Had the military-political structure charged with defending the nation looked at the Russian-Nippon War they would have seen a very capable enemy who had laid a a$$ whupp'n, on their opponents without notification.
"...looked at the Russian-Nippon War they would have seen a very capable enemy who had laid a a$$ whupp'n, on their opponents without notification."
Actually, studying the Russo-Japanese war would have been a very bad example for Western planners. While the Japanese Navy did lay an ass-whooping on the Ruskies, the Japanese Army was a different story. The Japanese suffered horrendous losses at the hands of the Russians and were about to collapse when the Russians finally gave up the ghost. Japan got far more at the negotiating table than the results in the field justified.
Likewise for th series of border wars fought between Japan and Russia in the late 30's (the battles of Nomonhon and the Amur River). Although the total forces committed by either side were relatively small, 'victory' in the first incident (Amur river) was the result of either nation being truly eager for a protracted conflict. In the series of battles around Nomonhon, General Georgi Zhukov overwhelmed the Japanese with numerical superiority and matched them man-for-man in the ruthlessness department. Japan was seriously smacked at this battle. Again, the fact that neither country was prepared nor seeking an extended conflict caused the whole thing to be quietly put to bed before it got out of hand.
Western experts recording the lessons of these two incidents also learned the wrong lessons. They held the Russinas in very low regard to begin with and when Japan was trounced by the same underrated Red Army not once, but twice, coupled with the Japanese xperience in China, and the assumption was that the Japanese Army was not all that effective a fighting force. Which was only sorta-kindqa true.
What made the Japanese Army such a fearsome weapon in the opening days of the Pacific War, were the Japanese navy and the Japanese Air forces; the Japanese, for all intents and purposes, practiced Blitzkreig without the tanks -- utilizing naval and air superiority to achieve the speed and shock of heavy armor. of course, their opponents in the early days of the war were caught by suprise, poorly equipped, and mostly very poorly led, which effectively multiplied Japanese combat power. This does not take away from the individual wualities of the Japanese fighting man, however. He was a fearsome opponent in his own right.
The asumptions that were made about the Japanese Army should never have been made about the Imperial Navy, but unfortunately were. The Japanese armed forces were largely viewed in the West as just "another Oriental rabble" would would turn tail the secodn they crossed swords with a "real" Western military. Again, this is a problem with the collection, analysis and dissemination of information in Western military and political circles. had anyone paid attention, they would have found a Japanese military which was, at the very least, professional and capable, and acted accordingly