Rumsfeld By Douglas Feit Sunday, November 19, 2006
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1742139/posts
Much of what you know about Donald Rumsfeld is wrong.
I know, because I worked intimately with him for four years, from the summer of 2001 until I left the Pentagon in August 2005.
Through countless meetings and private conversations, I came to learn his traits, frame of mind and principles — characteristics wholly at odds with the standard public depiction of Rumsfeld, particularly now that he has stepped down after a long, turbulent tenure as defense secretary, a casualty of our toxic political climate.
I want to set the record straight: Don Rumsfeld is not an ideologue. He did not refuse to have his views challenged. He did not ignore the advice of his military advisers. And he did not push single-mindedly for war in Iraq. He was motivated to serve the national interest by transforming the military, though it irritated people throughout the Pentagon.
Rumsfeld’s drive to modernize created a revealing contrast between his Pentagon and the State Department — where Colin Powell was highly popular among the staff. After four years of Powell’s tenure at State, the organization chart there would hardly tip anyone off that 9/11 had occurred — or even that the Cold War was over.
Rumsfeld is a bundle of paradoxes, like a fascinating character in a work of epic literature. And as my high school teachers drummed into my head, the best literature reveals that humans are complex. They are not the all-good or all-bad, all-brilliant or all-dumb figures that inhabit trashy novels and news stories. Fine literature teaches us the difference between appearance and reality.
Because of his complexity, Rumsfeld often is misread. His politics are deeply conservative but he was radical in his drive to force change in every area he oversaw. He is strong-willed and hard-driving but he built his defense strategies and Quadrennial Defense Reviews on calls for intellectual humility.
Those of us in his inner circle heard him say over and over again: Our intelligence, in all senses of the term, is limited. We cannot predict the future. We must continually question our preconceptions and theories. If events contradict them, don’t suppress the bad news; rather, change your preconceptions and theories.
If an ideologue is someone to whom the facts don’t matter, then Rumsfeld is the opposite of an ideologue. He insists that briefings for him be full of facts, thoughtfully organized and rigorously sourced. He demands that facts at odds with his key policy assumptions be brought to his attention immediately. “Bad news never gets better with time,” he says, and berates any subordinate who fails to rush forward to him with such news. He does not suppress bad news; he acts on it.
Rumsfeld’s drive to overhaul the Pentagon — to drop outdated practices, programs and ideas — antagonized many senior military officers and civilian officials in the department. He pushed for doing more with less. He pushed for reorganizing offices and relationships to adapt to a changing world. After 9/11, he created the Northern Command (the first combatant command that included the U.S. homeland among its areas of responsibility), a new undersecretary job for intelligence and a new assistant secretary job for homeland defense.
Seeking to improve civil-military cooperation, Rumsfeld devised new institutions for the Pentagon’s top civilian and military officials to work face to face on strategic matters and new venues for all of them to gather a few times a year with the combatant commanders. He also conceived and pushed through a thorough revision of how U.S. military forces are based, store equipment, move and train with partners around the world — something that was never done before in U.S. history.
On Iraq, Rumsfeld helped President Bush analyze the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime. Given Saddam’s history — starting wars; using chemical weapons against foreign and domestic enemies; and training, financing and otherwise supporting various terrorists — Rumsfeld helped make the case that leaving him in power entailed significant risks.
But in October 2002, Rumsfeld also wrote a list of the risks involved in removing Saddam from power. (I called the list his “parade of horribles” memo.) He reviewed it in detail with the president and the National Security Council. Rumsfeld’s warnings about the dangers of war — including the perils of a post-Saddam power vacuum — were more comprehensive than anything I saw from the CIA, State or elsewhere. Rumsfeld continually reminded the president that he had no risk-free option for dealing with the dangers Saddam posed.
Historians will sort out whether Rumsfeld was too pushy with his military, or not pushy enough; whether he micromanaged Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, or gave them too much slack. I know more about these issues than most people, yet I don’t have all the information for a full analysis. I do know, however, that the common view of Rumsfeld as a close-minded man, ideologically wedded to the virtues of a small force, is wrong.
Rumsfeld had to resign, I suppose, because our bitter and noxious political debate of recent years has turned him into a symbol. His effectiveness was damaged. For many in Congress and the public, the Rumsfeld caricature dominated their view of the Iraq war and the administration’s ability to prosecute it successfully. Even if nominee Robert Gates pursues essentially the same strategies, he may garner more public confidence.
What Rumsfeld believed, said and did differs from the caricature. The public picture of him today is drawn from news accounts reflecting the views of people who disapproved of his policies or disliked him. Rumsfeld, after all, can be brutally demanding and tough.
But I believe history will be more appreciative of him than the first draft has been. What will last is serious history, which, like serious literature, can distinguish appearance from reality.
Douglas J. Feith, a professor at Georgetown University, served as undersecretary of defense for policy from 2001 to 2005.
Unfortunately Feith’s name is mud now too so whatever he says is immediately discredited by the usuals too.
1. Why was the Iraqi army and paramilitary forces completely dismantled?
I ask this question because I overheard a very senior military official muse it often; (we didn't completely dismantle the German army or police force after WWII) the logical conclusion would have been to have those Iraqis who wanted to remain swear an oath to their country instead of to Saddam.
2. Why weren't more forces employed to protect against looting and WMD movement?
3. Why weren't there civil affairs personnel immediately in place (as they were in Germany, Japan post WWII surrender) to help manage the infrastructure of Iraq?
These are questions I've always asked.