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"After all, we clearly do not want to win in the middle east, but rather convert multiple warring factions from a fascist, heathen mentality into that of the populace of Boston circa 1776"

Your post makes sense, but I'm trying to understand that last line. Are you suggesting that we're deliberately not finishing the job in order to promote an indigenous structure that will take ownership of the democracy, the battle and presumably the victory? That's something I've speculated to, but haven't seen addressed.

Are you suggesting that we're deliberately not finishing the job in order to promote an indigenous structure that will take ownership of the democracy, the battle and presumably the victory?

The problem is that we're not fighting the Afghani (nor, really, the Iraqi) people, but only a small band of insurgents. Were we to take the gloves off against the Afghani (or Iraqi) people, and crack down ruthlessly, it might kill more insurgents, but it will also foster discontent and hatred for the American presence by the population whose support the new government needs. It would also encourage more civilian non-combatants to become insurgents.

That's why, for instance, the Army has ditched the kick-in-the-doors-at-night approach, for a softer approach. It's because Patraeus, the current commander in Iraq, understands counterinsurgencies well (he did, after all, literally write the book on them), and he knows that the hearts and minds of the people are as important as any tactical advantage.

I am not certain I would go so far as to say that we are consciously doing as you say, but it is certain that we prioritize setting up democracies over military victory.

I think we underestimate how rare democracy is.