"Since Li. [v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804], California cases uniformly have recognized that so long as an express assumption of risk agreement does not violate public policy (see e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92, 95‑101 [32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441, 6 A.L.R.3d 693] ), such an agreement operates to relieve the defendant of a legal duty to the plaintiff with respect to the risks encompassed by the agreement and, where applicable, to bar completely the plaintiff's cause of action. (See, e.g., Madison v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 589, 597‑602 [250 Cal.Rptr. 299], and cases cited.)" (Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 308‑309, fn 4.)
"[W]hat the language of [a release] means is a 'matter of interpretation for the courts and not controlled in any sense by what either of the parties intended or thought its meaning to be....' [Citation.]" (Citizens Utilities Co. v. Wheeler (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 423, 432.) Mr. Conway's subjective understanding that he thought the release applied to what might happen " 'up the trail' not in the paddock area," without more, does not affect our analysis.
As this court has said before, " '[t]he standards which a release such as this one must meet are well established. "To be effective, a release need not achieve perfection...." [Citation.] Thus, "[a]s long as the release constitutes a clear and unequivocal waiver with specific reference to a defendant's negligence, it will be sufficient. [Citations.] For it to be valid and enforceable, a written release exculpating a tortfeasor from liability for future misconduct must be clear, unambiguous and explicit in expressing the intent of the parties. [Citation.] If a tortfeasor is to be released from such liability the language used 'must be clear, explicit and comprehensible in each of its essential details. Such an agreement, read as a whole, must clearly notify the prospective releasor or indemnitor of the effect of signing the agreement.' [Citation.]" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Allabach, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015.)
Conway v. Holman Ranch, California Court of Appeals, 2003 WL 22138983 (September 16, 2003)
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The bottom line is that the civil case will come down to the language on the release, which is not public at this time.
I'm not sure that's necessarily the case. This case doesn't seem particularly good for assumption of risk to me. Usually, the doctrine applies to things like horseback riding, skiing, swimming, sky diving, etc. where there is a public policy preference to permit people to engage in the activity in question, and a recognition by the courts that if you don't permit assumption of risk, the business that caters to that activity will simply shut its doors. It also usually deals with a situation where the parties involved understand the risk.
But in my view, this case really isn't the kind of case where a court is going to say, "Sure, we want to facilitate this kind of activity."
Someone posted that they wondered how pie eating contests or hotdog eating contests would react to this. Maybe if you're a judge, that thought process would prompt you to uphold the assumption of risk clause in this case, but I don't think they are just going to read the release and make sure that they used the magic words "assumes the risk." My guess is that they will be looking for ways to throw it out.