I have some questions and observations on the LCS program and the Navy’s strategy.
In addition to the Philippines Islands as a locus of operation, the Navy apparently plans to operate these LCSs in potentially hostile waters which could include Communist China.
With the sophisticated anti-access/denial-access weapons in their possession, or soon in their possession, of the Chi-Coms, what chance do the LCSs have in this very hostile surface environment? In addition, the Chi-Coms have the Shakval homing torpedoes which travel close to 300 MPH for short distances (1,000 or so yards?). Finally, with the advances in anti-ship missiles (e.g., the Israeli ship was hit with one off Lebanon and remember the Falklands War) how can they even get into the littorals?
The missions assigned the LCS’s overlap and take away missions from the SSNs. How can the LCS possible compete with the SSNs on ISR missions, anti-sub missions and anti-mine missions? This is currently an unproven, and untested (and largely undeveloped) LCS program. The program dollars cut back from the highly proven VA class SSN construction program appear to closely match the program dollars being absorbed by the LCS program and related modules (also undeveloped).
What can be done to re-review this program decision and likely mission misjudgment? It perhaps also brings a great risk to national security as well as a great risk to the dedicated sailors who will man the LCSs?
The Russians/Soviets were very respectful of our SSNs and the Chi-Coms should be very respectful of our SSNs or they will pay a great price. I can not now see how the Chi-coms will be fearful of the LCSs compared to our SSNs. Meanwhile the Chi-Coms are building subs galore and buying Russian subs galore. Six shipyards are dedicated to this sub construction effort in Russia and China. Mothballed Russian Kilos (like brand new) were sold to North Korea (50) and many were also sold to China. Also, Russian subs are being refurbished for sale to China. China is planning to have 150 to 200 submarines in the next 15 years or so; they have 80 to 100 now but I do not know their condition. They are planning to use the older subs as sacrificial decoys against our SSNs; what a great mission for these poor submariners. Our Navy is planning 48 or less SSNs.
China has SSBNs that can hit 250 to 500 U.S. cities with MIRV ICBMs. Guess who gets to go after them and has to keep track of them just like the Soviet SSBNs? The Soviets were so afraid of our SSNs that they set up a bastion strategy under the polar ice where a Typhoon SSBN was surrounded by their SSNs to give it time to fire its missiles.
Both Russia and China believe submarines will win the next world war as aircraft carriers and their air arms won WW II in the Pacific. What do the Chinese and Russian know that we do not? What page are our war planners on? Don’t we need a two war capability with the Russians and Chinese working together? What page is the Navy on? Please enlighten me on these issues?
When confined to those missions, and with the necessary air and surface support our CSGs and SAGs will offer from further out to sea, they will do very well. It is not a mis-managed or mistaken mission. It is one that is needed and that these vessels, IMHO, will perform aptly.
Now, my biggest concern is our overall force structure. If the 50-60 necessary LCS vessels are simply a part of a 320 ship Navy, then we are, IMHO, going to be in trouble. I believe we need to build back to the 600 ship Navy of the Reagan era. 14 Carrier battle groups. 14 Phibrons, and all the necccessary cruisers, destroyers, attack subs, and logistic vessels to support them.
Instead, what we are seeing is a continuation and projection of a view that major surface or strike at sea warfare is somehow very unlikely or a thing of the past. This is a huge mistake, and someone better inform the Chinese in particular, as well as the Russians and others...because those people are building up for that very type of warfare at in the blue water, as well as the litoral areas.