Thank you for your additions to this conversation. Timimi was no longer at Mason when I arrived on scene but I know everyone else you mentioned as I used to work with them and was a student of and assistant to Dr. Alibek. There are two points I wish to address:
1. Re: The limitations on technical education and training that were imposed without being communicated. There were no such limitations imposed. Students could do research alongside the Molecular and Microbiology Faculty at the Center if they had the appropriate biology backgrounds (many didn’t but I did) and they could take advantage of internships and other employment opportunities offsite. Additionally, Dr. Alibek worked hard to provide his students with a variety of important opportunities both inside the laboratory and outside the laboratory. Though he did these types of things for many students, I’ll give you just a few personal examples to illustrate then get back on point: He offered me and other students challenging jobs within his company; He used his contacts to help others find jobs in other companies; He took half a day to meet with an associate of his to try and help me get a position in his associate’s organization; He arranged for me to help him teach biodefense courses (he declined most of the compensation and arranged for it to be given to me instead); He has asked me to stand in for him at some professional events; He introduced me as an expert at a national conference and gave me his speaking time so that I could present my work and establish my career; He arranged for me to provide the background material and to be interviewed for a Discovery Channel special on biological weapons; He arranged for me and some other students to jointly write a series of books for publication (he declined all compensation); When I ran out of money, he offered me a summertime position in his company (I declined because the wages were too high for the amount of work...he knew I was in financial trouble); And the new animal research facility to be built was intended to be staffed by students and graduates of the biodefense program.
From personal experience and knowledge from working both at the Center in the labs and from working for Dr. Alibek, there were no limitations on technical knowledge and training imposed upon the biodefense students who had backgrounds appropriate to the type of work you describe. It is absolutely vital to remember that laboratory based science is but a small (yet critical) part of the eclectic science of biodefense but many opportunities were definitely available to the students. It is also important to mention that the Center did not have highly pathogenic agents nor did we have access to them through ATCC, a secure facility.
2. Re: Capability of his students to build a biological weapon in the garage. Dr. Alibek is an extremely educated and experienced individual with an extraordinarily high degree of expertise in medicine, biotechnology, microbiology, and immunology as well as other areas less pertinent to this discussion (his knowledge of history is amazing). While he is sufficiently skilled to produce anti-cancer and cardiovascular disease drugs without any effort, his students lack such capability.
He did provide his students with the very sophisticated knowledge required to understand biological weapons (much more complex than biological agents) however he withheld a sufficient amount of information to make it extremely difficult for us to “build biological weapons in our garages”. When he says the information is available, he means that the information is available to all members of the public willing to sift through a large number of publications to assemble a variety of details important to the process. Once all of the details are collected, the interested parties would still have to devote all of the time required to assemble what can be a very complicated puzzle depending upon the type of weapon and attack they had in mind. It could take many, many years of trial and error for a group to develop an effective biological weapon useful for a sophisticated, mass casualty attack or it could take a few weeks to months to develop a biological dispersion device capable of achieving fewer casualties but still terrorizing the public.
Dr. Alibek trained us to understand and defend against biological weapons, not to build them. As probably one of the most educated of his students, having helped him with his courses on numerous occasions and having helped him teach some of his courses elsewhere, even I lack sufficient capability, not to mention I completely lack the motivation, to build a sophisticated biological weapon. But I do understand them and the threat exceptionally well thanks to amazing mentors (Ken Alibek and Peter Leitner) who worked tirelessly to raise awareness and to prepare a generation of defense experts trained to understand the differences between biological agents and biological weapons, the threats posed by biological weapons, and how to mount a comprehensive and multi-layered defense against them.
Now graduated and working in national security, seeing first hand what little knowledge about biological weapons (again, more complex than biological agents) remains in the community and how this dilemma is driving misplanning, I can promise you that loss of the unique education program Ken Alibek and Peter Leitner developed at Mason isn’t helpful (to put it mildly). In order to fix the problem, I need the assistance of other people who have been trained by these experts in a program that was dovetailed to provide comprehensive knowledge yet there are only a handful of graduates. It is a tremendous amount of work for so few people, even with the crucial cooperation of the many fine experts in microbiology, medicine, public health, etc. The situation is in serious and immediate need of resolution.
Thanks so much for the authoritative information. I like Ken and have always found his authoritative expertise equalled only by his approachability and willingness to educate the public on the policy issues. Same with others like Sergei P.
Can you help me with additional factual details?
Ken told me the FBI suspected Ali Timimi of accessing know how. But he said he thought of Timimi as more of a “numbers guy”, without hands-on drying expertise and in any event, did not know the non-technical aspects of the investigation such as al-Timimi’s work with OBL’s spiritual godfather al-Hawali. Al-Hawali’s detention was repeatedly invoked by OBL as the reason for his attacks. The Washington Post reported that the FBI suspected al-Timimi of involvement in the anthrax mailings in an October 2006 article titled “Hardball Tactics in an Era of Threats.” His lawyer too at the time of the search of his townyhouse noted their suspicion and alluded to the warrant.
The GMU webpage said that the bioinformatics people had access to the ATCC facilities. What facilities would have been involved? The bioinformatics program was jointly sponsored by ATCC.
Dr. Alibek used the phrase “catalog rights” — which some students had and some did not. What did that involve?
One former employee called me — after she was terminated shortly upon her hire — after she says she complained of lax security. She said that the media was failing to distinguish between the ATCC catalog and the patent repository, which she said would have had virulent Ames.
Dr. Alibek had a security clearance for mathematical support work for the Navy relating to bioinformatics. Would a security clearance allow access not available to students generally?
Who owned and operated the BL-3 lab at the location? When was that built? What pathogenic organisms required a BL-3?
Are you familiar with the March 2001 patent filed by Ken and Charles relating to concentrating biological agents using silica? And the related patent co-invented by Charles and Victor relating to removal of the silica from the surface by repeated centrifugation or an air chamber? It was a “bio-friendly” patent that was publicly disclosed sometime after 9/11, after 6 or more months of confidentiality. It was not classified, and left many details to be known only by those skilled in the art.
Serge says he never knew Ali to have any role in a biodefense project. Do you know what al-Timimi’s room number was? Do you know what Victor’s room number was when he first arrived? He inherited Ali’s telephone number when Ali left and Victor arrived and so I was wondering if he moved into that office in Discovery Hall (before taking an office in Bull Run when it was completed). That room was a few doors from both Ken and Charles which is why I ask. Neither Charles nor GMU will confirm Ali Al-Timimi’s room number — the lack of transparency is not good under the circumstances.
Thanks so much for your informed perspective. I think Ken is great and want to avoid misunderstanding of the facts. Ken was polygraphed as were 200, as I recall, who worked in the field. Were a number of people at GMU polygraphed?
Did you have a security clearance?
From the directory online, it is my understanding that Ali shared a department fax with Ken and Charles and the others in the department. Is that accurate?
BD, you describe ATCC as a secure facility.
Was Discovery Hall’s Center for Biodefense a secure facility?
BD,
Pardon the typo.
I had written:
“Dr. Alibek had a security clearance for mathematical support work for the Navy relating to bioinformatics. Would a security clearance allow access not available to students generally?”
I meant Ali Al-Timimi had a security clearance for mathematical support work for the Navy relating to bioinformatics.” Source: Milton Viorst’s fascinating “The Education of Ali Al-Timimi.”
MV knew Ali as a child. He tells me that he doesn’t think Ali should have to spend 15 minutes for exhorting some young men to go abroad if they felt so compelled by their faith. I tend to agree (so long as they surrender their citizenship upon leaving). It is merely serendipity that the state makes the rules which prevented the young men from exalting their religion over their nation state. Ali’s work for the Navy was for the SRA International which does biodefense work. I don’t know the nature of the work Ali did.
While I have the utmost respect for our country's higher educational establishment (still second to none in my humble opinion), it does have one glaring weakness which our country desperately needs to address: a shocking naivete when it comes to placing trust in foreigners, especially those from rather dubious locations when it comes to America's national security.
While I certainly don't know Ken Alibek personally, what I do know is that he comes from a background of the deep inner circles of the old Soviet government. And my personal life experiences have taught me that as a general rule, the Russians simply shouldn't be trusted. They are undisputed world masters at the Great Game.
One another name that I am certain you are familiar with is that of Dr. Ali Al-Tamimi, the doctor from George Mason University who was later found to be directly involved with our accursed and sizeable northern Virginia jihad community.
If there is anything that 9/11 and the recent London bombing attacks really should have taught us by now, it is that well-educated people from countries that are overtly hostile to America are being specifically trained to infiltrate the countries of the west under cover of science and academia, when their true purpose is really to gather intelligence on our capabilities, and in some cases to do even far greater damage.
I pray that our governments and academic institutions will someday pull their heads out of the sand and wake up to this reality before it is too late. If they do not, I fear for what eventually awaits us.