While I appreciate the 1828 Webster dictionary definitions, none that I saw answered the legal questions. For example, the first definition reflects that a person has a body and soul. What if someone does not believe that. Because Webster said it, ergo it must be true?
I used 1828 Webster because it gives the meaning of the word 'person' at the time the Constitution was written. The definition demonstrates that there was no phony dichotomy at that time between a human being and a person. It doesn't matter whether someone presently believes or doesn't believe the body/soul distinction; we know what the generally accepted meaning of the word was around the time of the Constitution. So reading back an arbitrary modern distinction between 'human being' and 'person' on the Constitution to make it mean something that was never intended is historically anachronistic and unjustified.
We all know that a fetus will hopefully become that one day, but is not so in its early stages of development
Ontologically speaking, capabilities are limited to the kind of thing to which they belong. Anything that has the potential to do human things, whether now or at any time in the future, is already a human being otherwise it could never have that capability. A turnip can only do turnip things, and does not have and will never have the ability to do uniquely human things. A turnip is the offspring of turnip parentage. A human being is the offspring of human parentage. If a being has the potential of rationality then that being is already a human being because no other kind of being has that nature. We know what a human being is as surely as we know what a turnip is.
There is absolutely nothing modern science knows today that would help make a determination as to whether a fetus has a soul or not. That is the issue. You speak of sophistry, but the greatest sophism I have run into is an attempt to use science to prove the existence of a soul...at any stage of a fetal development.
I am not trying to use science to prove the existence of the soul. I am simply pointing out that we know from science and from metaphysics what a human being is and how and when a human being begins. The soul question in this context is a canard. If you want to talk theology I'll be glad to do so as far as I am able, but it is a different matter.
The meaning of personhood is about as close to self-evident as one can get. A moments reflection should demonstrate it to you: If I ask you the meaning of the proposition, "I was conceived", you would understand exactly what is meant by the sentence, and you would not be able to coherently argue that it does not make sense, or that it is untrue of yourself.
The reason it makes sense to you is that your life has been a continuum from the moment you began to exist. If I ask you when you began to exist, the correct answer is, at the beginning, i.e., at your conception. Therfore, it would be incoherent to assert that you were not a person when you began to exist and only 'became a person' sometime later in your existence. For the most unfortunate example of what I'm saying, see Harry Blackmun's incoherent use of the word, "mother" in his infamous Roe opinion, not to mention his backwoods biology and his self-professed ignorance.
Because it cannot be ascertained with certainty the stage that the fetus becomes sufficiently developed to be classified as a person
As outlined above, the assumption that there is a distinction between a fetus and a person is a category error. If you positively assert that there is some such a distinction, the burden of proof is on you to justify that distinction. We know what the word meant in 1828.
Cordially,
Surely you are not suggesting that the USSC must accept the concept of a soul in determining issues such as abortion? In fact, during the time of Webster's definition, even the Church did not recognize it in a fetus' early stages. Why should the Court?
Ontologically speaking, capabilities are limited to the kind of thing to which they belong. Anything that has the potential to do human things, whether now or at any time in the future, is already a human being otherwise it could never have that capability.
I have never denied that, nor I believe would Augustine have. Yet, the "accepted" definition of a person in 1828 nothwithstanding, it still remains an issue that must be confronted in jurisprudence, ie: when is a human a person. It is a valid question, and one that requires more than a dictionary...or a Bible to answer.
I am not trying to use science to prove the existence of the soul. I am simply pointing out that we know from science and from metaphysics what a human being is and how and when a human being begins. The soul question in this context is a canard. If you want to talk theology I'll be glad to do so as far as I am able, but it is a different matter.
This whole issue has been one with a theological base. The issue came out on this thread as a debate on why the Church ultimately set aside 1200 years of belief with regard to the existence of the soul, and the practice of abortion. But for constitutional considerations, I maintain that the issue of when constitutional rights apply to the unborn is an open one with many. It cannot be resolved simply, and a quick look at the Bill of Rights will reveal that every one of those enumerated rights has limitations. The right to bear arms, the right to free speech, to freedom of the press, to privacy...all have certain limitations. We are discussing whether the 5th Amendment rights are guaranteed to someone not previously considered a person. And in that debate, the issues relating to development cannot be ignored.
"I was conceived", you would understand exactly what is meant by the sentence, and you would not be able to coherently argue that it does not make sense, or that it is untrue of yourself.
That is because I am a sentient being, with a fully developed central nervous system, and capable of feeling pain, etc. An early stage fetus has none of that. That is why it is an issue, whether those things matter in the determination of a person. And you speak of tradition. Well, an obvious question would be, if abortion was ok for early stage fetuses for over a thousand years in the Western world, what changed? The argument that the scientists and doctors of the time did not know about conception is not an argument. They did.
Therfore, it would be incoherent to assert that you were not a person when you began to exist and only 'became a person' sometime later in your existence
You continue to equate the unarguable biological truism of a human being with the highly arguable legal question of "person", as meant by the Constitution. They may ultimately be ruled one and the same, but it is a completely valid distinction and question.
For the most unfortunate example of what I'm saying, see Harry Blackmun's incoherent use of the word, "mother" in his infamous Roe opinion, not to mention his backwoods biology and his self-professed ignorance.
I will at least agree that the basis for the decision being privacy was silly. Past that, I would hope the coming examination of this does address the rights of the unborn person, which must by default also examine the definition of "person".
If you positively assert that there is some such a distinction, the burden of proof is on you to justify that distinction. We know what the word meant in 1828.
Let's further examine your definitions:
1. An individual human being consisting of body and soul.
At that time, the soul was considered to exist only in a formed, animated fetus, somewhere between 16 and 30 weeks.
We apply the word to living beings only, possessed of a rational nature; Does a fetus have a rational nature, or will that rational nature be formed at some time?
the body when dead is not called a person. Yet a corporation, not living, is a person.
It is applied alike to a man, woman or child.
None of which is a fetus, nor I would suggest was Webster thinking of a fetus in that statement.
A person is a thinking intelligent being.He or she will be one day, but certainly not as a fetus.
2. A man, woman or child, considered as opposed to things, or distinct from them. Again, the listing of a man, woman, or child. What is important here, is that again, he fails to address the term fetus. And even more importantly, he understood that biologically slaves were persons, but for purposes of the Constitution, they were not. There are legal distinctions that do not necessarily follow biology or the dictionary.
Take care.