An interesting read is the McCollum Memo from Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence...who submitted the memo in October 1940 to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox ...who were both two of the highest-ranking military advisers to FDR. An excerpt from the memo:
It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following course of action is suggested:
A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.
10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.
The memo was written in October 1940...and by December of '41, all 8 of the recommendations had been implemented. It could be argued that all of the actions proposed were designed to neutralize Japan...which the memo argued was vital to the British effort in Europe...but at the same time, the memo is also proof that high level advisers to FDR were hoping to goad the Japanese into an attack on the US so that they could marginalize the American public's resistance to getting involved in WWII.
You dramatically understate the case that this communication was inspired by concerns about the Nazis and Fascists' alliance with the Japanese. In fact, with the exception of the single reference to the political advantage of goading the Japanese to attack, it is not an issue deemed worth addressing until the very last part of the memo. I don't know who it is that underlined #10 with red ink, but it doesn't make a maddog bit of sense to believe it was McCollum.
The first three pages of McCollum's letter deals with his assessment that the Japanese threatened the British Empire's ability to deal with the Nazi-Fascist forces, and in a scenario in which the Japanese distraction in the Pacific led Germany and Italy to defeat England, America would be next on their list. From the bottom of page 1 and the top of Page 2 of the memo:
On the third page, there is an assessment of Japanese military forces and how they shape up against those of the U.S. While the Japanese had their strengths, they did not overall match up well against the Americans.
...As a result of this policy, Germany and Italy have lately concluded a military alliance with Japan directed against the United States. If the published terms of this treaty and the pointed utterances of German, Italian and Japanese leaders can be believed, and there seems no ground on which to doubt either, the three totalitarian powers agree to make war on the United States, should she come to the assistance of England, or should she attempt to forcibly interfere with Japan's aims in the Orient and,Page [2]
furthermore, Germany and Italy expressly reserve the right to determine whether American aid to Britain, short of war, is a cause for war or not after they have succeeded in defeating England. In other words, after England has been disposed of her enemies will decide whether or not to immediately proceed with an attack on the United States.
McCollum is steadfast on one thing: Neutralizing Hirohito's Japan gives the English and the Dutch the best chance at holding off Hitler and Mussolini. IMHO, A fair, non-conspiratorial reading of this document portrays a military leader strategizing to prevent the Japanese from making an subsequent Nazi-Fascist attack on the American mainland more likely. The "course of action" list and its preamble SHOULD be characterized as saying, "Look, we've got to beat the Japanese, but nobody wants us to fire the first shot. If THEY don't fire first, we'll just have to slow them down as much as we possibly can. If they are as determined as we believe they are, they WILL shoot first, after which the American public will be supportive of defeating them."
Indeed, the final two points in McCollum's summary are as follows (bold mine):
Note the absence of a repeating of the "led to commit an overt act of war" line of reasoning.
6. It is to the interest of the United States to eliminate Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan.7. In the absence of United States ability to take the political offensive, additional naval force should be sent to the orient and agreements entered into with Holland and England that would serve as an effective check against Japanese encroachments in South-eastern Asia.
It is the height of deception to trumpet this memo as being, as banned ex-Freeper and current 9/11 Truthgoof Michael Rivero puts it -- "The Smoking Gun of Pearl Harbor." And for crying out loud, it only makes sense that military leaders discuss among themselves the feasibility of going to war even when things have not yet degenerated into chaos. Only an incompetent leader would bar talk of a battle plan until diplomacy had broken down for the last time.
Of course there is that whole Japan invading China thing that was just so overrated I guess.....