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It may be a rag but it is still widely read. This is not a reason to fire Don Rumsfeld, who is doing exactly what he's supposed to do.

I read this is coming out. I disagree with it myself but it this is an executive decision that President Bush will make. Rumsfeld was asked to reform and modernize the military and he has done a good job of it, in my opinion. Yes, there are complaints but few alternatives offered, meaning different strategies to accomplish what needed to be done. There are some long time service people who resist the move to the more advanced use of technology and a leaner, faster fighting force. For example, one thing Rumsfeld did that upset some of the old guard was to mix separate artillery, infantry and armor units into one group. The traditional separation was resisted by those who did not want change and wanted to continue the status quo. I agree with what Rumsfeld did to consolidate these three elements into one fighting division that did not have to play political games in coordinating these necessary functions used in battle. Another element that Rumsfeld changed was the inter-service coordination to make the Army, Air Force and Navy closer to decision making in the field, and away from the bureaucratic oversight and interference that made success harder to obtain.

I have not read it yet but will. My concern is this is a normal evaluation and pro versus con concerning these changes and what would be the best way to accomplish the task given to the military. Sadly, it will be used as political fodder to score points without regard to what’s best for the military and winning wars. I am sure people who are anti-military and antiwar will use this to press their viewpoints without regard to accomplishing the goals that are worthy of attaining. This biased agenda makes political articles worthless as to being helpful in continuing to field the world’s finest fighting force. The goal, in my opinion, is to have the finest fighting force we can have.

Another element that Rumsfeld changed was the inter-service coordination to make the Army, Air Force and Navy closer to decision making in the field, and away from the bureaucratic oversight and interference that made success harder to obtain

This cannot be understated. Even as recently as 2001, the military has made important improvemnts in the CAS concept and bringing forces to bear on identified threats. This process, IMO, has been assisted by closer coordination of the services. The same goes for addressing the issue of blue-on-blue fires.

Great post Morgan! and spont on!

Terrific post here, and it points out why GW does not run the war based on political polls, popularity contests or the latest BS blowing in the wind.

He makes rational decisions(after consulting with his generals) for the welfare of the country, something the rats couldn't do if their lives depended on it. And a major reason why they should never get any power anywhere!! They simply don't know what to do without taking a poll.Bubba proved that time and time again.

OK, while I agree that change of our battlefield posture is necessary in fighting a war against terrorists or paramilitary forces, but do keep in mind that the military wasn't stupid until Don Rumsfeld came to town. I know you're not saying that, but we need to be careful and articulate the argument well.

The array of forces we've spent 50+ years planning against had been the grand armies of the Soviets, their mighty air forces, nuclear weapons, and global naval reach. I'll doubt you'll find any admirals or generals who thought that we couldn't also fight lesser forces then if we had to, given our might. But when the political leadership of the USA decided that, with the fall of the Soviet empire, we could get a grand "Peace dividend" by cutting our forces down appropriate to the demise of the Soviet forces arrayed against us, I was a little bit concerned.

This happened anyway. We weren't at war, the Soviets were gone, and vigorous Islamic terrorism hadn't made itself a central enemy against us, at least to the general public. I always thought that the DoD draw-down of 1990-2001 (minus the temporary 1990/1 buildup for Desert Shield/Storm--which we jokingly called "Operation Save Our Jobs" at the Pentagon) was short sighted. No one really gave much thought to the long term. So we just cut, closed, disbanded, shut, turned in, DRMO'd, disposed of, mustered out, and otherwise drew down from 2.1 million active duty to around 1 million by the time I retired in 1998.

I wondered about the Chinese. I wondered about the Indians. What could a untied through a Castro-like dictator South America do? What about a reinvigorated Iran and Iraq? Or a united Europe? A reborn Russia? No one really saw any of that as a short term threat, but not planning for them would be folly. In any case, our peacekeeping, nation-building missions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia kept those who remained busy. Operations over Iraq in 1998 and Serbia in 1999 expended all the major smart weapons we had! What if we had to go to war against China then? We'd have been hard pressed.

After Bush became president things looked up. Rumsfeld started working on his lighter, faster, more mobile force plan. Most of the admirals and generals thought this was a good idea, but there were also plans to take another look at our large-array forces and for long term, build nurture, and plan them for rapid deployment if needed. The attacks on 9/11 changed all that. After our lightening attack on Afghanistan, advocates of lighter, faster got more ear time. The shock and awe over Iraq helped that cause, too. Since then, our GWOT has been low conflict, anti-insurgency operations. So much that the Air Force has been volunteering airmen to do convoy duty in Iraq. Now that is great, and I'm proud of these boys (and girls) but this is really not the mission of the Air Force. They'll never have the training and legacy of an infantry force like the Army or Marines. But this is happening because the other services are stretched and the Air Force wants to do its part.

We still need to remember that China is out there, and Russia becomes more and more an adversary every day. After some time we'll probably have to re-mobilize, re-plan and re-equip large scale forces again. That'll be hard to do if we go too far over to the lighter, faster model. I sometimes wonder if Rumsfeld plan takes that into consideration. I've seen the arguments I've made poo-poo'ed a little too much for comfort by those in the Rumsfeld camp.

Portion of your post #239:

"I read this is coming out. I disagree with it myself but it this is an executive decision that President Bush will make. Rumsfeld was asked to reform and modernize the military and he has done a good job of it, in my opinion. Yes, there are complaints but few alternatives offered, meaning different strategies to accomplish what needed to be done. There are some long time service people who resist the move to the more advanced use of technology and a leaner, faster fighting force. For example, one thing Rumsfeld did that upset some of the old guard was to mix separate artillery, infantry and armor units into one group. The traditional separation was resisted by those who did not want change and wanted to continue the status quo. I agree with what Rumsfeld did to consolidate these three elements into one fighting division that did not have to play political games in coordinating these necessary functions used in battle. Another element that Rumsfeld changed was the inter-service coordination to make the Army, Air Force and Navy closer to decision making in the field, and away from the bureaucratic oversight and interference that made success harder to obtain."

You have some good thoughts on this. What do you think will happen to the transformation movement? Thanks!