Posted on 11/25/2006 3:52:09 AM PST by Cannoneer No. 4
For the next few months, Afghan and NATO troops will be out in the snow and bad weather, raiding villages where Taliban are hunkered down for the Winter. For U.S. troops, this is a 19th century tactic, pioneered by American General George Crook, to defeat the hostile tribes on the Great Plains. For the last four years, many American commanders have been trying to emulate Crook in other ways as well.
During the height of the Indian Wars in the American west, one of the most successful American commanders was General George Crook. He was an original thinker who used a combination of imagination and diplomacy to bring the wars to an end with a minimum of bloodshed. Crook's job was to pacify the tribes that still raided (as a form of sport or retribution for slights real or imagined) Indians and non-Indians alike. Crook also had to move tribes to reservations, or force them back there. But the main task of General Crook's troops was to keep the peace on a still turbulent frontier. Faced with the possibility of operating in Afghanistan, a rugged area populated by less well equipped, but more rugged and robust locals, it's a good idea to look back at how General Crook handled a similar situation.
First, General Crook saw diplomacy as his primary weapon. The Indians knew he had a more powerful military force, but they also knew Crook could be trusted. Crook used this trust, and his negotiating skills, to carry out American policies that he often didn't agree with. But Crook was also eager to avoid violence as much as possible. He was not a bloody minded soldier, and he realized that a reputation for senseless violence would make many of the tribes resist more stoutly and refuse to negotiate. Crook would recognize a similar situation in Afghanistan today. There is more to lose and little to gain by using a lot of fire power. You have to convince the Afghans that you do have the firepower, and can use it, but will only do so when there really is no other choice.
Using Indians to fight Indians was another technique Crook used a lot. First, he hired a lot of Indians as scouts. This made a lot of sense, as many of his troops were from back east and didn't know the local terrain, languages and customs. Crook saw to it that the scouts were treated well, for the scouts were usually recruited from weaker tribes that had a beef with the stronger tribes. The smaller tribes were usually easier to negotiate deals with. The larger tribes would often fight and Crook needed the scouts, and Indian allies (who sometimes fought for him). Same situation in Afghanistan.
Many of the Afghan tribes and ethnic groups (Pushtuns versus everyone else) don't like each other very much. The government has gotten a number of tribes to become friendly, and some of those that now support the Taliban do it either because of existing disagreements with the government, or other tribes, or because the Taliban are successful in using terror.
Crook also showed a lot of innovation on the battlefield. While "asymmetric" warfare is a hot item today, it was a common tool for General Crook. Asymmetric means using weapons and techniques that the enemy cannot easily deal with. For the Afghans, this means knowing the terrain better and being more capable of moving across the hills and mountains. Crook had the same problem, in that the tribes knew their backyard better and their grass fed ponies could move faster than his cavalry (which depended on supplies of grain to feed his larger horses.) But Crook also realized that in the winter the Indians had to settle in to survive the bad weather, and their ponies were forced to survive as best they could (and many didn't). Crook could move around in the Winter, by using many horses to carry supplies. While Crook's force was small and tied to their supplies, the Indians could hardly move at all, and usually succumbed to Crook's offer of bullets or bread. Protecting their families was always a top priority for the Indians and Crook would also, during Summer campaigns, strive to capture the women and children of a rebellious tribe. This improved his negotiating position immensely.
One can only speculate what General Crook would do in Afghanistan today, but he would likely cut deals with Afghans willing to deal. And there are always some Afghans willing to deal. Crook would look at the forces available to him and try to use his advantages (reconnaissance and air transport.) To succeed in Afghanistan, think like Crook.
Nice catch! And that is weapon #5:
5. Remove media from the battlefield.
Excellent point that you make, and something that I hadn't considered. I think the author was saying that the Indian ponies were more mobile, which is not exactly the same thing. Mobility takes-in a range of characteristics: speed, agility, range, endurance, etc. Guderian made the point that the engines of his tanks were as important as it's main armament.
A technique resurrected by Merrill's Marauders in the C-B-I Theater of WW2.
BTW... The Taliban has recently said it would not conduct major operations this winter. Taliban forces had previously vowed to fight THROUGH the winter this year... and it was widely reported by our DBM. Unfortunately... the DBM fails to point out this pertinent reversal to its readers.
Maybe it should be pacify the ones who want to be pacified- but don't waste
any time trying to convince them to want to be pacified.
I saw the movie version of A Distant Trumpet in 1965 and thoought it was one of the better oaters.
We defeated Islamic extremists in the Moro War (see #7), even though it took a long time. Although almost forgotten, the Moro War, which lasted from 1902 to 1917, was America's longest.
Pro-Indian punditry came late in the Indian wars, with the publication of Helen Hunt Jackson's books A Century of Dishonor (1881) and Ramona (1884). However, unlike the leftist pundits who take the side of our enemies today, she was primarily arguing for better treatment of the Indians.
I don't think this pessimism and defeatism belongs to the public at large. There is an anxiety present there, to be sure, and the corrupt media have translated that into pessimism to advance their left-wing masters into power.
That pessimism isn't based on reason, so it probably won't respond to reason. No amount of heads -- including that of Osama bin Laden himself -- is going to sway the liberal propaganda machine from its intended purpose: the betrayal of America.
We MUST NOT win this war!
Malamute?
Oh.
When you decide to attack their encampment... you will find their 'herd' nearby. One would also concur that in battles initiated by hostiles... additional mounts would be brought along if only to compensate for attrition.
I wonder if the logic breaks down here:Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics.The American Indian knew they were outnumbered by the white population. "White man is like the buffalo -- endless numbers".
The Islamist believes Muslims outnumber (or soon shall, "god" willing)the Infidels. They will fight on.
No strategy will defeat the Islamists. All we can do is hope to manage them. Even a "scorched earth", "glass parking lot" policy won't defeat them. They are with us until the end times.
In the line of work I do, I have said that "I'm in this fight until the last terrorist is reduced to a puff of pink mist". And I know I'll still be saying that when I'm 89, should the Lord tarry.
Tactics is what you do with the people, equipment, and supplies you have at the point of contact with the enemy. Logistics is having people, equipment, and supplies at the point of contact with the enemy. And strategy is winning without contacting the enemy where you don't have people, equipment, and supplies.Washington won the revolution without doing much in the way of winning battles - but merely by maintaining his army in the field long enough. Which was logistics and strategy. Nathaniel Greene won his southern campaign by inducing Cornwallis to fight his war - thereby turning the logistical tables on him at the point of contact.
Grain-fed, 1200-lb. animal toting 160-lb cavalryman, 30-lb. McClellan saddle, Springfield Carbine, saddlebags, bedroll, canteen, picket-pin, etc, etc.
Grass-fed 800-lb animal toting nearly naked 160-lb Indian with loaded Winchester.
Horse feed ties the cavalry to a supply train. Horses are designed to live on grass. Horse feed is a high-energy dietary supplement that boosts their performance, but ruins their ability to thrive without it.
That should be "lose".
The stragedy that Gen. Blackjack Pershing used was to send in the "pigs". The Moros gave up enmasse. This stragedy should be used in Iraq.
I took it as meaning that a light cavalry could live off the land and could, at a marathon pace, travel a longer distance than a grain-fed cavalry could. A grain-fed cavalry would need to operate like a multistage rocket, starting out big and leaving most of your initial quantity of horses behind with enough grain to RTB.The kicker being that the grain-fed cavalry had some capability to operate in the winter, and the grass-fed cavalry did not.
If we had to fight a French Girl Scout troop today, the media would immediately label it a "quagmire reminiscent of Vietnam", declare it unwinnable, and demand that we retreat before any more American troops get cookie crumbs on their BDUs.
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