Memorandum on Fort Sumter
March 18[?] 1861
Some considerations in favor of withdrawing the Troops from Fort Sumpter, by President Lincoln. Wells Papers
1st. The Fort cannot be permanently held without reinforcement. This point is too apparent too [sic] need proof
The cutting off supplies and consequent starvation, not to mention disease, would compel surrender in a few months at farthest, without firing a gun
2 The Fort cannot now be re-inforced without a large armament, involving of course a bloody conflict and great exasperation on both sides, and when re-inforced can only be held by sufficient number to garrison the post and to keep open communication with it by means of the harbor.
3. The Fort in the present condition of affairs is of inconsiderable military value, for: It is not necessary for the Federal Government to hold it in order to protect the City of Charleston from foreign invasion, nor: Is it available under existing circumstances for the purpose of collecting the revenue: and, It is difficult to see how the possession of the Fort by the Secessionists can be rendered a means of annoyance to the Federal Government. Every purpose for which the fort can now be made available would be better subserved by Ships of War, outside the harbor.
4 The abandonment of the Post would remove a source of irritation of the Southern people and deprive the secession movement of one of its most powerful stimulants.
5 It would indicate both an independent and a conservative position on part of the new administration, and would gratify and encourage those, who while friendly to the Union are yet reluctant to see extreme measures pursued.
6 It would tend to confound and embarrass those enemies of the Union both at the North and South who have relied on the cry of ``Coercion'' as a means of keeping up the excitement against the Republican Party.
7 If the garrison should, while in an enfeebled condition be successfully attacked, or from want of proper supplies should be cut off by disuse the administration would be held responsible for it and this fact would be used by their opponents with great effect.
8 The moral advantage to the Secessionists of a successful attack would be very great.
Objections
1st The danger of demoralizing the Republican Party by a measure which might seem to many to indicate timidity or in common parlance, ``want of pluck.'' That this may be the first impression is probable but if the measure is justified upon the double ground of the small importance of the post in a military point of view and the desire to conciliate wherever this can be safely done a second thought will discover the wisdom of the course, and increase rather than diminish the confidence of the party in its leaders.
2 The danger of the movement being construed by the Secessionists as a yielding from necessity, and in so far a victory on their part...
Here is what Lamon's mission discovered:
Lamon visited James L. Petigru, the famous Unionist, on Sunday and learned from him that there was no Unionist strength in the state and that "peaceable succession or war was inevitable", and on Monday morning obtained an interview with Governor Pickens. In replies to Lamon’s questions, Governor Pickens stated very positively that any attempt on the part of President Lincoln to reinforce Sumter would bring war and only his “unalterable resolve not to attempt any reinforcement” could prevent war. Lincoln and Fort Sumter by Charles Ramsdell
Lincoln’s two secretaries John G. Nicolay and John Hay, in their long but not impartial in the Sumter Affair come so close to divulging the essence of the stratagem that one cannot suspect that they knew of it. In once place they say, in reference to Lincoln’s solution of this problem of Sumter, “Abstractly it was enough that the government was in the right. But to make the issue sure he determined to put the rebellion in the wrong.” And again, “President Lincoln in determining the Sumter question had adopted a simple but effective policy. To use his own words, he determined to ‘send bread to Anderson’ if the rebels fired on that, they would not convince the world that he started the civil war.” And still later, “When he finally gave order for the fleet to sail, he was master of the situation…master if the rebels hesitated or repented, because they would therefore forfeit their prestige with the South, master if they persisted, for he would command a united North.”
Orville Browning, 20 year friend of Lincoln: "He himself conceived the idea, and proposed sending supplies, without an attempt to reinforce giving notice of the fact to Governor Pickens. The plan succeeded. They attacked Sumter -- it fell, and thus, did more service than it otherwise could. The Diaries of Orville H. Browning.
Do you know the difference between ‘re-inforce’ and ‘re-supply’?
Take any stand-off situation. Take the Cuban Missile Crisis. If it had resulted in a nuclear conflict, we can't simply conclude that Kennedy was angling for war. He may just have been trying to stand up to the Soviets and hoping they'd back down.
Lincoln also may have expected the country to rally around a tough stance on the forts. That happened in the North after Sumter was attacked. Lincoln greatly overestimated unionist strength in the South, though, and there the reaction was against the union. I'm not saying that he calculated the results of a Confederate attack, though, just that he thought a strong stand would have won support for Washington.
Also, given that Lincoln only resupplied, rather than reinforced, the fort he might have hoped that this would not be taken as a provocative gesture. He was wrong about that, but his belief wouldn't have been irrational. He may not have taken the virulence of Southern passions seriously. If you were Lincoln and remembered close ties with Southerners in Congress you might underestimate how much they wanted war.
What some may have concluded is: if Lincoln had wanted a war and wanted to make it the rebel's fault, he would have acted as he did. But that's a deduction that won't convince everyone. It involves a degree of bias and an unwillingness to consider all the circumstances.