Special Report: New North Korean Preparations Likely Just for Show
SummaryNo sooner had the dust cleared from North Korea's first nuclear test Oct. 9 than speculation emerged about a second test. Although the North Koreans probably are capable of carrying out another test, Pyongyang can get almost as much political mileage by merely faking preparations for a second test.
Analysis
Within hours of North Korea's nuclear test Oct. 9, the head of Seoul's National Intelligence Service, Kim Seung Gyu, told South Korea's parliament that Pyongyang might be preparing a follow-on nuclear test at its Ponggye site in the country's northeast. Kim said increased activity, vehicles and personnel have been observed at the site, which was originally believed to be where the first North Korean nuclear test would take place.
The North's Oct. 9 test, now believed to have taken place in the Hwadae area, was about a 4.2 on the Richter scale, which would be consistent with more than 1,000 tons of high explosives, or one kiloton. Other estimates have put the blast at around 550 tons of high explosives. In either case, the blast was very small compared to past and current nuclear weapons.
A second nuclear test certainly is within North Korea's capabilities. It is widely believed that Pyongyang possesses six to eight nuclear devices and material enough to produce a few more.
The relatively small explosive yield of the test suggests that the North Korean device failed to function properly, though it could also mean that the North Koreans wanted to test their design on a smaller scale before conducting a full-scale test. If that is the case, Pyongyang, now confident in the effectiveness of its device, could be preparing a full-effect test.
The preparations at Ponggye cited by Kim, however, could be just for show. North Korea might be seeking to capitalize politically on the first test by making the world think a second test is imminent. This would be useful for keeping those countries that are most concerned with its nuclear capabilities -- the United States, Japan, South Korea and China -- off balance. With elections set for 2007 in South Korea and U.S. midterm elections only weeks away, the political magnitude of the North's test might exceed what was actually measured on the Richter scale.
This behavior is consistent with Pyongyang's strategy in dealing with the United States, Japan, South Korea and China, part of which is delaying a solution to the nuclear crisis for as long as possible. Keeping these countries off balance and jittery over the possibility of another test prevents them from acting decisively. The indecision keeps them from being unified in their response, and the resulting lack of unity gives North Korea time and leverage.
North Korea's intent with its first nuclear test was to shock the world and demonstrate that it has the will and capability to carry out its threats. That was accomplished. From Pyongyang's perspective, there is little need for a second test. Just about the only reason the North Koreans would have for conducting a second test is that they have constructed two types of nuclear devices -- plutonium and uranium -- and want to test them both. Given their meager resources, the North Koreans are not likely to waste material to carry out two explosions of the same type.
In this sense, the preparations at Ponggye are similar to the activity at North Korea's missile test sites in the days and weeks following the July 4 test launch of the Taepodong-2 missile. After the test launch, a second Taepodong-2 was set up in plain view of U.S. reconnaissance satellites. The speculation about follow-on launches that followed caused the same kind of political tension that Pyongyang is hoping to foster now. About a month later, the North Koreans took the missile down.