee in December 2001, Dr. Richard Spertzel and Dr. Dr. Ken Alibek discussed access to the Ames strain and the method of weaponization. They might just as well have been demonstrating how to palm a basketball — with Dr. Alibek agreeing with Dr. Spertzel on the likely general method but saying it is easier than Dr. Spertzel may think. According to an article in the New England Journal of Medicine, “Scanning electron microscopy of the spores used in the Senate office attack showed that they range from individual particles to aggregates of 100 [microns] or more. Spores were uniform in size and appearance and the aggregates had a propensity to pulverize (i.e., disperse into smaller particles when disturbed).”

At least everyone can agree that the product, fortunately, was not resistant to antibiotics. “That’s the best news you’ve had as president,” Condi Rice told the President. Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani noted at the time, “The baby has responded to treatment, and we are very hopeful he is going to make a full and complete recovery.” As Tom Brokaw said in closing a broadcast, “In Cipro we trust.”

A scientist from the FBI Laboratory, Dr. Doug Beecher, in a July 2006 issue of “Applied and Environmental Microbiology” provided me a copy of his article that reports that:

“a widely circulated misconception is that the spores were produced using additives and sophisticated engineering supposedly akin to military weapon production. The issue is usually the basis for implying that the powders were inordinately dangerous compared to spores alone. The persistent credence given to this impression fosters erroneous preconceptions, which may misguide research and preparedness efforts and generally detract from the magnitude of hazards posed by simple spore preparations.”

Harvard University Matthew Meselson reviewed the language before publication. “The statement should have had a reference,” editor-in-chief of the microbiology journal told a trade periodical. “An unsupported sentence being cited as fact is uncomfortable to me. Any statement in a scientific article should be supported by a reference or by documentation.” Footnoted or not, the two sentences provide the best and authoritative insight on the question of the method of processing since the mailings. The two sentences essentially said what Dr. Alibek had been saying: “’[J]ust because you have a sophisticated product doesn’t mean the technique has to be sophisticated.’ “ Silica in the culture medium would not be a sophisticated “additive” but would serve to concentrate the agent.

The FBI scientists have been able to distinguish between water isotopes ratios in the anthrax. Brian Williams reports that investigators have told NBC that the water used to make the spores came from the Northeastern United States. researchers have been able to establish that anthrax grown in water in the Northeastern United States is distinguishable from anthrax grown in water from the Southeast and Pacific Northwest. In one published anthrax study, researchers grew Bacillus subtilis, a harmless bacteria that resembles Bacillus anthracis, using local water from five different U.S. cities. The scientists were able to distinguish those grown in various cities. The method can be used to narrow the number of possible origins of the water based on the number of oxygen and hydrogen isotopes. Similarly, a press release announced in September 2003 that University of Maryland researchers have developed a technique to help the FBI track the origins of deadly anthrax spores by identifying the medium used to grow it. The FBI asked Maryland professor Catherine Fenselau to turn her mass spectrometry lab to the forensic task of sleuthing how bacillus spores, such as anthrax, are prepared.

Interviewer Kestenbaum said: “Ehleringer is now creating a map showing how the isotope ratios of water vary anthrax was grown, it may rule some places out.” As defined by the Census Bureau, the Northeast region of the United States covers nine states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. A scientist explained the research in an NPR interview in 2004.

I infer from the NBC report that from the isotope ratios, authorities believe either that the anthrax was grown in one of the yellow (or perhaps light green) areas, but not one of the dark green, blue or red areas. [Perhaps Ed could upload the map as I don’t know how to upload pictures] The yellow swath includes much of the Northeastern United States — places like Syracuse, NY but also places like Ann Arbor and Minneapolis. If that is the isotope ratio range, Islamabad and Baghdad can be excluded. Pretty much all foreign locations apparently can be excluded (except for parts of Canada), along with places with comparable oxygen isotope ratios such as Central New Jersey, Maryland and Ohio. Locales with such excludable ratios include Pakistan (Lahore), Iraq (Baghdad), and Singapore. Outside of the United States, pretty much only the adjacent parts of Canada above Northeastern US (e.g., parts of Ontario and Quebec) match the yellow swath that the scientists found distinguishing. The authors of one of the key articles noted that they couldn’t distinguish between North Carolina and Ohio — the dark green. Similarly, they can’t distinguish between Central New Jersey and North Carolina (again, the dark green). The key studies in the peer reviewed literature indicate that they were funded by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Ehleringer and his colleagues published a March 2007 article titled “Stable isotope ratios of tap water in the contiguous United States” in “Water Resources Research.” The study was funded by the “federal government.” The raw data survey results have been embargoed by the federal government.” ( I believe the agency would usually be identified). In other water isotope ratio studies the funding agency was identified as the Central Intelligence Agency or whatever agency it was. (It varied). Perhaps this March 2007 study was funded by the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation and was done specifically for the purpose of laying the scientific groundwork of a prosecution in Amerithrax. While Helen W. Kreuzer-Martin, the Maryland scientist in a study published in April 2007 titled “Stable Isotope Ratios and the Forensic Analysis of Microorganisms,” was looking at the nutrients in the culture, the Utah scientist in this study is looking at the tap water. The DOJ/FBI likely hopes to put all the data together with the more familiar reasons to suspect someone (means, motive, modus operandi and opportunity), and put on a case that to a moral certainty proves it was committed by the perp(s). Absent the scientific evidence, there is a lack of a “smoking gun.” Here, based on this new science, there apparently is thought to be a smoking petri dish

By looking at the oxygen, hydrogen and deuterium geospatial distribution, you can more precisely identify the here the water came from. For example, the deuterium map might be relied upon to eliminate an ambiguity left by the range indicated by the oxygen and hydrogen maps.

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology detected silica. The Daily News (New York) reported on October 30, 2001

[USAMRIID Major General John] Parker did disclose that the anthrax in question contained silica, a common substance found in sand and quartz.

“I don’t know what the significance of it is,” Parker said.

One expert said the presence of silica is significant, but he declined to say why, citing national security concerns.

“I don’t think I want to give people - terrorists - any information to help them, said Dr. Charles Bailey, a scientist at Advanced Biosystems Inc. and former commander of the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.

Former Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and Harvard biologist Matthew Meselson have opined that there was no special silica coating observable in the Scanning Electron Microscope (”SEM”). images they saw. The presence of any silica, Drs. Meselson and Alibek say, may have come from the environment because of the special tendency of anthrax spore coats to attract silicon. (The lead FBI scientist Dwight Adams relied on the study provided the FBI by Meselson in briefing the Congress in November 2002.) Indeed, the silica may have been in the culture medium and then removed as described by patents filed by researchers at Dr. Alibek’s Center for Biodefense at GMU. Dr. Alibek reports that, like Dr. William Patrick, he was also given a polygraph.

In a March 31, 2003 public exchange sponsored by the Washington Post, in response to my written question submitted in advance, Kenneth Alibek, former head of Russia’s biological program, to include its anthrax production program, said: “This anthrax wasn’t sophisticated, didn’t have coatings, had electric charge and many other things.” In other responses, he further explained: “There was no special need to add silica to this anthrax. Presence or absence of silica says nothing about whether it was state sponsored.”

US bioweaponeer William Patrick gave it a 7 out of 10 -— calling it professionally done but not weapons grade. In an interview with CBS, William Patrick explained that he had been given a polygraph in June 2002 about the anthrax letters. He reports that “The FBI that they wanted me to become a part of their inner circle of—of experts, and that in order to become a part of that inner circle of technical experts, that I’d have to pass a polygraph test.” In fact, he has not been quoted since, as he often was in 2001. Thus, this was a good indication of what scientific information the FBI credits or at least that they credit his expertise.

On April 11, 2003, Scott Shane reported that reverse engineering “carried out at the Army’s biodefense center at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, raises the disquieting possibility that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups could create lethal bioweapons without scientific or financial help from a state.” Quoting one outside bioterrorism expert. “It shows you can have a fairly sophisticated product with fairly rudimentary methods.” At last report, the reverse engineering reportedly was not able to recreate the identical product.

Lisa Bronson, deputy undersecretary of defense for technology security policy and proliferation, has said that commercially available equipment used to make powdered milk could be used to make powderized anthrax. A spray dryer is used in chemical and food processing to manufacture dried egg, powdered milk, animal feed, cake mixes, citrus juices, coffee, corn syrup, cream, creamers, dried eggs, potatoes, shortening, starch derivatives, tea, tomatoes, yeast, and — last but not least — yogurt. Washington State University also has an informative discussion on the web. Making dried milk is not rocket science and doesn’t require a PhD. But, if experience is any guide, Al Qaeda has PhD’s and even rocket scientists who are sympathetic to its cause (indeed, even the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb

To find the missing spraydryer, perhaps the FBI merely needs to find and trace the steps of Al Qaeda’s expert yogurt or dried milk or animal feedstuffs or rice hull processor. Dr. Alibek has told me that he now thinks that it was made using a fluidized bed dryer rather than a spraydryer.

A key fact is that of the exosporium, which is a loose-fitting protein envelope surrounding about 7-10 spore coats that overlay the cortex, had traces of silica. The exosporium is the spore’s outermost layer. The silica was not dispersed inside of the B. anthracis spore coats and cortex under the exosporium. Ari Fleischer discusses the silica in the anthrax in his book Taking Heat. He reports that he had argued at length with ABC News over its story that the additive was bentonite (which arguably was characteristic of the Iraq program) — and explains that from the start he had told ABC that it was silica, not bentonite, that had been detected. The suggestion that AFIP experts did not know the difference between silica and silcon is not well founded, and the scientist who performed the EDX specifically told the journalist that oxygen was also detected in ratios consistent with silicon dioxide.

One potential lead that was reported in the press concerned a $100,000 piece of equipment bought by someone from Pakistan paying cash who had it delivered to 215 Main St. in Ft. Lee, NJ, one mile from where pilot Nawaf al-Hazmi lived. Nawaf attended a critical meeting with Yazid Sufaat, the biochemist working on anthrax, in January 2000. The United States alleged in its indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui that on or about April 1, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi was in Oklahoma (at the same time Zacarias Moussaoui was in Norman, Oklahoma). Nawaf then lived in Falls Church, VA and attended mosque and met with the imam that spoke alongside fellow Falls Church imam Ali Al-Timimi at a conference with other Salafists in Toronto and London in July and August 2001. The individual from Karachi who had ordered the processor pled guilty to a check kiting scheme that raised the funds used to purchase the processor. The purchaser, Syed Athar Abbas from California and then New Jersey, used the name Arthur Abbas in making the purchase. The front company was Computers Dot Com, a computer peripherals wholesaling firm, owned by Abbas. A Syed Athar Abbas (with records showing a different age and a different social security number) had a computer peripherals wholesaling firm named Mixun Solutions, also based in Karachi. Mixun Solutions went defunct after the New Jersey Syed Athar Abbas was arrested. According to the database PACER, he had initially been denied bail because he turned in two expired passports but failed to turn in the third. The New Jersey Syed Athar Abbas was given back his passport after serving a 15 month sentence.

The Homeland Security Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, held a hearing in July 2005 on “Engineering Bio-Terror Agents: Lessons from the Offensive U.S. and Russian Biological Weapons Programs.” The hearing evaluated Al Qaeda’s ability to develop and use catastrophic biological weapons — such as weaponized anthrax — as part of the Subcommittee’s broader review of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) bio-threat assessment activities. The hearing also examined the known biological warfare capabilities developed by the U.S. and Russian offensive programs, and the potential of those capabilities being utilized in future terrorist attacks. Witnesses at the hearing included: Dr. Kenneth Alibek, Executive Director, Center for Biodefense, George Mason University; Dr. Roger Brent, Director and President, Molecular Sciences Institute; and Dr. Michael V. Callahan, Director, Biodefense & Mass Casualty Care, CIMIT/Massachusetts General Hospital.

As Dr. Michael V. Callahan, Director, Biodefense & Mass Casualty Care, CIMIT/Massachusetts General, explained:

“It is also important to note that the people who participated in that exercise used all open source information, they used the U.S Patent Office and they used out of print microbiology textbooks. It is a scary incredible thing, and it is not just theoretical, it has already been capitalized both in laboratory modelling and in actual experience. I refer you back to the intelligence community’s information on the American anthrax attack in 2001, which we won’t discuss here.”

Kathryn Crockett, Ken Alibek’s assistant, brilliantly addressed these issues in her 2006 thesis, “A historical analysis of Bacillus anthracis as a biological weapon and its application to the development of nonproliferation and defense strategies.” She expresses her special thanks to Dr. Ken Alibek and Dr. Bill Patrick. Dr. Patrick consulted with the FBI and so the FBI credits his expertise. Dr. Alibek’s access to know-how is beyond reasonable dispute. Katie successfully defended the thesis before an esteemed panel that included USAMRIID head and Ames strain researcher Charles Bailey. She says that scientists who analyzed the powder through viewing micrographs or actual contact are divided over the quality of the powder. She cites Gary Matsumoto’s “Science” article in summarizing the debate. She says the FBI has vaccillated on silica.

“Regarding the specific issue of weaponization, according to several scientists at USAMRIID who examined the material, the powder created a significant cloud when agitated meaning that the adhesion of the particles had been reduced. Reducing the adhesion of the particles meant that the powder would fly better.” She explains that “The most common way to reduce electrostatic charge is to add a substance to the mixture, usually a silica based substance.”

On the issue of encapsulation, she reports that “many experts who examined the powder stated the spores were encapsulated. Encapsulation involves coating bacteria with a polymer which is usually done to protect fragile bacteria from harsh conditions such as extreme heat and pressure that occurs at the time of detonation (if in a bomb), as well as from moisture and ultraviolet light. The process was not originally developed for biological weapons purposes but rather to improve the delivery of various drugs to target organs or systems before they were destroyed by enzymes in the circulatory system” (citing Alibek and Crockett, 2005). “The US and Soviet Union, however, “ she explains, “used this technique in their biological weapons programs for pathogens that were not stable in aerosol form... Since spores have hardy shells that provide the same protection as encapsulation would, there is no need to cover them with a polymer. “ She explains that one “possible explanation is that the spore was in fact encapsulated but not for protective purpose. Encapsulation also reduces the need for milling when producing a dry formulation.” By reducing the need for milling, she means permits greater concentration of the biological agent. If the perpetrator was knowledgeable of the use of encapsulation for this purpose, then he or she may have employed it because sophisticated equipment was not at his disposal.”

My consulting military scientist who has made anthrax simulants described the GMU patents as relating to an encapsulation technique which serves to increase the viability of a wide range of pathogens.

Richard L. Lambert, the FBI inspector in charge of the “Amerithrax” investigation, told the court in a filing that a civil suit by Dr. Steve Hatfill could jeopardize the probe and expose national secrets related to U.S. bioweapons defense measures. “In the hands of those hostile to the U.S., this valuable intelligence could aid state sponsors of terrorism or terrorist organizations in their efforts to genetically engineer or alter their anthrax bioweapons to ‘spoof’ or escape detection.” Lambert said that disclosure also could make public sensitive intelligence collection sources and methods.

In “connecting the dots” one would want to consider whether any supporter of the militants had access to the know-how of this encapsulation technique. I’ve posed the question whether Ali Al-Timimi (another GMU grad student at the department), had access to such know-how. A supporter of the Taliban who was working with Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor, Al-Timimi was a Salafist imam sentenced to life plus 70 years for sedition and exhorting some young men to go abroad and defend their faith. We might also consider whether any supporter of the militants has expertise in such polymerization or encapsulation relating to drug delivery, such as biochemist Magdy al-Nashar. He studied in North Carolina in 2000. His webpage at Leeds explained he was expert in functional polymers used in the delivery of drugs.

Ali Al-Timimi was a graduate microbiology student at George Mason University, where famed Russian bioweaponeer and former USAMRIID head Charles Bailey on March 14, 2001 filed a patent involving the use of hydrophobic silica in permitting greater concentration of biological agents. Here is a Floor Plan for the First Floor of Discovery Hall at George Mason University. The First Floor that intermingled the Center for Biodefense/Hadron and the GMU/ATCC computational sciences people.

A BBC interviewer explained:

“The private contractor companies linked to the military and jokingly referred to as “beltway bandits” because they’re sprinkled around the Washington beltway ring-road, is where individuals with the right mix of skills might be working. Some of these contractors are now known to have been involved in classified bio-defence projects. One of these secret projects, carried out in the Nevada desert, was part of a series of three In the first few days of September last year - immediately prior to the attacks of the 11th, the New York Times carried a major investigation which at any other time would have been a story of huge significance...It revealed three secret bio-defence projects at a time when the American people believed none was taking place. One - run by a contractor - Battelle - was to create genetically altered anthrax.”

GMU microbiology grad Al-Timimi, who was working with and had been taught by Bin Laden’s sheik, did mathematical support work for the Navy, a Beltway contractor. What did his work involve?

When pressed by the interviewer, “Does it nag at you in the back of your mind that possibly you do know him?” Dr. Bill Patrick said: “Possibly, possibly, I could have talked to these people. But it would have been within the context of their having a need to know.” He explained: “ Most of my discussions about the biological problem has been in secure conferences and meetings, and involve people with need to know, with security clearance and what have you. I don’t talk about ‘how to’, I don’t get into ‘how to’ with many people, no people other than the fact that those who really have a need to know.”

Al-Timimi had a high security clearance for some of his work for the government. Why? When?

Proliferation of know-how serves to proliferate opportunities for access to that know-how.


637 posted on 09/17/2007 10:43:28 AM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 635 | View Replies ]

Free Republic
Browse · Search
News/Activism
Topics · Post Article


FreeRepublic, LLC, PO BOX 9771, FRESNO, CA 93794
FreeRepublic.com is powered by software copyright 2000-2008 John Robinson