True. But that's my point. Logically, utility serves either an objectively good end or an apparently good end. But in either case, utility presupposes some end. Utility simply cannot be an end in itself. It presupposes an object or end. Therefore, "good" cannot be defined as simple utility.
Interestingly, your argument presupposes the fact that health is an objective good (even though you use scare quotes) and that running away from the police is objectively evil, because if these things are not true, your argument has no force.
Utility is the same, the ends are not.
That's true, and that's what distinguishes the morality of the two acts, one being good and one evil. That's what makes utility, considered absolutely, irrelevant to moral reasoning. What makes an act moral is the action itself, the circumstances surrounding the act, and the intention of the act. Again, if you claim that these acts are truly morally equivalent, then you undercut your argument above.
That's why the tools are only tools, and are beyond value judgment.
True. But human acts are not tools, except as they may represent a means to an end. And the acts in your example are not beyond value judgement because of the intention of the acts.
All acts are instrumental, and therefore are tools. Even unvoluntary acts, like sneezing or twitching, are instrumental, the first to respiratory, the second to muscular functioning. If somebody runs away with the money from the bank holdup, it serves his purpose [to get money]. To catch and punish him serves not his purpose, but ours. For him getting caught is not "a good". For us caching him is. That's why it is much better to use a framework in which the word "good" does not even enter. It does not have to be im-moral, just a-moral.