[Fred Nerks]

http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/winep/policy_2003/2003_791/


New Evidence of Wider Threats from Lebanon's Asbat al-Ansar

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy



The Australian Connection

One of the linchpins that ties al-Qaeda, Asbat al-Ansar, and the Tripoli Cell together is Bilal Khazal, an Australian citizen of Lebanese origin. Also known as Abu Suhaib, Khazal is head of Australia's "Islamic Youth Movement" (Ash-Shabab al-Islami), a small but influential group of perhaps 150 members that is suspected of recruiting Islamic radicals. Since 1994, the organization has published a radical Salafist magazine called Nidaa ul-Islam (call of Islam).

According to the Lebanon Daily Star and al-Hayat, Khazal is also a direct financier of Asbat and other radical factions inside Ein al-Hilweh. For example, one member of the Tripoli Cell told a Beirut military court last week that the cell's leader, Mohammed Ka'aki, received at least $1,800 from Khazal. Recent Australian press reports indicate that Khazal has been friends with Ka'aki since the late 1990s, and that Khazal's brother, Maher, met with Ka'aki during the same period to discuss financing for terrorist operations in Lebanon. Beirut issued a warrant for Khazal's arrest in June 2003.

Khazal is known to have other ties to al-Qaeda. Australian authorities have been suspicious of his activities for nearly five years. He is thought to be the organizer of an illegal weapons training camp uncovered in Australia in August 2000. According to the Lebanese daily an-Nahar, authorities searched his home just before the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, and in 2001, authorities confiscated his passport based on suspicions that he was linked to al-Qaeda. Australian authorities now indicate that Khazal is closely linked to Mahmoud Habib, an Australian national currently held at Guantanamo Bay.

According to a 2002 CIA document, "the al-Qaeda leadership has allegedly delegated responsibility" to Khazal. The document cited uncorroborated intelligence that he was planning attacks against U.S. targets in the Philippines and Venezuela. The document also claimed that Khazal "was in Afghanistan in 1998, where he was affiliated with Ayman al-Zawahiri and Usama bin Laden." Other reports suggest that Khazal has met repeatedly with Abu Qatada, a London-based radical cleric who was initially detained under Britain's antiterrorism laws and who now faces extradition to Spain after formal charges were placed against him in September for allegedly participating in al-Qaeda.

[USF]

>Thanks Fred... the last few posts re the "former Quantas baggage handler" Bilal Khazal/Khazzal are very troubling.

I travel quite a bit at times and (without going into detail in public - at times like this I wish I could, but common sense tells me otherwise) have always observed not only glaring lapses in security, and several patterns of behavior that can be expolited to get around aspects of security at some of the worlds major airports, but also how sleeper RoP cells could easily exploit some of the many access points to both aircraft, and the passengers (enabling them to hand off items within "secure" zones).

It's not the first time RoPers with airside access have been arrested or declined access to the aircraft recently. In the last year alone, there were reports of the arrest of a RoPer (Amin Asmin Tariq) airport worker with "all areas pass" at Heathrow during the liquid bomb plot, RoP baggage handlers in Paris have come under scrutiny, and reported incidences like this will only be the tip of the iceberg.

Security is only as strong as its weakest link and often that can come down to one individual... and it seems just about any focused terrorist group can still quite easily plant sleepers within the system, biding their time until the day they are activated to "do their duty."

We need to remember the original Bojinka plot... it was never intended to be a mass suicide mission. KSA et al, may have evolved it into 9/11 because they had expendable assets in place who needed to be used and others have been revisiting and tinkering with Bojinka's original details over the last year or so, but in my mind, and surely in theirs too, Bojinka is still very "do able" despite recent additions to security.

It's not a comforting thought each time you climb to 37,000 feet in an aluminum tube, but who wants to listen, never mind act...