The Telegraph (UK)
(Filed: 16/10/2006)
If you want to engage in gunboat diplomacy, it helps to have some gunboats. Britain has been in the vanguard of those pressing for sanctions on North Korea after its detonation of a nuclear device.
Now that the UN Security Council has authorised those sanctions, it falls to us to assist in their enforcement in any way we can, in particular via a blockade of North Korean trade.
But, just as the Army has been starved of the resources to do its job in Iraq and Afghanistan, so there are serious question marks over whether the Navy is equipped for this task.
Since Labour came to power in 1997, the Navy has lost a third of its ships. We should be able to rustle up a couple of frigates or destroyers, a submarine, even an aircraft carrier.
But as the Sea Harrier was withdrawn from service earlier this year, and its replacement does not arrive until 2013, those ships will be defenceless against missile fire.
Unless our fleet shelters under the protection of the French or the Americans, its air defences are pitiful; were the Falklands crisis to recur today, our task force would be sunk before ever sighting Port Stanley.
The threat of North Korea's missiles is not the only reason for trepidation. Even if Kim Jong-il accepts the presence of foreign vessels off his coast, it is easy to imagine a situation in which a misunderstanding or accident could spark an exchange of fire that escalates irreversibly.
The incident need not even involve North Korea: to have a Japanese and American fleet in its waters is the stuff of nightmares for China. Nor is the success of sanctions assured even if the naval operation works.
Is China able or willing to seal its vast border with the country? What will be done if, for example, an Iranian 747 flies into Pyongyang? Will Mr Kim, a leader happy to accept the starvation of millions of his own people, be especially touched by their suffering if his stockpiles of lobster and cognac remain intact?
Also, keeping ships on station and on alert is an expensive business; the temptation for an intervention force to sail back to port after winning a few token concessions will be great.
But the ships must still be sent – and British vessels must, if called for, be among them. We cannot have a repeat of the Lebanese situation, when fine words at the United Nations translated into embarrassingly low troop commitments.
Containing Mr Kim is not just about making sure that North Korea does not destabilise the international scene any further. It is about ensuring that other nations that might be tempted into nuclear adventurism see that there is effective punishment for defying the international order.
The lessons of North Korea will be learnt across the globe – in Malaysia and Indonesia, in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and, above all, in Iran. As a result, dealing with Mr Kim will be one of the most vital – and delicate – diplomatic and military tasks of the coming years. It will be a disgrace if Labour's neglect of our Armed Forces renders us unable to play our part.
I would think the United Kingdom learned in 1941 that is was folly to go screwing around in Asian water without air-cover. With out the Harrier or other interceptor A/C ther Royal Navy is worthless on the sea frontier. The Falkland's War proved this. To this observer, Britain seems to be happy with a part time Navy.
Folks, Western Europe is a military shell of its former self and we're only seeing the beginning of its military erosion (see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6120659,00.html).
It's time for us to wake up to the reality and realize we're on our own.