Excerpts from:
Rules of Engagement: Can Our Troops Defend Themselves?
(Dave Eberhart, NewsMax.com - Tuesday, Dec. 6, 2005)
Buried in some new fine print in military regulations is a phrase that may hold the answer. It's hard to ferret out, as rules of engagement are for the most part classified as for "limited" distribution only.
First, there was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01A of 15 January 2000:
"Nothing in these ROE limit an individual soldier's right to defend himself or a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take appropriate action to defend his unit and other U.S. and friendly forces in the vicinity."
And these words for the unit leader:
"These rules do not limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-defense of the commander's unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity."
Then there was CJCSI 3121.01B of 13 June 2005: (Promulgation of the unclassified version of the latter is limited, but the concern among some who have perused it is that the new regulation adds a few choice words that could spell a world of difference to the individual soldier fighting a dirty war in Iraq against urban guerrillas)
The new standard ROE promulgated this past summer (CJCSI 3121.01B) has individual self-defense described as a subset of unit self-defense.
Furthermore, the new regulation ominously adds some specific wording that says, "as such, commanders may limit the individual right of self-defense."
Last May just before the ostensible change -- Lawrence Di Rita, a Pentagon spokesman, dodged a question at a news conference concerning the investigation at the time of a Marine who allegedly shot a wounded insurgent in the mosque in Fallujah.
The question: "The statement put out by the Marines says that this Marine's actions were consistent with the established rules of engagement. Are you able to tell us what those rules of engagement are?"
Di Rita responded by saying, "We don't discuss rules of engagement because it's unsafe to our troops if we tell people what they're supposed to do to protect themselves. So we just don't discuss rules of engagement. But they have the right of self-defense at all times, and that's a consistent rule of engagement."
(CONTINUED)
On November 22, 2005 - well after the wording change - Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, who commands the Multinational Corps Iraq, was at another press conference where the subject emerged of the deaths of members of an Iraqi family apparently killed by U.S. troops that week.
The question was: "Has there been any talk this week about changing the rules of engagement or clarifying the rules of engagement, or have any advisories gone out from you and your staff on being more careful or how to be more careful on this?"
Gen. Vines had this to say: "The loss of any innocent life - indeed, any life - is tragic. But we continually evaluate and investigate those, the loss of each life, to determine whether or not the rules of engagement were applied correctly, whether or not the rules of engagement are still valid, whether additional training would have precluded the loss of innocent life, whether additional equipment will do that. So we continually assess that. What we must never do is deprive a soldier in harm's way of the ability to protect himself and his fellow soldiers. And so we're not going to deprive them of that right, to make the decisions based on the threat they believe they have on the ground. So we will continue to do everything we can to provide them the best training that we can, the best equipment that we can and the rules of engagement that allow them to operate with maximum safety."
Article by Colin Kahl in the December 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs.
From the outset of the war:
The U.S. military has put in place several mechanisms to ensure compliance with the principles of distinction and proportionality. In the lead-up to the invasion, the Pentagon developed the “joint target list,” an inventory of all potential targets for coalition forces, which was vetted by judge advocates and other legal advisers.
•
Certain operations directed against Saddam Hussein’s regime were deemed off-limits because they targeted civilians or risked producing disproportionate damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure.
•Starting in late 2002, the Pentagon also enlisted UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations to help draw up a “no-strike” list including thousands of schools, mosques, sensitive cultural sites, hospitals, water-treatment facilities, power plants, and other elements of civilian infrastructure. The list placed significant constraints on air and land operations. During the initial ground invasion, for example, the artillery batteries used by U.S. forces were programmed with a list of sites that could not be fired on without a manual override.
The no-strike list isn’t the only measure taken to limit collateral damage:
The U.S. military has also tried to limit risks to civilians by reviewing its military targets with the collateral damage estimation methodology (CDEM), which uses computer software and human analysis to estimate possible civilian casualties for every target studied.
•The CDEM requires commanders and their legal advisers to ask themselves five questions to determine whether a given target is a legitimate one.
oCan they positively identify the person or the site according to the current ROE?
oIs there a protected civilian facility or significant environmental concern within the range of the weapon to be used?
oCan damage to that concern be avoided by attacking the target with a different weapon or a different method?
oIf not, how many people are likely to be injured or killed in the attack?
oMust a higher commander be called for permission?
When the targets considered represent a risk of “high collateral damage,” the CDEM requires political approval by the secretary of defense and, during major combat, the president.
The rules of engagement have also sought to achieve a balance each troop’s legitimate right to self-defense with the importance of complying with the laws of war:
They attempt to maintain this balance by providing troops with a clear sense of what constitutes a legitimate military target. During major combat in Iraq, the criterion was status-based. Individuals or groups, namely Iraqi military and paramilitary forces, that were “declared hostile forces” under the ROE, could be attacked on sight until they were wounded or they surrendered. As the war transitioned into a counterinsurgency mission and U.S. forces confronted adversaries who were largely indistinguishable from the civilian population, the criterion became conduct-based:
•U.S. troops must now positively identify a “hostile act” (such as the firing of an automatic weapon in their direction) or a “hostile intent” (such as the brandishing of a rocket-propelled grenade or the planting of an improvised explosive device) before they may fire their weapons.
If the naked eye isn’t sufficient to positively identify a hostile force, act, or intent before attacking:
U.S. forces rely on advanced optics. Forward observers are used to identify and “paint” targets, or provide coordinates for laser- or GPS-guided bomb attacks. Air force, navy, and marine fighter aircraft have also been retrofitted with new reconnaissance pods that allow real-time overhead surveillance and streaming video, thereby helping ground forces distinguish insurgents from civilians during raids and combat missions.
Another precaution pertains to the choice of weapons:
U.S. forces have been reluctant to use artillery against insurgents, even when they have been under mortar and rocket fire. Artillery systems (such as howitzers, mortars, and ground-launched rockets) have a large radius of destruction and so have a high potential for collateral damage, especially in densely populated areas. Instead, U.S. forces have either relied on close air support and ground forces that can keep their “eyes on the target” or refrained from attacking altogether. This summer, for example, as I was conducting interviews in the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, the Green Zone was hit by two rockets and two mortars. Although the attack’s point of origin—a residential neighborhood near Sadr City—was determined quickly, the U.S. military chose not to fire back with artillery.
Our rules of engagement have also emphasized the importance of using proportionate force when engaging legitimate military targets in order to minimize collateral damage:
The current rules explicitly require U.S. troops to respond to a hostile act or intent with “graduated” force. Under many circumstances, U.S. forces may engage in deadly violence only after warning their targets and trying nonlethal measures against them to no avail. The U.S. military also frequently engages in “weaponeering”—selecting the most specifically tailored type and quantity of weapon necessary to produce a desired effect. When air strikes are required, it increasingly relies on precision-guided munitions, such as laser-, GPS-, and optically guided weapons. During the major combat phase of the war in Iraq, 68 percent of the munitions used were precision-guided, compared with 7-8 percent during the 1991 Gulf War, 30 percent in Kosovo, and 60 percent in Afghanistan. The U.S. military has also developed munitions with smaller payloads to ensure that it uses the smallest force necessary, and it relies heavily on penetrating munitions with delayed fuses to confine the damage caused by blasts and fragmentation to the area of impact. Additional mitigation techniques, including adjusting the timing, angles, and azimuths of attacks, have also been regularly employed to reduce risks to civilians.
The number of U.S. air strikes has declined sharply since the end of major combat operations, indicating the U.S. military’s heightened concern for proportionality:
Official figures suggest that U.S. planes launched 18,695 strikes during the first 30 days of the war, compared with just 285 strikes in 2004 and 306 in 2005. Other estimates put the 2005 total at 654. Even with the higher number, however, there were almost as many air strikes per day during the major combat phase (an average of 623) as there were during all of 2005.
