Are you citing NY Times v. Somebody? I have forgotten where that is now. Do we need “intent” or is reckless disregard enough? Certainly we don’t need anything akin to “criminal intent.”
Are you arguing the issue of malice? I certainly don’t have to show malice, and even if I have to show “intent,” or malice, I’ll bet I can get at least three of the 88 to testify about meetings, conversations, etc, where phrases such as “let’s get these bastards” were uttered.
re: malice. These three are not public figures, because, even though they were subject to much media attention, they did not seek it or any public attention.
I see the 88 as a house of cards, probably about 40 of them ready to throw everyone else to the wolves to get themselves off (most probably with p/o spouses), 40 “true believers” and 7 or 8 who had no idea what they were signing.
Re: specific harm. In a civil rights case, I’ll know it’s OTW, but I could argue “tainted something.” :~)
I would take it on contingency, with costs covered. Wouldn’t you?
NYT v. Sullivan. Either malice or negligence is sufficient, but actual malice is required for a public figure. I'm not a lawyer, and I don't know to what degree the Sullivan ruling has been tweaked over the years -- usually, by the time you get close to a credible libel suit, you're probably on the wrong side of a few ethical rules, and I don't tread that close.
re: malice. These three are not public figures, because, even though they were subject to much media attention, they did not seek it or any public attention.
The court in Sullivan ruled that someone could be considered a public figure by virtue of being involved in public events, even if their fame (or notoriety) was unsought. The plaintiff/respondent in the case was an Alabama sheriff accused in an ad in the Times of mistreating civil rights marchers. The Court found that while Sullivan would not normally be considered a public figure for purposes of the Times' national audience, his involvement in the civil rights unrest made him one.
Meanwhile, I found the actual ad -- or at least a Google-cached HTML version of a PDF that's been taken down. Read the ad itself. There is one reference to an allegation of rape, and one reference to "March 13." The three students are not referred to by name, nor are they even referred to as three students or as lacrosse players. I don't see any libel there.
The ad was part of, and fed into, an overall climate of racial unrest, and was an attempt to spin the case into part of a larger narrative -- one in which the guilt of the three was assumed, or at least their actual guilt or innocence was dismissed as unimportant. And that shouldn't be forgiven or forgotten. But frankly I don't see libel here. If, is I believe, there's nothing ipso facto lieblous about the content itself, then the court need not consider negligence or malice at all.
Are you arguing the issue of malice? I certainly don’t have to show malice, and even if I have to show “intent,” or malice, I’ll bet I can get at least three of the 88 to testify about meetings, conversations, etc, where phrases such as “let’s get these bastards” were uttered.
I'd tend to doubt it; if they had the goal of "getting these bastards," the ad is awfully soft, even for academics.
I would take it on contingency, with costs covered. Wouldn’t you?
Don't think so. Slim chance of a win, even slimmer chance of collecting any serious money, it'd be time consuming, and after reading the ad itself, I don't see anything that outrages me enough to work for free on principle.
The deep pockets belong to Duke -- the profs didn't just sign as individuals, but as representatives of their academic departments (at the bottom of the ad, the departments are listed as supporting the ad). It seems likely, to me, that the profs were acting in an official capacity, and that ad was probably part of the settlement with the university.